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INTRODUCTION 
The world financial crisis of 2007-2009 commenced with adverse dynamics of 
key macroeconomic indicators in transition economies as well as the developed ones, 
including developing economies. However, the impact of global crisis is not 
homogeneous on different countries.   
Particularly, among the countries that were most affected by the crisis are those 
that alongside with drastic decrease in foreign investments inflow, life standards 
aggravation and social production decline suffered dramatic national currency 
depreciation. These countries are primarily countries of Southern America, Baltic 
States, African countries as well as some European states. The most illustrative and 
unexpected example is served by Iceland, with its national currency having lost half 
its value in the course of the crisis (judging by the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 
Index). 
At the same time, other countries, such as France, managed to maintain their 
financial system sustainability, although the global crisis aftermath is evident in their 
decreased GDP and increased prices.  
The study of monetary policy in the respective countries alongside with the 
analysis of financial and economic premise of their relatively high financial 
sustainability constitutes a potential source of deeper insight into the essence of 
current crisis and post-crisis phenomena and, respectively, the basis for development 
and substantiation study of a more perfect and universal system of prevention and 
counteraction against permanent economic stagnation. 
Apart from the above, it should be mentioned that the current financial crisis has 
caused unprecedented need to reconsider topical approaches toward risk evaluation 
and management on the macroeconomics level as well as microeconomics one. 
Therein an optimal insurance of national economy against abrupt drying up of foreign 
capital inflow and other crisis aftermaths, which can be achieved through 
implementation of gold and foreign currency reserves management and control over 
public debt dynamics, is becoming an urgent issue.  
Thus, the urgency of this research can be described by the following: 
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 comprehensive comparative analysis of dynamics of key macroeconomic 
indicators for a wide range of countries before crisis, in crisis and after crisis with the 
view to detect premise that increase vulnerability of a country’s financial system 
amidst global financial instability;  
 systematization of experience of macroeconomic regulation in different 
countries in accordance with the level and nature of their involvement in global crisis; 
 stating parameters that determine management of gold and foreign currency 
reserves and public debt in such a way as to take into account probability of crisis 
emergence (e.g. the risk of unexpected suspension of foreign investments inflow, 
etc.).  
Correspondingly, the aim of the research is to analyze international practice of 
monetary regulation aimed at retaining stability of national currency, deduction of 
general regularities of crisis approximation prerequisites and calculation of gold and 
foreign currency reserves optimal level for Ukrainian financial system subject to 
crisis emergence probability.  
In order to achieve the aforementioned aim, the following main tasks should be 
expounded: 
 to carry out a thorough research on macro-financial plight within sampling 
of 10 countries most affected and 10 countries least affected by the crises basing on 
the system of representative macroeconomic data.; 
 to single out and analyze key characteristics indicating approximation an 
and aggravation of crises and leading to a substantial depreciation of national 
currencies of the selected countries; 
 to group the countries according to nature of economic processes in pre-
crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods; 
 to determine timetables of crisis course in every country of the selected 
ones on the basis of crisis indicators, including the Foreign Exchange Market 
Pressure Index; 
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 to figure out the gold and foreign currency reserves optimal level for 
Ukraine subject to  crisis emergence probability.  
The methods of the research are  methods of Economics and Economic 
Analysis,  Probability theory and Mathstatistics, Econometrics methods and models, 
in particular probability models, vector- autoregressive models and etc.   
The findings of the research can be used to analzye and substantiate exchange 
rate policу, to improve prediction-analytical methods, used for long-term calculations 
of macroeconomic data and currency-exchange-rate politics indicators..  
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PART 1. COMPERATIVE ANALYSIS OF MACROECONOMIC DATA 
DYNAMICS IN PRE-CRISIS, CRISIS (2007-2009) AND POST-CRISIS (2010) 
PERIODS 
1.1 General tendencies of world financial crisis 2007-2009 and the 
peculiarities of the early stage diagnostics of world’s financial crisis 
tendencies’ development  
 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 is considered the most vigorous 
financial crisis since the Great Depression. The years 2001-2006 provided most 
favorable conditions for the development of one of the biggest speculative “bubbles’’ 
in the history of humanity, the burst of which gave way to the global crisis. The thick 
of the events was the real-estate market in the USA, which due to unprecedented 
availability of lending was growing at a very high rate in the course of years 2001-
2006. The inflow of foreign capital to the USA from Asian countries with actively 
developing markets and the OPEC-countries combined with low interest rates in the 
USA within years 2002-2004 created prerequisites for “bubbles” emergence on real-
estate markets and credit markets, thus promoting debt financing of consumption. 
Thus, the number of households with a personal house increased from 64% in 1994 to  
69,2% (the highest level) in 2004 [5]. The practice of subprime loans promoted the 
increase in the homeowners’ quota, which in turn bulled housing prices. In the course 
of 1980-2001 average price of an American house exceeded annual average 
household income in 2,9 times, and in 2006 this ratio climbed to 4,6. The boost in 
prices fostered considerable speculations of the owners with mortgages. With the cost 
of housing rising, the owners used to refund their houses at lower rates or receive 
consumer credits collateralized by the increase in housing price exceeding that of a 
mortgage value. As the result, households were saving less and consuming more at 
the expense of credits extension. The USA households debt grew from 705 billion 
dollars in 1974, amounting to 60% of the then annual household income to 14,5 
trillion dollars in the middle of 2008, otherwise 134% of the available income. The 
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gross increase in households’ consumption resulting from value added of the 
housing since 2001 till 2005 is estimated at 5 trillion dollars. [21]. 
 The increase in credits volume and in prices on real estate market caused the 
boom on development market. With interest rates having increased in 2006, credits 
availability decreased and a huge surplus of unplaced houses emerged. As a result, 
housing prices reached their high in the second six months of 2006 and headed 
downward. Credit availability in the previous years and confidence in the further 
increase in housing prices has motivated many borrowers to take out mortgage credits 
at adjustable rate (“adjustable-rate mortgages”). Such mortgage credits enabled 
borrowers to pay low interest within the determined period of time, which was 
succeeded by a period of higher interest. Such mortgage credits were usually taken 
out by low-income families and as a result, 80% of mortgage credits classified as 
subprime were “adjustable-rate mortgages” [12]. Borrowers that could not afford to 
pay higher interest, when the grace period ran out, tried to refund their mortgage 
credits. When housing prices began to decrease and the interest began to increase, the 
refunding became practically impossible and a lot of borrowers were forced to 
declare bankruptcy.  Borrowers’ houses passed into ownership of the banks who put 
them up for sale, as the result housing prices were plummeting and more and more 
borrowers were refusing to pay interest. The decrease in mortgage interest payments 
also wrote down the value of “mortgage-backed securities”, thus aggravating 
financial plight of banks. This cycle was self-energizing process and was in the thick 
of crisis on real-estate market in the USA. From mid 2006 till September of 2008 the 
housing market prices plummeted by more than 20%. As a result houses of 
approximately 12 million borrowers cost less than mortgage on them by the end of 
2008. Such owners had a direct financial interest in giving up mortgages and 
transferring the house into bank’s ownership, which an owner is entitled to according 
to the USA legislation. In the wake of mass bankruptcies a surplus of 4 million 
unplaced houses emerged on the market thus bringing prices down, undermining 
creditworthiness of borrowers and aggravating balance sheet statements of financial 
institutions [2].  
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Many factors fostered growth of this “bubble”, among them are the following: 
gradual reduction in interest rates by Federal Reserve System within years 2000-
2003, which created more favorable crediting conditions for general public and  
opened access to credit resources for commercial banks; financial market 
deregulation, invoking the emergence of the so called “shadow banking system”, 
excessive leverage of the commercial banks [30]; financial innovation on mortgage 
market manifested itself in practice of adjustable-rate mortgages, high-risk mortgages 
to borrowers with low creditworthiness (“subprime” class),  overall crediting 
standards decrease; substantial owners’ gambling on increasing housing prices which 
provoked further big price rises; growing of practice of securitization, usage of 
mortgage-backed securities, the value of which was based on borrowers’ interest 
payments; overstatement of MBS’s credit ratings by rating agencies and etc [7].  
A particular emphasis should be made on development of securitization and 
“shadow banking system”, without which the crisis in the USA would not have 
acquired its present scope and would have been unlikely to grow into global financial 
crisis. During the boom, the amount of transactions with mortgage-backed securities  
on real estate and credit markets was growing rapidly. The mortgage-backed security 
is a bond entitling its holder to receive interest payments from mortgages. Whereas 
traditional mortgage scheme involved a bank that granted a credit to the borrower and 
assumed risk of a default on it, popularization of securitization has changed this 
scheme. Banks used to issue mortgages to general public and then to sell these 
mortgages to investment banks and other financial intermediaries, which used to pack 
them in pulls and issue securities backed by cash flows from mortgages, packed in 
this pull. Thus, substantial part of credit risk was transferred to investors buying these 
securities, and it enabled banks to renovate their financial resources and give out 
more credits. Firstly, it spawned a problem of malpractice, since banks had incentives 
to issue more loans but didn’t have enough incentives to guarantee their high quality. 
Secondly, it was development of securitization that enabled investors from all over 
the world to invest in the USA real estate market. As a result of the above, the overall 
volume of mortgage-backed securities almost tripled since 1996 to 2007 and 
amounted to 7,3 trillion dollars. The percentage of mortgages of subprime class, that 
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had been securitized, grew from 54% in 2001 to 75% in 2006. American households 
and corporations owned approximately 25 trillion dollars in debts as of 2008.  
American banks held approximately 8 trillion dollars from this sum on their balance 
sheets as traditional mortgages. The owners of bonds amounted to another 7 trillion. 
The remaining 10 trillion were provided by securitization markets. [10].  
This development of securitization was, in turn, induced by “shadow banking 
system”, that flourished in the USA since 2001 till 2008 and its role in issuing loans 
was not less than that of traditional banks. The “shadow banking system” does not 
accept loans from general public and thus it is not an object of standard supervision 
over banking system. Prominent representatives of the “shadow banking system” are 
hedge-funds, investment banks, money market funds, structured investment vehicles 
and special purpose entities. All these institutions of “shadow banking system” 
virtually performed functions of banks, such as borrowing funds on money markets 
of short-term capital and investing them in long-term assets, as well as mortgage 
credits and mortgage-backed securities. At the same time, these financial institutions 
didn’t meet the requirements to become an object of supervision over bank capital 
adequacy, and thus afforded to sustain higher levels of financial leverage. In the 
course of years preceding the crisis, four largest commercial banks of the USA 
transferred about 5,2 trillion dollars of their assets and liabilities value into special 
purpose entities and other institutions of “shadow financial system”. It enabled them 
to evade capital adequacy requirements of those times and increase leverage and 
profit during the boom, and at the same time increase losses during the bust. Total 
amount of capital of the “shadow banking system” equaled approximately 10 trillion 
dollars of capital of the USA banking system at the beginning of 2007. Assets of five 
largest investment banks amounted to 4 trillion dollars and the amount of assets 
funded through repurchase operations on the open market equaled 2,5 trillion dollars. 
So, investment banks depended directly on money market conditions, since they were 
made to constantly refinance their liabilities. This circumstance together with high 
leverage undoubtedly made the system vulnerable to abrupt shocks on credit market 
[18]. 
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Apart from the above, in the course of years 1998-2008, Credit Default 
Swaps market, derivatives markets used to protect owners of bonds against default 
risk were growing at high pace. Deregulation of this market and the possibility to 
conclude transactions irrespective of the fact of ownership of basic assets invoked 
increased speculations. Actually, credit default swaps enabled gamblers to bet on the 
very same securities more than once, as long as sellers or buyers of these contracts 
could be found. This all provoked excessive growth of credit default swaps market, 
the size of which increased 100 times in the course of years 1998-2008. According to 
different estimates, as of November 2008, the amount of liabilities, insured by credit 
default swaps equaled from 33 to 47 trillion US dollars. [24].  
Since February 2007, in the wake of increasing defaults on mortgage credits, 
securities prices began to sink, the price of mortgage-backed securities also sagged – 
the crisis was spreading from local real estate market in the USA to financial market 
and to global one. Banks were resorting to mass write-offs of securities backed by 
mortgages, mass shutdowns and acquisitions of financial companies servicing 
mortgage market were taking place.   The crisis caused panic on financial markets in 
2007 and urged investors to take funds out of risky mortgage-backed securities and 
invest them in world raw materials markets. Gambling on futures on raw materials 
markets invoked rise in world prices on agricultural products and oil. 
As of August 2008 року, financial institutions throughout the world incurred 
losses of 501 billion US dollars resulting from write-offs of mortgage-backed 
securities’ value by banks. These losses undermined world banking system lending 
capacity. This effect was felt particularly adversely by banks in countries, which had 
introduced the “Basel” system of banking system regulation, since they were made to 
abide by the rules of maximal leverage level and therefore to cut down the number of 
loans issued to businesses and households. [18]. 
When Lehman Brothers and other prominent financial institutions of the USA 
went bankrupt in September 2008 року, the crisis reached its critical stage – mutual 
money market funds followed in the fate of banks. Withdrawal of capital from money 
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markets of the USA amounted to 144,5 billion dollars within one week compared to 
7,1 billion dollars the week before. [23].  
Such drastic outflow of funds from money markets can be explained by the 
inability of investors to make reasonable judgment of the situation. On the one hand, 
dispensing of risks through securitization made it difficult to estimate the cost of 
mortgage-backed securities adequately basing on real estate market default data. On 
the other hand, lack of public data on amount of such securities on balance sheets of 
“shadow banking system” made it practically impossible to estimate risks of every 
particular financial institution. Joseph Stiglitz summed up the role of credit default 
swaps in unfolding of systemic crises: “With such intricate system of rates of 
substantial value no-one could be certain in financial plight of any one else or even 
his or her own financial plight. No wonder, credit markets virtually froze” [43]. 
The Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman and the Secretary of the US Treasury 
Timothy Geithner consider this winding down of the “shadow banking system” a key 
to understanding of financial crisis. Not having the possibility to receive short-term 
financing, investment banks and other institutions of “shadow banking system” were 
not able to grant financing to corporations and firms, issuing mortgages. Thus, more 
than one third of credit mechanism was unavailable to serve as resource of financing, 
which undermined propensity of corporations to refinance their short-term liabilities. 
According to Brookings Institution data, as of June 2009 the traditional banking 
system lacked necessary capital to compensate for this shortage in crediting.  Money 
market freeze, which was key source of credits for banks and non-financial 
corporations, threatened to cause collapse of global financial system. [30, 18]. 
Responses from Federal Reserve System, the European Central Bank and other 
central banks did not take long to appear. In the last quarter of 2008 central banks 
bought out 2,5 trillion dollars of government bonds and toxic assets of banks. This 
was the biggest injection of liquidity in credit markets in the history of humanity.    
Governments of European States and the USA also increased capital of national 
banking systems by 1,5 trillion dollars through buy-out of newly issued preference 
shares of systemic banks. 
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However, the crisis swiftly transformed into global financial and economic 
ones, resulting in bankruptcies of many European banks, stock exchange indices 
slump, dramatic decrease in market price of shares and prices of raw materials. Rapid 
spread of the crisis was fostered by the fact that investment banks and institutional 
investors throughout the world kept considerable amount of mortgage-backed 
securities. Moreover, a widespread use of credit default swaps enhanced bonds 
among international financial institutions. Thus, bank losses led to deleveraging 
process and aggravation of credit terms for real economy, which kept escalating 
solvency crisis and foreign trade decline. According to the IMF estimates, big banks 
in the USA and Europe incurred losses of more than 1 trillion US dollars due to bad 
assets write-offs since the beginning of 2007 until September 2009. Total losses may 
amount to 4 trillions US dollars, according to the IMF forecasts. [25]. 
Stock markets’ collapse had grave consequences on world financial system. 
Since the beginning of 2008 until October 2008 shareholders of US corporations 
sustained losses of approximately 8 trillion US dollars, with 40% of these losses 
being sustained by foreign investors. [47]. Resulting from stock and real estate 
markets’ collapse the total welfare of US households decreased by 14 trillion US 
dollars in comparison to its peak value in the second quarter of 2007. In the wake of  
landslide of prices for real estate, another source of increase in total consumption of 
US households dwindled, whereas its pre-crisis input amounted to 5 trillion US 
dollars, namely it is use of real estate value increase to finance consumption 
expenditures. According to Brookings Institution, consumtion growth in the USA 
amounted to more than one third of world consumption growth in the course of years 
2000-2007 рр.  This consumption was primarily financed through the inflow of 
capitals from Asian countries and the OPEC countries, which were transformed into 
consumption and mortgage credits for general public by banking system. The rest of 
the world virtually depended on the USA as the prime source of world demand. With 
the beginning of recession in the USA and increase in savings’ quota, the GDP 
growth rates’ decrease was well felt in other countries as well. In the first quarter of 
2009, the GDP decreased by 14,4% in Germany, 15,2% in Japan, 7,4% in Great 
Britain and 9,8% in Euro zone (annual estimate). 
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Heavy economic losses were incurred by developing countries. In the course 
of years 2003-2007 рр., these countries experienced economic boom: the GDP 
growth rate amounted on average to 7% per annum. Among four factors prerequisite 
to such growth were the following: accessibility of capital, high prices on raw 
materials and considerable flows of transfer payments. The first two factors coincided 
in 1970s, however the simultaneous influence of the three factors had taken place for 
the first time. The fourth factor, substantially influencing international trade and 
prices for raw materials, was an economic growth of Asian economies and, in 
particular, China. These conditions changed with the beginning of crisis in the middle 
of 2007. However, prices on raw materials kept climbing for a year after the crises 
had begun. This factor together with high levels of international reserves caused 
influx of capital to countries with developing markets even after the crisis on the US 
stock market had broken off. [22]. 
Crisis in developing countries was triggered by U-turn of positive tendencies 
taking place within the boom period, namely drastic increase of transfer payments, 
capital influx and trade enhancement. 
Slowdown of transfer increase rates was taking place in 2007, primarily in Latin 
American and East European countries as the result of real estate market freeze in the 
USA and Europe. Although absolute slump of transfers was quite rare, its growth rate 
had slowed down dramatically.  
One of the key channels of crisis transfer from developed countries to the 
developing ones was the channel of capital flows. Negative effects manifested 
themselves in the volumes of these flows as well as in the cost of capital.  
As far as volume of capital flows is concerned, it had reached its peak since 
2006 until 2007. After certain slowdown in the third quarter of 2007, in consequence 
of the crisis on the US equity market, it recovered in 2008 but then plummeted again 
since the third quarter of 2008 and turned out to be negative for some countries.  
As far as financing cost is concerned, even though spreads of developing 
countries’ bonds had grown since the middle of 2007, this effect was considerably 
smoothed over by interest rates decrease in developed countries and as the result, 
financing cost had not increased substantially. Only since June 2008, financing cost 
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had started to increase and virtually exploded in mid September 2008, in 
consequence of financial crisis unfolding.   
Such dynamics of capital flows volume and their cost was the key mechanism of 
crisis transfer from equity markets in developed economies to those in developing 
ones.  This channel of transfer of global financial crisis was more significant for 
countries with developing markets than for low-income countries, since the first ones 
were quite deeply integrated in international capital markets. Transition economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe were most badly affected by the crisis, since combination 
of negative expectations resulting from substantial current accounts deficits and their 
financial systems’ vulnerability lead to immediate outflow of capital. U-turn of 
portfolio investments in East and South Asia was also drastic and in some cases 
rather unexpected. In particular, according to the Institute of International Finance, 
investors withdrew 45 billion dollars from South Korea only in 2008. Such countries 
as India and Taiwan also faced portfolio investments withdrawal. Major problems in 
Latin America, Brazil and Mexico were caused by the halt of “carry-trade” hedge 
strategy, which is investment of excessive liquidity of currency with low interest rates 
in assets in currencies of countries with higher profitability [16].  
From the point of view of categories of capital flows, the most negative factors 
for developing countries was gap between issuing of bonds in the end of 2008 and 
considerable decrease in volume of interbank crediting. Both phenomena were a part 
of overall decrease in world crediting volume. According to the estimates of the 
Institute of International Finance, the volume of bank crediting at the developing 
markets decreased from its peak value of 410 billion dollars in 2007 down to 176 
billion dollars in 2008 [42]. 
Another source of problems was high level of payments for repays of credits and 
bonds of private borrowers in developing countries, which according to the estimates 
amounted to 250 billion dollars in 2009. Some countries, in particular South Korea, 
Russia and Ukraine, substantially increased amounts of short-term debts in 2007- 
2008; difficulty in refinancing of these debts posed a serious problem for their 
economies [22]. 
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Another category of problem capital flows is flows from non-bank sources, 
such as mutual funds and hedge funds. Withdrawal of capital from mutual funds in 
developed countries and the halt of “carry-trade” strategy since July 2008 resulted in 
closure of currency positions in profitable assets of developing countries and 
transition into developed countries’ currencies. This phenomenon caused depreciation 
pressure on developing countries’ exchange rates, even in the countries where current 
accounts surplus was quite substantial. 
Another key channel of crisis transfer from developed countries to developing 
ones was the trade. In the course of years 2003-2006 international trade was growing 
at an average rate of 9,3% per annum, which  was two times higher than world GDP 
growth rate (3,8%). It should be noted that trade growth rates substantially correlate 
with world GDP growth rates, thus being virtually pro-cyclical – that is why booms 
as well as recessions are enhanced. The growth rate of trading volume had decreased 
since the middle of 2007 року to 2% in September 2008 року. As early as at the end 
of 2008, the slump in international trading volume measured in absolute indeces took 
place. This slump in trading volume most significantly affected exporters of 
industrial products and services, whereas the most significant factor for raw 
materials’ exporters was landslide of prices. 
Within recent years, international economy experienced the strongest raw 
materials prices boom in the last century, which was the strongest in duration, 
intensity and goods range [20]. The boom was more explicit for raw materials , 
including oil and other energy carriers, than for agricultural goods [38]. The boom 
was caused by underfunding of these branches in previous period owing to low 
prices, rapid economic growth of developing countries, as well as huge demand of 
China for metals. There occurred the deficit on raw materials market during the 
boom, even though investments in the respective production increased substantially, 
the time lag between investments and actual increase in supply existed. Increase in 
demand for biofuel on agricultural markets was key mechanism of transmission of  
high prices for energy carriers to agricultural products prices, particularly in the 
second six month of 2007 and first six month of 2008, which was the last phase of the 
boom on agricultural products [22]. Prices rise on raw materials and agricultural 
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products in 2007-2008, according to some estimates, as well as substantial 
speculative component – investors withdrawing funds from the US mortgage markets 
invested them in more then attractive raw materials markets. [4].  
U-turn of the trend began in June 2008 for the majority of raw materials and in 
August for energy carriers, i.e. immediately before financial collapse of September 
2008. However, further global crediting freeze caused drastic landslide of prices for 
raw materials.  
Thus, the U-turn of positive tendencies existing during the boom in developing 
countries lead to crisis, particularly in foreign debt and exchange rate spheres. [32]. 
Analysis of financial crises and attempts at prediction is dedicated enough 
theoretical and empirical research. If the theoretical works dealt with the crisis within 
the construction of formal mathematical models to explain their origin, in practical 
research, the focus is on search and validation of such indices and indicators that 
would enable to define and predict the financial crisis.  
It should be noted that there is no unambiguous definition of financial crisis. 
Moreover, even the definition of specific time frames that can be called financial 
crisis is a daunting task. The classical definition of the financial crisis associated with 
problematic events in the banking sector. In this classical sense, the crisis in the 
markets of assets that do not threaten the banking system are not considered financial 
crises [46]. However, most modern scholars and experts interpret the notion of 
financial crises more broadly [36]. In particular, the classification of financial crises 
from the perspective of empirical research considers three basic types of financial 
crises: banking crisis, currency crisis and the crisis in financial markets (including 
public finance crisis) [73]. 
Banking crisis characterized by massive withdrawal of deposits, leading to 
closure, nationalization or takeover of one or more banks. The signs of bank crisis 
also consider the closure, merger, nationalization, or massive state aid system-bank or 
group of banks, which initiates a series of similar events for other banks. 
A significant number of researchers believe signs of bank crisis onset cases 
of public crisis management in the banking sector, including recapitalizing banks, the 
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moratorium on withdrawal of deposits, for the general public deposit or bank 
holidays announcement [9]. 
Thus, the banking crisis manifests itself as a situation in which problems 
arising from banks, leading to considerable reduction of capital of the banking 
system, increasing the ratio of problem assets to total assets of the banking system. 
Currency crisis or balance of payments crisis manifests itself as a situation 
where the result of speculative attacks on currency, there is a sharp depreciation of 
the exchange rate, or massive central bank intervention to prevent it, leading to a 
drastic reduction of its international currency reserves. An alternative answer to the 
national bank in this situation may be raising interest rates. Thus, the value 
determined exchange rate depreciation, which can be considered an indicator of the 
currency crisis does not exist [3, 15, 35, 13, 27]. 
Crises in financial markets is the increasing volatility of prices for financial 
assets or fall, due to the change investors' expectations. The crisis of public finances 
and public debt shows a certain critical level of debt, cases of sovereign default or 
debt restructuring agreements with [11]. 
The important fact is that usually these types of crises occur simultaneously, 
so when the crisis offered by most scientists understand a set of problems in the 
financial system, which seriously affect economic activity [73]. 
The main indicators that determine the traits of economic systems of the 
world economies is the subject of extensive scientific discussions and their analysis, 
identification and substantiation devoted a significant amount of theoretical and 
empirical research. 
In theoretical research focuses on modeling of currency crises. It is possible 
to identify two main conceptual approaches: the traditional approach, based on the 
assumption that the crisis caused by negative dynamics of basic macroeconomic 
indicators, and alternative approaches, including those in which the presumed 
possibility crises samozdiysnyuyutsya and self-support. 
And systematic research work initiated currency crises P. Krugman, in which 
it was formulated the hypothesis that the main cause of currency crises is economic 
policy, namely the incompatibility of policies to support a fixed exchange rate and 
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incentive (fiscal or monetary) economic policy (monetary expansion) [29]. The 
author had constructed an economic model in which a fixed exchange rate of 
domestic credit expansion leads to a reduction in international reserves and, 
consequently, to speculative attacks on currencies. The attack instantly depletes 
reserves and forces the government abandon a fixed exchange rate policy. 
Calculations based on the proposed model show that the period before the currency 
crisis characterized by a gradual decrease in international reserves and the rapid 
growth of domestic credit relative to demand. Additionally, given that excessive 
money creation may result from the necessity of funding public sector budgetary 
imbalances (deficit) and public sector credit could also be considered indicators of 
approaching crisis. 
Subsequent research expanded the basic model of Krugman in different 
directions. For example, it was found that speculative attacks generally should 
precede the actual strengthening currency and a worsening trade balance. These 
results were obtained with models in which expansionary fiscal and credit policies 
lead to higher demand for goods export and import group (which causes a 
deterioration in the trade balance) and goods which are not included in it (which 
triggers an increase in relative prices of these goods and hence the real appreciation 
of currencies). 
Similar results were obtained with models in which expectations of future 
crisis led to an increase in nominal wages, which, in the presence of stiff price 
increases and real wages, but reduces competitiveness. 
In addition, calculations based on models in which the ambiguity was taken 
into account credit policy or loss reserves amount to which the National Bank agrees 
to support the policy indicate that domestic interest rates should increase with 
increasing probability approaching crisis. 
Thus, analysis models discussed above leads to the conclusion that the real 
exchange rate, trade or current account balance, real wages and domestic interest 
rates could be considered as leading indicators of crisis. 
Note that under the traditional approach, the gradual reduction of 
international reserves is the main reason for the fall of the fixed exchange rate. 
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However, some scholars who base their conclusions on payments for management 
models, believe that the decision to abandon support for the exchange rate may go on 
concern the central bank (CB) of the negative dynamics of key economic variables. 
So these economic variables can be useful in predicting currency crises. 
For example, Ozkinym and Sutherland, was developed and evaluated a model 
in which the central bank's objective function positively dependent on the benefits 
arising from the support of fixed exchange rate (such as enhancing the credibility of 
the central bank to reduce inflation) and negatively dependent on deviations from a 
GDP target level. In a fixed rate of growth of international interest rates leads to 
higher interest rates domestically, reducing the level of GDP, making the more costly 
for the Central Bank to maintain parity. When international interest rate exceeds a 
certain critical level, loss of retention rate exceed the benefits from it, forcing the 
central bank to refuse to support it. According to calculations by the above model, 
GDP growth and domestic and foreign interest rates may be considered a useful 
indicator of currency crisis. 
Overall, the approach is suggested by the authors in [39] empirically 
confirms that the factors that may affect the goal function of the central bank can also 
be used as indicators ahead of the currency crisis. For example, rising domestic 
interest rates, which is essential to maintain the fixed exchange rate may increase the 
cost of debt financing for the government. Thus, depending on how much weight the 
government gives a negative fiscal impact of fixed exchange rate policy, the decision 
to cease support of parity may depend on the state debt. Also, higher interest rates 
could weaken the banking system and the government may prefer to depreciation 
than the costs for maintenance and recapitalization of banks. Thus, the presence of 
banking problems (reflected in the relative prices of bank shares, the percentage of 
non-performing loans, central bank credit to commercial banks or a significant 
reduction in deposits) also may indicate an increased likelihood of crisis. In addition, 
leading indicators can be considered and political variables. 
Western scholars have recently been developed other than traditional 
approaches based on application of modern mathematical tools and shows that crises 
may develop without any noticeable changes in economic fundamentals [37]. In 
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particular, it was found that the unpredictable nature of economic policy may cause 
several simultaneously possible market equilibria and the generation of crises that 
come true as a result of the interaction of expectations. 
This result is based on the assumption that economic policy is not determined 
in advance, and responds to changes in the economy and take into account that 
economic agents forming their expectations. At the same time, expectations of 
economic agents and affect the certain parameters, which influence economic policy. 
This cycle creates the possibility of multiple equilibria and the economy can move 
from one equilibrium to another with no significant change of the values of 
fundamental parameters. Thus, the economy may be in first position, with possible 
support for a fixed rate, but the sharp decline in expectations can lead to changes in 
economic policy, which as a result will lead to a collapse of fixed exchange rate, thus 
confirming expectations of economic agents. The main conclusion from the analysis 
of such models is that the problem of finding the close link between fundamental 
variables and crises can be quite difficult, and sometimes crises can occur without 
significant changes in economic fundamentals [37]. 
Recently, the rapid development of mathematical approaches, which consider 
the effects of infection as the main causes of crises, including balance of payments 
crises. For example, Zherlahom Smettsom and proposed a model in which it was 
shown as a currency depreciation in one country leads to the depreciation of 
currencies of its trading partners who seek to avoid loss of competitiveness [19]. The 
effects of infection can also occur if investors are paying enough attention to the 
analysis of fundamental behavior of key macroeconomic indicators of countries and 
thus are not easily distinguish the riskiness of investments in different countries. If 
the present effects of infection, the crisis in one country can be an indicator of future 
crisis in the neighboring country partners. 
Thus, the analysis of different theoretical approaches to the possible 
emergence and development of financial crises (including balance of payments 
crises), to identify a list of possible indicators that determine the traits of the world 
economy, namely: 1) reduction of international reserves, 2) credit growth and public 
private sector (monetary expansion), 3) budget deficit (fiscal expansion), 4) the real 
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appreciation of the currency; 5) deterioration in the trade or current account 
balance, 6) increasing domestic interest rates, 7) fall in GDP, or deviation from trend; 
8) growth in foreign interest rate, 9) amount of total debt, 10) for problems in the 
banking sector, 10) political variables. 
Note that the problem of determining indicators of economic and financial 
crises has been a great number of not only theoretical, but empirical research, in 
particular, examined and approaches to early warning of financial crises. 
Considerable interest in models of early diagnosis of financial crises was caused by 
their distribution in 1990, especially in countries in transition. This fact has led to 
widespread discussion on the subject in economic literature.  
Detailed review of empirical research on early diagnosis and prevention of 
financial crises are in the work of Kaminsky and Reinhardt [27]. In particular, the 
work the parameters used in the analysis of currency crises in 25 empirical studies 
covering the period from 1950 to mid 1990's, covering both the developed and 
developing countries. Most studies consider once a significant number of countries 
and crises, and few focus on specific crises. 
Despite the fact that the studies are significantly different both from the 
methodological point of view, and considered a list of crises, the authors reached a 
number of general conclusions.  
Firstly, the country's vulnerability to crisis is characterized by a significant 
number of changes in economic indicators, both internal and external related to this 
country.  
Second, the authors chose indicators that showed the best results in studies 
that were statistically significant in probit-lohit regressions or behavior in which most 
episodes peredkryzovi significantly different from the control periods, or those who 
gave the most correct and least number of false signals before the crisis (in the 
methodology of signal approach "). 
As a result, the most effective performance prediction of the crisis were: 
international reserves, real exchange rate, domestic credit growth, government loans, 
domestic inflation. Just as effective indicators are: trade balance, exports, money 
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supply growth, the ratio of M2 to international reserves, real GDP growth and scope 
of the budget deficit. 
Third, the indicators relating to external debt were not effective in predicting 
currency crises. Also, contrary to expectations, the current account balance was not 
very effective indicator of financial crises. The authors explain this by saying that the 
information contained in the current account is somehow reflected in the dynamics of 
real exchange rate. 
Empirical studies of banking crises were also conducted on a similar logic. 
So in the work of Kaminsky and Reinhardt [28] the "twin crises", namely the 
simultaneous currency and banking crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart fifteen describe 
the dynamics of macroeconomic indicators for 24 months before and after crises and 
compared it with the dynamics in quiet periods. Results relating to currency crises, in 
general, confirmed previous research. With regard to banking crises, the authors 
reached the following conclusions: 
 crisis precedes the growth of money supply and interest rates (both 
loans and deposits), which indicates a high level of demand for money and credit 
resources;  
• among the balance of payments indicators peredkryzovi periods in the 
growth of exports relative to trend down, and the real exchange rate increases; 
• real GDP growth declining trend relative to about 8 months before the 
crisis and stock market index peaks at about the same time. 
These findings confirm that the banking crisis often precedes the downward 
phase of the cycle. The most effective parameters in the above study found: the 
growth of the real exchange rate, stock market index and the money multiplier and 
the real interest rate.  
Kunta Detrahiashe and made a detailed analysis of literature devoted to the 
construction of indicators, predictors of banking crises, which complement our own 
calculations [8]. 
The authors obtained the following main results:  
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• low GDP growth, high inflation and high real interest rates are strongly 
correlated with banking crises. Thus, crises tend to occur during periods of weak 
economic growth and lack of monetary control;  
• Real interest rates and international interest rate is a source of risk to the 
stability of the banking system; 
• ratio of money supply to international reserves, which shows the 
vulnerability to speculative attacks, are statistically significant in most models 
constructed, which proves that the vulnerability to currency crises increases the risks 
for the banking system;  
• high growth in loans, and significant amounts of lending to the private 
sector increase the probability of a banking crisis. Thus, countries where the banking 
sector has a significant amount of loans to the private sector more vulnerable as a 
result of uncontrolled liberalization; 
• high ratio of loans to deposits of the banking system and high ratio of total 
external debt to deposits is the risk of banking system stability;  
• interest rates on loans and deposits, as well as growth spread between rates 
on loans and deposits may indicate a growing probability of occurrence of banking 
crises; 
• With regard to institutional variables, the low GDP per capita and the 
availability of deposit insurance increase the likelihood of a banking crisis in the 
country; 
• changes in trade and exchange rate depreciation • changes in trade and 
exchange rate depreciation does not significantly affect the probability of banking 
crisis. 
Thus, after analysis of empirical studies of currency and banking crises can 
generate a list of possible indicators that define the crisis tendencies in the world 
economy: 
1. Reduced or low level of international reserves. 
2. Raising the real exchange rate. 
3. Rapid growth and significant amounts of domestic credit. 
4. Credit expansion of government. 
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5. High inflation. 
6. The worsening trade balance. 
7. Reduced exports. 
8. Broad money growth. 
9. The growth of the money multiplier. 
10. Increasing the ratio of M2 to international reserves. 
11. Reduced growth rate of real GDP. 
12. A significant budget deficit. 
13. Growth of real interest rates on loans and on deposits. 
14. Growth spread between rates on loans and on deposits. 
15. Falling stock index. 
16. Growing international interest rate. 
17. High ratio of loans to deposits of the banking system. 
18. High ratio of total external debt to deposits of the banking system. 
Thus, empirical studies confirm and extend the list of indicators arising from 
the theoretical models of crises. Based on detailed analysis of both theoretical and 
empirical research, can be identified for further detailed analysis of such indicators, 
grouped by sector: 
• Real sector: 
1. The fall in GDP, or deviation from trend. 
2. Falling stock index. 
• Debt burden: 
1. Total external debt. 
2. Total public external debt. 
• Balance of payments: 
1. The trade balance. 
2. Current account balance. 
3. Dynamics of international reserves. 
4. Terms of trade. 
5. Dynamics of imports. 
6. Export dynamics. 
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7. The real exchange rate. 
• International variables:  
1. International interest rate.  
2. The ratio of domestic and foreign interest rates.  
• Financial liberalization:  
1. Domestic credit.  
2. The growth of the money multiplier.  
3. Real interest rate on loans and deposits.  
4. Spread between rates on loans and on deposits or their relationship.  
5. The ratio of loans to deposits of the banking system. 
• Other financial variables: 
1. The consumer price index. 
2. Broad money growth. 
3. Increasing the ratio of M2 to the level of international reserves. 
4. High ratio of total external debt to deposits of the banking system. 
• Fiscal performance:  
1. A significant budget deficit.  
2. The growth of public sector lending. 
Note that in practice, not all indicators can be used in the analysis of financial 
system stability, because the statistics for some of them may be unavailable. It should 
be noted that these indicators to achieve comparability of data should be considered 
in certain transformations, such as growth rate, the rate of growth compared with the 
trend, or normalized to a baseline (GDP, M1, M2 or the level of imports, etc.). Table 
1.1. summarized the main indicators, which offer seen as leading indicators of 
occurrence of the crisis state of the economy. 
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Table 1.1 Leading indexes onset of economic crisis 
Indices Transformation Formula 
Behavior before 
crisis  Source Explanation 
Real sector          
GDP Increment rate, % 
%100
1
1 




 


t
tt
GDP
GDPGDP
 
Decrease IFS 
Slowdown of the economy worsens the capacity 
of national  lenders to pay its obligations, credit 
risk increases. 
Stock Market Index Increment rate, % 
%100
1
1 




 


t
tt
SPI
SPISPI
 
Decrease IFS 
Reducing the stock market index may indicate 
outflow of foreign speculative capital from the 
market of a developing country, due to increasing 
risks. 
Debt Load          
Joint external debt 
Attribution to 
GDP, % 
%100





t
t
GDP
GEDP
 Increase, high  
level  JEDH, IFS 
Significant amounts of foreign debt increases the 
vulnerability of the economy to rising global 
interest rates and a possible deterioration in access 
to global capital 
Joint internal debt 
Attribution to 
Export, % 
%100





t
t
EXPORT
GEDP
 Increase, high  
level JEDH, IFS 
Significant amounts of foreign debt increases the 
vulnerability of the economy to rising global 
interest rates and a possible deterioration in access 
to global capital 
Joint external government 
debt 
Attribution to 
GDP, % 
%100
_






t
t
GDP
GGFD
 Increase, high  
level JEDH, IFS 
Significant amounts of public debt impose certain 
costs on the fiscal budget, complicating the 
balance. 
External debt 
Attribution to 
GDP, % 
%100
____





 
t
tt
GDP
FCDCFDSTDCFD
 
Increase, high  
level JEDH, IFS  
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Debt servicing 
Attribution to 
GDP, % 
%100
_






t
t
GDP
GGFD
 Increase, high  
level JEDH, IFS  
Balance of payments          
Balance of payments  
Attribution to 
GDP, % 
%100
__






t
t
GDP
BALTRBOP
 
Decrease, 
negative 
quantity IFS 
The negative trade balance is decreasing 
competitiveness of exporters or falling global 
demand. Somehow, this leads to a drop in the 
volume of foreign exchange earnings of exporters 
and pressure for currency depreciation to the side, 
as well as the deteriorating financial situation of 
exporters. 
Current account balance 
Attribution to 
GDP, % 
%100
_






t
t
GDP
CURACCBOP
 
Decrease, 
negative 
quantity IFS 
Significant current account deficit may signal a 
reduction of liquidity of the financial system 
increase the probability of currency crisis. The 
growth of currency risks in turn may cause the 
outflow of short-term investments. 
International reserves 
Attribution to 
Export, % 
%100
_






t
t
EXPORT
RESERVESINTERN
 Decrease, low 
level IFS 
The gradual  reduction of international reserves 
could indicate pressures on the currency 
downward. Low level of international reserves, 
the central bank not long maintain a fixed 
exchange rate in adverse situations. 
International reserves 
Attribution to 
Import, % 
%100
_






t
t
IMPORT
RESERVESINTERN
 Decrease, low 
level IFS 
The gradual reduction of international reserves 
could indicate pressures on the currency 
downward. Low level of international reserves, 
the central bank not long maintain a fixed 
exchange rate in adverse situations. 
International reserves  
Attribution to 
GDP, % 
%100
_






t
t
GDP
RESERVESINTERN
 Decrease, low 
level IFS 
The gradual reduction of international reserves 
could indicate pressures on the currency 
downward. Low level of international reserves, 
the central bank not long maintain a fixed 
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exchange rate in adverse situations. 
Commercial Terms 
The ratio of 
export unit price 
for the unit price 
of imports, % 
%100
__
__






t
t
PRICESUNITIMPORT
PRICESUNITEXPORT
 Deterioration IFS 
Significant deterioration of terms of  trade leads to 
difficulties in the financial sector. Most sensitive 
to changes in world demand is a small economy 
with a high dependence on exports of raw 
materials. 
Import  Increment rate, % 
%100
1
1 




 


t
tt
IMPORT
IMPORTIMPORT
 Increase, high 
level IFS 
Import growth, especially if it occurs 
simultaneously with increasing inflow of funds on 
the capital account and credit liberalization often 
precedes the currency crisis. 
Export  Increment rate, % 
%100
1
1 




 


t
tt
EXPORT
EXPORTEXPORT
 
Decrease  IFS 
Reduction of export competitiveness due to 
deterioration or decline in world demand may 
indicate a decrease of competitiveness of 
exporters or falling global demand. Somehow, 
this leads to a drop in the volume of foreign 
exchange earnings of exporters and pressure for 
currency depreciation to the side, as well as the 
deteriorating financial situation of exporters. 
Real effective exchange rate Increment rate, % 
%100
1
1 




 


t
tt
REER
REERREER
 
Increase  IFS 
REER growth leads to lower competitiveness of 
domestic producers, may lead to slower economic 
growth. 
Nominal effective exchange 
rate Increment rate, % 
%100
1
1 




 


t
tt
NEER
NEERNEER
 
Increase  IFS 
NEER growth leads to lower competitiveness of 
domestic producers, may lead to slower economic 
growth. 
International variables           
International interest rate  Rate, % LIBOR  Increase  LIBOR 
Rising world interest rates increases the 
vulnerability of national financial systems, as is 
capital flight from emerging markets to developed 
markets, deteriorating creditworthiness of 
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borrowers in emerging markets (for loans in 
foreign currency). 
Real internal and external 
rate (lending and deposit) Rate, interest rate 
LENDRATELIBOR
DEPRATELIBOR  Increase  
LIBOR, 
IFS 
Differential between foreign and domestic interest 
rates showing the relative attractiveness of 
investment in assets of the country. With the 
growth of this indicator for a possible outflow of 
capital account. 
Finance liberalization           
Internal lending Increment rate, % 
%100
1
1 




 


t
tt
LOANS
LOANSLOANS
 
Increase  IFS 
Financial crisis often precedes the expansion of 
domestic credit, including by increasing the share 
of more risky loans. 
Money multiplier Rate t
t
MBASE
M 2
 
Increase  IFS 
Significant growth multiplier can be an indicator 
of the weakening of the selection procedures of 
borrowers by banks. 
Real lending rate Rate, % 
1
_1
1



t
t
DEFLGDP
LENDRATE
 
Increase  IFS 
Growth of real interest rate increases instability of 
the banking system, will boost the share of 
lenders that are unable to refinance or repay loans. 
Real deposit rate Rate, % 
1
_1
1



t
t
DEFLGDP
DEPRATE
 
Increase  IFS 
Growth of real interest rate increases instability of 
the banking system, will boost the share of 
lenders that are unable to refinance or repay loans. 
Lending rate and deposit 
rate Rate, interest rate 









1
_1
1
t
t
DEFLGDP
LENDRATE









 1
_1
1
t
t
DEFLGDP
DEPRATE
 
Increase  IFS 
In many cases, before the currency crises are 
increasing the gap between rates on loans and on 
deposits. This is because, often before the crisis is 
the expansion of domestic credit. In this situation, 
an increasing proportion of unreliable lenders and 
banks raise rates on loans, trying to offset the 
risks. Rates on deposits are growing so fast. 
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The size of loans to deposits 
of the banking system Rate, % 
%100





t
t
DEPOSITS
LOANS
 
Increase  IFS 
Ratio of accumulated credits to deposits 
characterizes the ability of the banking system to 
obtain financial resources that are necessary to 
meet the demand for loans. A high rate may 
indicate potential problems with bank liquidity. 
Other financial variables          
Consumer price index 
(CPI) Increment rate, % 
%100
1
1 




 


t
tt
CPI
CPICPI
 
Increase  IFS 
Accelerating inflation complicates the assessment 
of credit risks and increase uncertainty in the 
economy. 
Money supply  Increment rate, % 
%100
1
1 




 


t
tt
BRMONEY
BRMONEYBRMONEY
 Increase  IFS 
The rapid growth of money supply under fixed 
exchange rate can lead to speculative attacks on 
currencies in the direction девальвації. 
The ratio of M2 to 
international reserves Rate, % 
%100
_
2






t
t
RESERVESINTERN
M
 
Increase  IFS 
Growth (may be an indicator of the credit boom or 
too soft monetary policy and low level of 
reserves). 
The ratio of liabilities to 
deposits of the banking 
system Rate, % 
%100
_






t
t
DEPOSITS
LIABBANK
 
Increase  JEDH, IFS 
Growth (may be an indicator too high inflow of 
debt capital as opposed to banks on deposits). 
Fiscal indices           
Fiscal deficit 
Attribution to 
GDP, %  
Increase, high 
level  IFS 
Significant budget deficits under fixed exchange 
rate leads to increased speculative pressure on the 
currency depreciation in its side and forced to 
spend central bank gold reserves. 
Government lending 
Attribution to 
GDP, %  
Increase, high 
level IFS 
Lending to the central bank the government is 
"hidden" emissions. 
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where  JEDH - Joint External Debt Hub ; IFS – International Financial Statistics .  
1.2. Determination of the period that takes an economy to get in the crisis and 
grouping economies by the level of crisis on the basis of index of currency 
market pressure  
It is necessary to analyze the existing statistical information and its quality in order 
to make the final selection of indexes and countries which will be used for further analysis 
of the preconditions of sharp exchange rate depreciation and determining periods of the 
crisis state occurrence for the countries. The total number of indexes that have been 
preliminarily selected for detailed analysis is 71 (see paragraph 1.2), and the total number 
of countries is 239. 
The output has been stored in a table with each row consisting of following data 
attrubutes: specific country code, variable full name, designation of the variable (for the 
purposes of further research), source database name and its corresponding indexes. To 
avoid variable scaling issues, all variables except those measured in units (such as 
exchange rate or price of gold), percentages and percentage points, were converted to 
millions of corresponding units. 
Hence, the output data array is three-dimensional with country, index and time 
period attributes. The analysis covers quarterly data for the period from the 1
st
 quarter of 
2002 to the 2
nd
 quarter of 2010. 
 Since equally-meaning variables in the database may have different names for 
different countries, all the variables required for the calculation of selected indexes have 
been additionally encoded for convenience with a unified (intermediate)  system of 
variable names. Table 1.2. presents the decoding for the introduced unified system of 
(intermediate) variable names. 
Table 1.2. Additional (intermediate) variable (index) unified coding system  
 
№ 
Variable (index) 
name Variable description № 
Variable (index) 
name Variable description 
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1 CPI_CHNG % change in CPI over the previous period 37 FD_GG External debt: the government 
2 EXPORT Exports, FOB, mln. U.S. 38 FD_GG_ST Short-term external debt: the government 
3 EXPORT_UNT_PRICES Export unit price, USD . U.S. 39 FD_MA External debt: central bank 
4 GDP_DEFL_CHNG 
% change GDP deflator, to the previous 
quarter 40 FD_MA_ST Short-term external debt: central bank 
5 GDP_VOL_CHNG GDP% change over previous quarter 41 FD_OS External debt: other sectors 
6 GOLD_OUNC Gold, U.S.. ounces 42 FD_OS_ST Short-term external debt: other sectors 
7 IMPORT Imports, C.I.F., mln. U.S. 43 GDP_DEFL_2005 GDP deflator,% (2005 = 100%) 
8 IMPORT_UNT_PRICES Unit price of imports, USD U.S. 44 GDP_VOL_2000 The volume of real GDP,% (2000 = 100%) 
9 INTERN_RESERVES International reserves, (SDR) 45 GEDP Gross external debt position 
10 RMG International reserves minus gold, (SDR) 46 GFCF Gross fixed capital formation 
11 BOP_CURACC Current account balance, errors are not incl.  47 M3 M3 
12 BOP_GS Balance of goods and services 48 NGDP Nominal GDP 
13 BOP_GSI Balance of goods and services and incomes 49 NEER 
NEER 
14 BOP_TR_BAL Trade balance 50 REER 
REER based on the relative purchasing power parity 
Capacity 
15 BRMONEY 
Monetary aggregate of money in the broad 
sense - BROAD MONEY 51 GDP_VOL_2005 The volume of real GDP,% (2005 = 100%) 
16 DEP_EXCL Deposits not included in BROAD MONEY 52 GNDI Gross national income at the disposal 
17 DEP_OTH 
Other deposits included in BROAD 
MONEY 53 GNI Gross national income 
18 DEP_TRANS 
Transferable deposits, are not included in 
BROAD MONEY 54 SPI Index of stock market 
19 ER 
Official / national market exchange rate. 
monetary unit  to the USD 55 BIS_GOLD_HOLD Pure gold reserves, BIS data 
20 GVT_CLAIMS 
Claims on Government, mln of monetary 
units 56 GOLD_IMF Gold reserves, IMF data 
21 LENDRATE crediting rate 57 WIG20 WIG-20 –  period average 
22 LOANS The volume of loans 58 WIG20EP WIG-20 – end of period 
23 M2 
M2 
59 MICEX 
MICEX 9/22/97 = 100 
24 MBASE Monetary base 60 FTSE100 
FTSE 100 
25 BOP_CAPACC Capital account balance, errors are not incl.  61 GOLD_LOND 
The price of gold, London 
 
26 CONS_GOV Governmental consumption 62 GOLD_SDR_OUNC 
Gold, SDR price(London) 
27 CONS_H Private consumption 63 AMEX 
AMEX, period average 
28 DEPRATE Deposit rate 64 NASDAQ 
NASDAQ COMPOSITE 
29 FD_CB External debt: commercial banks 65 SP_IND 
S&P INDUSTRIALS 
30 FD_CB_ST Short-term external debt: commercial banks 66 USD_SDR 
US DOLLARS PER SDR, end of period 
31 FD_DC External debt denominated in local currency 67 GOLD_MARKET 
Gold at market price 
32 FD_DC_LT 
Long-term external debt denominated in 
local currency 68 GOLD_SDR 
Gold(SDR) 
33 FD_DC_ST 
Short-term external debt denominated in 
local currency 69 LIBOR 
3-MONTH US DEP. LONDON OFFER 
34 FD_FC 
External debt denominated in foreign 
currency 70 RTS 
RUSSIAN TRADING SYSTEM (RTS) 
35 FD_FC_LT 
Long-term external debt denominated in 
foreign currency    
36 FD_FC_ST 
Short-term external debt denominated in 
foreign currency       
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To effectively analyze output information availability and completeness on the basis 
of existing data structures (see appendix 1), a three-dimensional data model, that is, a 
three-dimensional matrix having values indexed by name, country and time, should be 
created. 
A special procedure was written in Matlab in order to construct such three-
dimensional matrices. It filters data by each of the attributes (country, index and time 
period) consistently, places it in a multidimensional matrix object, converting it into a new 
MDData object with three-dimensional data matrix and code vectors, which correspond to 
the value sets for each attribute – country names, variable names and time period 
denotations. 
In order to analyze the availability and completeness of statistical data the quantity of 
empty observations (NaN) for each country (all attributes) and each index (all countries) 
must be computed. The number of empty observations for each index and country through 
all time periods is represented by the graph in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1. Graphical representation for the total number of empty observations for 
each index and country through all time periods. 
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Note that the horizontal axis (X-axis) represents the index list position (see table 
1.3.), and the vertical axis (Y-axis) shows the quantity of empty observations for every 
separate index for all countries through all time periods. The correspondence between 
index list position and its designation is shown in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3. The correspondents between index list position and its short description as 
used in the research. 
 
№ 
n/n 
Designation of 
index № n/n 
Designation of 
index № n/n 
Designation of 
index 
№ 
n/n Designation of index 
1 RMG 19 MBASE 37 FD_OS 55 GDP_DEF_2005 
2 
INTERN_RESE
RVES 20 DEP_EXCL 38 GEDP 56 BIS_GOLD_HOLD 
3 ER 21 BOP_CAPACC 39 GDP_VOL_2005 57 GOLD_IMF 
4 CPI_CHNG 22 NEER 40 FD_CB_ST 58 WIG20 
5 DEPRATE 23 LOANS 41 FD_GG_ST 59 WIG20EP 
6 GOLD_OUNC 24 REER 42 FD_MA_ST 60 FTSE100 
7 BRMONEY 25 SPI 43 FD_OS_ST 61 GOLD_LOND 
8 LENDRATE 26 
GDP_VOL_CH
NG 44 GDP_DEFL_2005 62 GOLD_SDR_OUNC 
9 IMPORT 27 
GDP_DEFL_C
HNG 45 
IMPORT_UNT_P
RICES 63 AMEX 
10 EXPORT 28 CONS_H 46 GNI 64 NASDAQ 
11 GVT_CLAIMS 29 GFCF 47 GNDI 65 SP_IND 
12 DEP_TRANS 30 CONS_GOV 48 GDP_VOL_2000 66 USD_SDR 
13 DEP_OTH 31 NGDP 49 FD_FC 67 GOLD_MARKET 
14 M2 32 M3 50 FD_DC 68 GOLD_SDR 
15 BOP_CURACC 33 
EXPORT_UNT
_PRICES 51 FD_FC_LT 69 LIBOR 
16 BOP_GS 34 FD_CB 52 FD_FC_ST 70 RTS 
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17 BOP_GSI 35 FD_GG 53 FD_DC_LT 71 MICEX 
18 BOP_TR_BAL 36 FD_MA 54 FD_DC_ST     
 
The graph for the quantity of empty observations for each index and country through 
all time periods is shown on Figure 1.2.  
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Figure.1.2. Graphical representation of the quantity of empty observations for each 
index and country through all time periods 
 
Note that the Y-axis (vertical axis) shows the quantity of empty observations for 
every separate country for all indexes through all time periods. The X-axis (horizontal 
axis) represents country id. The correspondence between country id and its real name is 
provided in Table 1.4. 
Table 1.4. The correspondence between country id and its name. 
№ 
n/n Name of the country 
№ 
n/n Name of the country 
№ 
n/n Name of the country 
№ 
n/n 
Name of the 
country 
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1 Hungary 61 Ecuador 121 Haiti 181 
EmerDevelopEc
o 
2 Colombia 62 ChinaPRHongKong 122 Tanzania 182 
ExpEarnNonF
uel 
3 Turkey 63 Morocco 123 StKittsandNevis 183 Benin 
4 Chile 64 Luxembourg 124 SriLanka 184 ExportEarnFuel 
5 KoreaRepublicof 65 Malta 125 Fiji 185 Chad 
6 United States 66 India 126 Anguilla 186 
CongoRepublico
f 
7 SouthAfrica 67 ElSalvador 127 Maldives 187 MidEastNAfrica 
8 Thailand 68 Guatemala 128 Barbados 188 DevelopingAsia 
9 Sweden 69 NewZealand 129 ChinaPRMainland 189 Mali 
10 Croatia 70 Jordan 130 Samoa 190 WAEMU 
11 Denmark 71 Singapore 131 Global 191 MiddleEast 
12 CostaRica 72 Cyprus 132 NetherlandsAntilles 192 Libya 
13 Brazil 73 Albania 133 Aruba 193 
MicronesiaFedSt
s 
14 Bulgaria 74 ChinaPRMacao 134 Ghana 194 Niger 
15 CzechRepublic 75 Pakistan 135 TrinidadandTobago 195 Africa 
16 Malaysia 76 Botswana 136 SaudiArabia 196 
SubSaharanAfri
ca 
17 Poland 77 Cambodia 137 Swaziland 197 GuineaBissau 
18 Switzerland 78 AzerbaijanRepof 138 Comoros 198 Djibouti 
19 Japan 79 Nicaragua 139 Yemen 199 CEMAC 
20 Latvia 80 BruneiDarussalam 140 IranIRof 200 Montenegro 
21 Germany 81 EuroArea 141 SoTomPrncipe 201 Liberia 
22 RussianFederation 82 Bangladesh 142 Ethiopia 202 CIS 
23 Ukraine 83 MacedoniaFYR 143 Montserrat 203 
UnitedArabEmir
ates 
24 Iceland 84 Belize 144 BosniaHerzegovina 204 SanMarino 
25 Lithuania 85 Jamaica 145 ECCU 205 AfghanistanIRof 
26 Belarus 86 Uganda 146 LaoPeoplesDemRep 206 Mauritania 
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27 Estonia 87 Honduras 147 Eritrea 207 Zimbabwe 
28 Argentina 88 Tunisia 148 Vietnam 208 
TaiwanProvofC
hina 
29 Canada 89 Suriname 149 Sudan 209 Guinea 
30 SlovakRepublic 90 SolomonIslands 150 SyrianArabRepublic 210 EUROArea 
31 Finland 91 Lesotho 151 TimorLeste 211 Macedonia 
32 Greece 92 Panama 152 BahrainKingdomof 212 Kiribati 
33 Indonesia 93 CapeVerde 153 Malawi 213 NewCaledonia 
34 Moldova 94 Tonga 154 Bhutan 214 FrenchPolynesia 
35 Ireland 95 Mongolia 155 SierraLeone 215 AmericanSamoa 
36 Belgium 96 Mozambique 156 Togo 216 
BelgiumLuxemb
ourg 
37 Georgia 97 Namibia 157 Myanmar 217 Bermuda 
38 Bolivia 98 PapuaNewGuinea 158 Tajikistan 218 CaymanIslands 
39 Mexico 99 Zambia 159 CentralAfricanRep 219 CookIslands 
40 Israel 100 Burundi 160 KosovoRepublicof 220 Czechoslovakia 
41 Romania 101 Vanuatu 161 Iraq 221 FalklandIslands 
42 Norway 102 Kenya 162 Angola 222 FaroeIslands 
43 Slovenia 103 Kuwait 163 Cameroon 223 Gibraltar 
44 Austria 104 Algeria 164 Gabon 224 Greenland 
45 Peru 105 Oman 165 GambiaThe 225 Guadeloupe 
46 Italy 106 BahamasThe 166 EquatorialGuinea 226 Guam 
47 Spain 107 VenezuelaRepBol 167 Senegal 227 GuianaFrench 
48 France 108 Nigeria 168 BurkinaFaso 228 Martinique 
49 Portugal 109 Nepal 169 HongKongChina 229 Nauru 
50 Uruguay 110 SerbiaRepublicof 170 Rwanda 230 
PanamaCanalZo
ne 
51 Armenia 111 Dominica 171 CtedIvoire 231 Runion 
52 Kazakhstan 112 DominicanRepublic 172 Madagascar 232 Ryukyus 
53 Netherlands 113 Grenada 173 WestBankandGaza 233 Somalia 
54 Australia 114 StLucia 174 AdvancedEconomies 234 StHelena 
55 Philippines 115 StVincentGrens 175 APEC 235 StPierreMiquelo
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n 
56 KyrgyzRepublic 116 Seychelles 176 CongoDemRepof 236 Timor 
57 UnitedKingdom 117 AntiguaandBarbuda 177 World 237 Turkmenistan 
58 Paraguay 118 Lebanon 178 Europe 238 Uzbekistan 
59 Mauritius 119 Guyana 179 WesternHemisphere 239 YugoslaviaSFR 
60 Egypt 120 Qatar 180 CentEastEurope     
 
    
Note that the list of indexes includes some variables that are not bound to a specific 
country, but are used in calculations as global economic indicators. These include gold 
prices and stock indexes. These variables have their "country" attribute assigned to value 
“Global”. Also note that for them the number of empty observations is the largest as shown 
in chart 1.2. 
The analysis of statistical data allowed reducing the sample of countries from 239 to 
60 one, those that have been observed to possess the most complete information. 
According to the analysis, the list of indexes was also shortened to 60 items. Therefore, the 
final subset contains 41 of the best indexes with the availability of complete information 
for all countries and through all time periods and 19 (stock) indexes, for which a single 
time series is sufficient (such as variables that have global impact on all countries). 
The graph for the quantity of empty observations for each index and country through 
all time periods, as well as the graph for each index and country from the final sample 
through all time periods are shown on Figures 1.3 and 1.4 respectively. The list of 
descriptions and names of indexes and countries included in the final sample is presented 
in Appendix 2. 
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Figure.1.3. Graphical representation of the total quantity of empty observations for each index and all countries from 
the final sample through all time periods 
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 Figure.1.4. Graphical representation of total quantity of empty observations for all countries and indexes from the final 
sample through all time periods.
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Note that the Y-axis (vertical axis) in Figure 3.1 shows the quantity of empty 
observations for every separate index and all countries from the final sample through all 
time periods, while the X-axis (horizontal axis) shows the description of every index 
from the final sample. 
The quantity of empty observations for every separate country and all indexes 
from the final sample through all time periods is shown on Y-axis (vertical axis) in 
Figure 4.1, while the names of countries included in the final sample are presented on 
X-axis (horizontal axis). 
 The aforementioned graphs prove that for the majority of indexes the information 
loss in all countries through all time periods reaches up to 500 observations, which is on 
average less than 8 observations per country. Consequently, a conclusion can be drawn  
that the acquired information is sufficiently complete and thus suitebale as an input 
statistical database for further analysis, including grouping countries by level of 
involvement in the global crisis. 
Exchange Market Pressure index (EMP) is widely used to identify currency crises 
and to study changes of pressure upon the currency through monetary instruments of a 
country. Accordingly, this index can be used as a universal indicator for grouping 
countries by the level of involvement into the global crisis of recent years.  
The formula of the EMP index is the following:  
   (1.1)  
where  is the index of pressure on the currency market:  is the exchange rate, 
expressed as the value of national currency through the unit value of foreign currency;  
 - a change of international reserves; - a modified domestic rate of interest of the 
country; - elasticity levels  of exchange rate and interest rate respectively.  
In general, the behavior of EMP index gives an idea about the absence or 
approaching exchange rate crisis. In particular, if there is a significant increase in the 
EMP index, it is possible to assume that the exchange rate is in crisis.  
Two approaches are used to calculate the index of exchange market pressure: 
precision weighting and equal weighting.  
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 Researchers criticize the approach of precision weighting method for its limited 
ability to reflect the political reaction on speculative attacks. Thus, it is believed that this 
approach has no clear economic interpretation, as it is generated by a combination of 
market volatility and political reaction to it. Precision weighting method is likely to be 
applied if the information about indicators of flexibility of exchange rate and interest 
rate is absent [33].  
 We have used both approaches to calculate the exchange market pressure index. To 
simplify the calculations, it was assumed that the money market is balanced: a one 
percent change in exchande rate  is equivalent to one percent change in reserves and 
interest rate. 
For the calculations of the exchange rate pressure index, based on real information, 
the general formula is used: 
1 1
2
( _ )
0log
2 /
ER IR RES
t t
M
INTERN RESERVES
MlogER IR
M ER
ER   
 


   
  
(1.2)  
 
where: ER  - the official or market exchange rate;  logER  - the difference between 
logarithms of ER ’s current and previous value; log IR  - the difference between 
logarithms of current and previous loan rates; 
2
0
M
M
  - the approximation of money 
multiplier; _INTERN RESERVES  - the amount of international reserves, expressed in 
special drawing rights (SDR); 1 1/2t tM ER   - the approximation of money supply, 
expressed in dollars, for the preceding period; ER , IR , RES  - the weights of the index.  
We offer the procedure of the calculation carried out in three stages, two of which 
are common for the first and second approaches (i.e. precision weighting and equal 
weights), and the third stage specifies the process of weighting for each of them, in 
order to give the final index, calculated on the base of precision weighting or equal 
weights approach. Note that the program for calculating the index based on real 
information for each country in the final sample using the Matlab environment for each 
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of the analyzed approach is given in Appendix 3-4 respectively.  
       It is important to analyze the characteristics of each of the offered approaches.  
 
The peculiarities of calculating the Exchange Market Pressure index based on 
the precision weighting approach.  
      
 The EMP index calculations based on the precision weighting approach  is 
conducted using the formula (1.2) in three stages:  
Stage 1. On the first stage the individual components of the formula (1.2) are 
calculated, or the following variables are obtained: 
2
0
log
log
M
MM
M
LOGER ER
LOGIR IR


                                                                                                          (1.3). 
Stage 2. On the second stage, values DER, DIR, DRES are calculated on the basis of 
variables, obtained on the first stage: 
1
1
1 1
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
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(1.4) 
 
Stage 3. It is the stage of weighing and calculating the exchange rate pressure index. 
This stage is different for two selected approaches. For precision weighting, weights are 
defined as inverse standard deviation of each of the components of DER, DIR, DRES, 
and EMP index is calculated using the formula: 
DER DIR DRES
DER DIR DRES
EMP
  
                                                                          (1.5) 
 
As a result of consecutive calculations, the exchange market pressure index (EMP 
index) is formed, based on the precision weighting approach. 
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Note that the program for calculating exchange market pressure index based on the 
precision weighting approach for each country in the final sample using Matlab 
environment is given in Appendix 3. 
 
The peculiarities of calculating the Exchange Market Pressure index based on 
the equal weighting approach   
 
  The EMP index calculations based on the equal weights approach is also conducted 
using the formula (1.2) in three stages:  
Stage 1. On the first stage the individual components of the formula (1.2) are 
calculated, or the following variables are obtained: 
2
0
log
log
M
MM
M
LOGER ER
LOGIR IR


                                                                                                          (1.7). 
Stage 2. On the second stage, values DER, DIR, DRES are calculated on the basis of 
variables, obtained on the first stage: 
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(1.8) 
 
Note that Steps 1 and 2 coincide completely with steps of EMP index calculations 
using the considered above precision weighting approach. 
Stage 3. It is the stage of weighing and calculating the exchange rate pressure index. 
For the examined equal weighting approach, weights for all three components of DER, 
DIR, DRES are equal to one, and the EMP index is calculated according to the 
formula: 
DRESDIRDEREMP                                                                              (1.9) 
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As a result of consecutive calculations, the exchange market pressure index (EMP 
index) is formed, based on the precision weighting approach. 
Note that the program for calculating exchange market pressure index based on the 
precision weighting approach for each country in the final sample using Matlab 
environment is given in Appendix 4. 
The country is determined as being in a condition of  the financial crisis, when the 
deviation of index EMP (calculated using one of the approaches discussed above) of the 
country from its mean exceeds a certain threshold. 
As a threshold that characterizes the deep currency crisis of a country, we offer 2 
standard deviations of EMP in a positive direction (the pressure on depreciation of the 
currency) or negative side (the pressure on the appreciation). According to the 
hypothesis about the normal distribution of this index, the probability of such events is 
less than 10 percent. 
Meanwhile, countries that are less affected by the crisis in terms of pressure on the 
exchange rate are determined as those, for which the deviation from the EMP index 
average is equal to one to two standard deviations in either direction. 
The selection of countries into two main groups: most and least affected by the crisis 
of 2008-2009 on the basis of calculations on real data for the years 2002-2010 in terms 
of pressure on the exchange rate (calculated on the basis precision approach) is 
presented in Table 1.5. 
 
Table 1.5. Distribution of the most and least affected countries during the crisis of 
2008-2009, based on the value of EMP index  
Countries that suffered greatly 
during the crisis 
Countries that have not suffered 
significant losses during the crisis 
Armenia Argentina  
Belarus Australia  
Chile Austria   
Costa Rica Belgium  
Georgia Bolivia  
Iceland Canada  
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Indonesia Croatia  
Republic of Korea  Denmark  
Malaysia  Finland  
Mexico France  
Moldova  Germany  
Paraguay Greece  
Romania  Ireland  
Russian Federation  Israel  
Ukraine Italy   
  Kazakhstan  
  Kyrgyz Republic  
  Mauritius  
  Netherlands  
  Norway  
  Peru  
  Philippines  
  Poland  
  Portugal  
  SlovakRepublic  
  Slovenia  
  Spain  
  Sweden  
  Switzerland  
  Thailand  
  Turkey  
  United Kingdom  
 
For the ease of analysis of current crises, the countries in the final sample were 
ranked by time of occurrence of the crisis (based on the Exchange Market Pressure 
index, calculated using precision weighting approach), beginning from the 3rd quarter of 
2007. 
Graphically, the results of ranking of the countries with deep financial crisis (the 
threshold is EMP2 ) by the time of occurrence and duration of the crisis are presented in 
the form of "periods and countries” maps  on picture 1.5. 
The results of countries ranking by the time of occurrence and duration of the crisis 
for the loose threshold ( EMP ) are shown on picture 1.6. 
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It should be noted that Greece entered the group of countries that have not suffered 
from crisis. This can be explained by the fact that this state is characterized by a budget 
crisis (or government regulation crisis), but not currency crisis. 
Note that the program in Matlab environment for ranking of countries for different 
thresholds and graphical representation of results in the form of "periods and countries" 
maps  is listed in Appendix 5.  
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Q3 2008 Q4 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 Q1 2010 Q2 2010
Colombia
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Paraguay
Japan
 
Picture.1.5. The map of occurrence and duration of the currency crisis (red - depreciation pressure, blue - appreciation). The threshold is equal to two 
standard deviations.
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Picture.1.6. The map of occurrence and duration of the currency crisis (red - depreciation pressure, blue - appreciation). The threshold is equal to one 
standard deviations. EMP Index is calculated on the base of precision weighting approach. 
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   The visual analysis of graphs 1.5. and 1.6. leads to the conclusion that a 
significant number of states have the critical state; also there is a significant increase in 
the duration of the crisis period while reducing the threshold for the index from two 
standard deviations ( EMP2 ) to one standard deviation ( EMP ). This fact can be 
considered a confirmation of our assumptions about the logical definition of the set of 
countries that are in a deep financial crisis by setting the threshold for rejection of the 
index EMP beyond two standard deviations (see table 1.5.) 
    To finalize the conclusions, we made the ranking of countries based on exchange 
rate pressure index calculated with the help of the equal weights approach. Similar to the 
previous case, we built graphics-maps of the crisis with different levels of threshold 
( EMP2 ; EMP ). Graphically, the results of ranking of countries which had a state of 
deep financial crisis (threshold is EMP2 ) by the time of occurrence and duration of the 
crisis are shown in the form of maps: “periods and countries” on picture 1.7.  
The results of ranking of countries by the time of occurrence and duration of the 
crisis for the loose threshold ( EMP ) is shown on picture 1.8. 
Note that the program in Matlab environment for ranking of countries for different 
thresholds and graphical representation of results in the form of maps: "periods and 
countries" is listed in Appendix 5.   
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Picture.1.7. The map of occurrence and duration of the currency crisis (red - depreciation pressure, blue - appreciation). The threshold is equal to two 
standard deviations. EMP Index is calculated on the base of equal weighting approach. 
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Picture.1.8. The map of occurrence and duration of the currency crisis (red - depreciation pressure, blue - appreciation). The threshold is equal to one 
standard deviation. EMP Index is calculated on the base of equal weighting approach. 
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     The analysis of the calculations to determine the period of onset of the 
crisis, based on the exchange rate pressure index using two approaches discussed 
above, allows to determine the general algorithm of ranking countries based on the 
involvement into the global crisis and to justify the set of countries with high state 
of financial crisis and set of countries little affected by it.  
According to the chosen approach, the initial grouping of countries is based on 
the currency market pressure index (EMP) using the following general rule:  
• The group of countries, significantly affected by the crisis, includes countries 
for which the EMP index’s deviation from its average value is more than two 
standard deviations, calculated on the basis of historical values of the EMP index for 
the analyzed countries  
• The group of countries, relatively little affected by the global financial crisis, 
includes countries for which the EMP index‘s deviation from its average value is 
more than one and less than two standard deviations, calculated on the basis of 
historical values of the EMP index for the analyzed countries 
 
Justification of the final selection of countries that suffered from crisis 
  
          According to the rules of the calculations and visual analysis of graphs 1.7. 
and 1.8., a group of countries was selected and the beginning of the crisis period for 
them based on the exchange rate pressure index, calculated using the precision 
weighting method. The results of grouping are presented in Table 1.6. 
Table 1.6. Groups of countries with a significant crisis in the beginning and 
the onset of the crisis for them (according to the EMP index calculated using the 
precision weighting method) 
3 rd quarter 2008 4 th quarter 2008 1 st quarter 2009 
Costa Rica Romania Russian Federation 
Republic of Korea Chile Moldova 
Malaysia Republic of Korea Ukraine 
Iceland Russian Federation Belarus 
 Indonesia Armenia 
 Ukraine  
 Georgia  
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 Mexico  
 Paraguay  
 
However, if to use the EMP index calculated using the equal weighting method, 
the group of countries in the Table 1.7 can be distinguished. 
 
Table 1.7. Groups of countries with a significant crisis in the beginning and 
the onset of the crisis for them (according to the EMP index calculated using the 
equal weighting method) 
3 rd quarter 2008 4 th quarter 2008 1 st quarter 2009 
Costa Rica Chile Ukraine 
Malaysia Republic of Korea Moldova 
 Russian Federation Armenia 
 Ukraine  
 Mexico  
 Paraguay  
 
Thus, by comparing both approaches, and including the potential interest to a 
country in terms of similarity or relationship to the economy of Ukraine, for further 
analysis a pool of 10 countries that experienced a deep crisis condition was formed: 
1. Ukraine ; 2. Republic of Korea; 3. Russian Federation; 4. Moldova; 5. 
Armenia; 6. Costa Rica; 7.Chile; 8. Iceland; 9. Romania; 10.Georgia. 
Let’s briefly characterize the features of economic processes in each country 
from the group.  
Ukraine. Survived the sharp depreciation of the currency during the 4th quarter 
of 2008. Targets the exchange rate against the U.S. dollar. Is characterized as a 
small open economy, the main drivers of economic development of which are the 
following: exports of ferrous metals, chemicals, heavy engineering products. Is 
characterized by the high inflation and bank interest in local currency.  
Iceland. Is characterized by the largest value of national currency depreciation 
during the last crisis. NEER declined almost twice within 2-4 quarters of 2008. The 
inflation is targeted, exchange rate is floating. In 2007 the economy was among the 
ten most productive economies in the world per capita. Export commodities: fish 
and fish products, aluminum and ferosilicon.   
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Republic of Korea. More than 30% depreciation of the currency during the 
last crisis in terms of NEER. The market economy is 15th in the world by nominal 
GDP and 12th by purchasing power parity. Monetary policy regime: since 1998 - 
inflation targeting with the help of money market interest rate controlled by the 
central bank. Floating exchange rates. Exports: engineering goods, electronics. One 
of the few countries that have avoided major economic recession during the global 
crisis. 
Russian Federation. 12th economy in the world by nominal GDP and the 7th 
largest economy by purchasing power parity. Monetary regime: the regime of 
“повзучої прив’язки”, in fact - an active exchange rate management based on the 
discretionary decisions of the central bank. Export: energy, heavy machinery.  
Moldova. Agro-industrial economy that is in the process of structural 
adjustment. Monetary regime – managed exchange rate float with no pre-defined 
path, monetary aggregates targeting. Main industries: the service sector, agricultural 
industry. Moldova receives monetary support from the IMF and other international 
financial organizations.  
Romania. EU member since 2007, the economy with the income level above 
average. Driver of economic growth in recent years is the agricultural industry. 
Export commodities: textiles, industrial machinery, electronics and electrical 
appliances. Regime of monetary policy: inflation targeting through the exchange 
rate management, without a specific direction. In late 2008-early 2009 the exchange 
rate depreciation took place, about 15% of the NEER. The country receives 
financial support from international financial organizations. 
Armenia. The transitional post-soviet economy, befor independence - industrial, 
now – agrarian. Is experiencing a series of structural rearrangements, including the 
emergence and development of new industries such as electronics and jewelry 
industry. Supports floating exchange rate, monetary benchmarks are defined by the 
programs of IMF, WB and EBRD, which also help. 
Chile. Market-oriented economy, focused on international trade. Has one of the 
highest credit rating (S&P A+) in South America. Supports floating exchange rate 
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and inflation targeting at the level of 2-4 percent per year. The crisis caused a drop 
in GDP, despite a massive program to support the economy by the government.  
Georgia. Country in transition, which is developing very rapidly. Thus, in 2007 
the real GDP growth reached 12 percent. The exchange rate is in the managed 
floating regime, without a specific direction of change. The objectives of monetary 
policy are determined by the requirements of international financial programs. 
Costa Rica. Main areas - pharmaceuticals, software development, financial 
outsourcing, ecotourism. GDP per capita in 2009 was $11,122 PPP. However, the 
economy has the fourth highest level of annual inflation in Latin America. Central 
Bank targets the exchange rate using the regime of the “повзучої прив’язки”, the 
gradually devaluating the currency.  
 
Justification of the final selection of countries were not significantly affected 
by the financial crisis.  
 
The selection of countries, which are relatively less affected by the crisis, is 
proposed to make on the base of EMP index using this general rule: 
• The group of countries, which are not affected by the crisis, includes countries 
for which the EMP index’s deviation from its average value is less than one 
standard deviation, calculated on the basis of historical values of the EMP index for 
the analyzed countries 
• When choosing countries, it is proposed to take into consideration the factors of 
territorial proximity to Ukraine, the similarities to the Ukrainian economy and the 
possibility to reach more continents.  
Based on the EMP index, calculated with the help of the precision weighting 
method and the method of equal weighting, a group of countries without a deep state 
of currency crisis during the period: 3rd quarter of 2008 - 1st quarter of 2009 was 
selected. The group includes 33 countries, listed in Table 1.8. 
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Table 1.8. Countries without a deep currency crisis during the period: 3rd 
quarter of 2008 - 1st quarter of 2009 (based on the ERP index, calculated by the 
two approaches).  
№ 
n/n 
Name of the country № n/n Name of the country 
1 Turkey 18 Israel 
2 United States 19 Norway 
3 Thailand 20 Slovenia 
4 Sweden 21 Austria 
5 Croatia 22 Peru 
6 Denmark 23 Italy 
7 Poland 24 Spain 
8 Switzerland 25 France 
9 Germany 26 Portugal 
10 Argentina 27 Kazakhstan 
11 Canada 28 Netherlands 
12 Slovakia 29 Australia 
13 Finland 30 Philippines 
14 Greece 31 Kyrgyz Republic 
15 Ireland 32 United Kingdom 
16 Belgium 33 Republic of Mauritius 
17 Bolivia   
 
Considering the factors of territorial proximity to Ukraine, Ukrainian economy 
similarities and the possibility to include more continents, a pool for the analysis of 
10 countries that has not significantly affected by the crisis during the period: 3rd 
quarter of 2008 – 1st quarter of 2009 was formed: 1.Canada; 2. Sweden; 3.Croatia; 
4. Poland; 5. Germany; 6.Argentina; 7. Slovakia; 8. Norway; 9. Kazakhstan; 10. 
Australia. 
Let’s briefly characterize the features of economic processes in each country 
selected from the group. 
Canada. The country managed to avoid currency and banking crises through a 
strong system of bank regulators and lack of the wide range of financial instruments 
in the market. Canada's banking system and government financial institutions 
conduct a conservative politics. They are reluctant to give loans to potential home 
buyers at reduced interest rates, which allowed avoiding high-risks in attracting 
questionable borrowers. Interestingly, Canada is the only country from the "Big 
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Seven" that is characterized by a balanced budget for 11 years, which enabled the 
country to avoid deficit. None of the banks in Canada needed financial support from 
the state during the crisis period. The economy of Canada is innovative
 1
, with the 
advanced infrastructure, institutions, education, and high productivity. During the 
World Economic Forum 2010 Canada's financial system was recognized as 10th 
(from 139 countries) strongest and healthiest in the world. GDP per capita is U.S. 
$39.669 thousand. 
Sweden. The economy of Sweden managed to avoid possible negative 
consequences due to practical steps in resolving the balance of payments, which 
kept the demand high, and the interest rates – low. Financial oversight and limiting 
of the size of mortgage loans were introduced. The continuous growth of incomes of 
Swedish population and the partial decrease of the tax burden compensated financial 
troubles. However, the banking crisis of 1992 was felt . The economy of Sweden is 
innovative, with the developed advanced system of institutions and infrastructure, 
higher education system, macroeconomic environment and technological security. 
During the World Economic Forum in 2010 Sweden's financial system was 
recognized as second strongest and healthiest in the world. Size of GDP per capita is 
U.S. $ 43.986 thousand. 
Croatia. You can not say that this country did not suffer from the crisis; 
however, as evidenced by relevant statistics, Croatia managed to restrain the crisis 
                                                        
1
 According to the methodology of Potrero, there are five groups of countries depending on their stage of their 
development. Salaries increase with the development, and it is needed to raise productivity for increasing revenue.  
In the first stage, the economic development depends on the availability of factors; countries compete in the 
sustainability of resources: unskilled labor and natural resources. Companies compete on the base of prices and sell 
products and elementary goods. Low productivity is reflected in low wages. Staying competitive at this stage 
depends on the stable functioning of public and private institutions, adequate infrastructure, stable macroeconomic 
situation and a healthy labor force.  
With the growth of wages, the countries are moving to the stage of development where their growth depends on 
efficiency. At this stage it is important to develop more rational production processes and to improve the product 
quality. Strengthening of the competitiveness depends on higher and professional education, efficient markets for 
goods and services, stable functioning of labor market, financial market development, ability to use new technology 
and large capacity of internal and external markets.  
When countries move to the stage of dependence on the innovation, high wages and living standards are possible 
when companies can compete, using new and unique products. At this stage, companies have to compete through 
innovation and develop new products using various production processes.  
Thus, three main stages are distinguished:  
1. Dependence on factors (factors-oriented country).  
2. Dependence on effectiveness (efficiency-oriented country).  
3. Dependence on innovation (innovative country).  
In the methodology there are also two more stages: the transitional stage from the factor-oriented to the efficiency-
oriented and from efficiency-oriented to innovative country.  
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and to avoid receiving credits from the International Monetary Fund. The main 
explanation may be the pretty quick recovery of the country's main partners, namely 
the euro-zone, including Germany, Austria and Italy. Mistake, for which the 
government of Croatia was criticized, has been described as a high level of social 
spending during the financial crisis and the external debt. Economy of Croatia is in 
transition from orientation on effectiveness to innovation group, the strengths of 
which are the infrastructure, health care and education, technology. During the 
World Economic Forum in 2010 the financial system of Croatia was recognized as 
seventy-seventh in the world by the Global Competitiveness Index. Size of GDP per 
capita is U.S. $ 14.243 thousand. 
Poland. The economy of this country even before the crisis was characterized by 
a stronger system of state regulation, compared with the states of its type, which 
diminished the impact of the financial crisis. In addition, the Polish financial market 
is not strong enough to provoke negative trends of a crisis. The economy of Poland 
is in transition from focusing on the efficiency to innovation, the benefits of the 
country are: the high-quality system of higher education, the development of the 
domestic market. During the World Economic Forum in 2010 Poland's financial 
system was recognized as thirty-ninth in the world by the Global Competitiveness 
Index. Size of GDP per capita is U.S. $ 11.288 thousand. 
Germany. The conservative policy of state regulation, financial injections into 
the market and deep economic integration of Germany's economy in the European 
Union contributed to overcoming of crisis. To reduce the budget deficit, Germany 
focused on the increasing the demand for exports and the related increase in 
industrial production, which contributed to job growth. The economy of Germany is 
innovative, with the advanced system of institutions and infrastructure, and good 
higher education system. During the World Economic Forum in 2010 the German 
financial system was recognized as the fifth healthiest and strongest in the world. 
Size of GDP per capita is U.S. $ 40.875 thousand.  
Argentina. This country is hardly affected by the crisis of 2008-2009, but 
experienced the crisis of the early 2000's, when its national currency was devalued 
by 70%. According to the National Bank of Argentina, in 2008 the economy grew 
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by 6%, but in December the industrial production declined by only by 0,9% 
compared to the previous month, while the national currency (peso) devalued only 
by 13,5%. Peso was not characterized by high levels of fluctuations, because the 
National Bank conducted the relevant policy. The lack of external funding 
stimulated the development of the domestic market. Argentine economy is oriented 
on efficiency; its advantages are the developed macroeconomic environment and the 
domestic market. During the World Economic Forum in 2010 Argentina's financial 
system was recognized as eighty-seventh in the world by the Global 
Competitiveness Index. Size of GDP per capita is 7.726 thousand dollars. 
Slovakia. The country, which in 2009 joined the euro zone, was characterized by 
one of the highest levels of development among the EU countries even before the 
crisis. After accession to the euro zone, Slovakia managed to avoid significant 
fluctuations in financial sector. With the onset of the crisis, despite temporary 
difficulties due to the adjustment to the policy of the euro zone, the economy 
continued to grow with the highest rates in the European Union. Labor force in 
Slovakia is three times cheaper than in its nearest neighbors: Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Poland, and six times than in Western Europe. So, thanks to low 
unemployment and avoiding significant social costs, the country is in a more 
advantageous position compared to others. The economy of Slovakia is in transition 
from focusing on efficiency to innovation; the benefits of the country are developed 
financial and domestic markets, labor productivity and potential technological 
development. During the World Economic Forum's in 2010 the financial system of 
Slovakia was recognized as sixtieth in the world by the Global Competitiveness 
Index. Size of GDP per capita is U.S. $ 16.282 thousand.  
Norway. Thanks to receiving substantial income from the sale of oil and gas in 
recent years, Norway was able to accumulate enough assets, which in times of 
financial instability were used to stimulate industry and support the level of social 
services. In addition, the governmental policy in regulation of financial markets is 
stronger, compared to other countries. The economy of Norway is innovative; its 
strengths are institutional and infrastructural development and high level of financial 
market development, technology and higher education. During the World Economic 
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Forum in 2010 Norway's financial system was recognized as fourteenth healthiest 
and strongest in the world. Size of GDP  per capita is U.S. $ 79.085 thousand.  
Kazakhstan. Constant demand for raw materials (oil and agricultural products), 
which are major exports of Kazakhstan, allowed the country's GDP to grow during 
2008-2009. The country benefited from the fact that during several years oil prices 
were based not on fundamental approaches, but on speculative transactions, which 
allowed Kazakhstan to grow a sufficient level of international reserves. In addition, 
the policy the government was aimed at reducing the social component in public 
expenditures. Problematic aspects of this country are underdeveloped banking and 
real sectors, but now these factors have not become a hurdle for Kazakhstan. The 
economy of this country is in transition from factor-oriented to efficiency-oriented, 
with a sufficiently developed macroeconomic environment and high productivity of 
labor potential. During the World Economic Forum in 2010 the financial system of 
Kazakhstan was recognized as seventy-second in the world by the Global 
Competitiveness Index. Size of GDP per capita is U.S. $7.019 thousand.  
Australia. Australian economy was initially less financially unstable compared 
with other developed countries, which was achieved through a rigid system of state 
regulation. The growth continued even during the crisis years thanks to the 
successful economic reforms: privatization, deregulation and tax reforms. GDP in 
2009 increased by 9,2%. Australian economy is innovative, its benefits are 
institutional and infrastructural development, high level of macroeconomic and 
financial market performance, and employment potential. During the World 
Economic Forum in 2010 Australia's financial system was considered as sixteenth in 
the world. Size of GDP per capita is U.S. $45.587 thousand. 
 
1.3. Comparative statistical analysis of macroeconomic indexes dynamics 
of world’s countries before and during crisis periods  
 
 
The analysis of macroeconomic indicators were conducted based on the data 
before, during and after the currency crisis as follows: 
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 Based on the approach that was described in the Chapter 1.4 – exchange 
market pressure index (EMP) – it was identified two groups of countries: 
“countries that are significantly affected by the crisis” and “countries that are 
not significantly affected by the crisis”. 
 For “the countries that are significantly affected by the crisis” it was defined 
crisis periods based on pointed weights and equivalent weights methods. 
Distribution of periods to the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis took place on 
the basis of the average exchange market pressure index (EMP). The crisis 
periods for “the countries that are significantly affected by the crisis” are 
shown in the Table 1.10. 
Table 1.9. The list of “countries that are significantly affected by the crisis” with 
the the respective periods of crisis indicating 
                   Crisis 
Period 
Country Name 
3rd 
Quarter  
2008 
4th Quarter 
2008 
1st Quarter 
2009 
Armenia 
   
Chile 
   
Costa Rica 
   
Georgia 
   
Iceland 
   
Republic of Korea 
   
Moldova 
   
Romania  
   
The Russian 
Federation    
Ukraine 
   
 
 crisis is observed 
 crisis is not observed 
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 On the basis of scientific sources analysis, empirical calculations and 
synthesis of international experts’ conclusions crisis periods  for “countries 
that are not significantly affected by the crisis” is defined as follows: 
1. pre-crisis period: 1st quarter of 2002 year –2nd quarter of 2008 year 
2. crisis period: 3rd  quarter of 2008 year – 1st quarter of 2009 year 
3. post-crisis period: 2nd quarter of 2009 year – 2nd quarter of 2010 year 
The crisis periods for the "countries that are significantly affected by the crisis" 
are shown in the Table 1.10. 
Table 1.10. The list of “countries that are not significantly affected by the crisis” 
with the the respective periods of crisis indicating 
                   Crisis 
Period 
Country Name 
3rd 
Quarter  
2008 
4th Quarter 
2008 
1st Quarter 
2009 
Argentina 
   
Australia 
   
Canada 
   
Croatia 
   
Germany 
   
Kazakhstan 
   
Norway 
   
Poland 
   
Slovakia 
   
Sweden 
   
 
 crisis is observed 
 crisis is not observed 
 
Under the chosen approach, we do not consider countries for which the 
exchange market pressure index does not identify any signs of the currency crisis. 
This would mean that the crisis has not affected the foreign exchange market of a 
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country (country is the object of direct interest in the context of this study) or that 
country is not sufficiently integrated into the global financial system (its experience 
in crisis resistance is not relevant and applicable). 
Indicator Analysis 
In order to conduct statistical analysis of macroeconomic dynamics of world 
economies during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods, the following 
parameter groups, chosen according to the Chapter 1.2, were analyzed: 
 Real sector: 
1. Real GDP growth. 
2. Gross fixed capital formation. 
5. Consumption of fixed capital. 
 Debt Load: 
1. Total external debt. 
2. Short-term external debt. 
 Balance of Payments: 
1. The trade balance. 
2. Current account balance. 
3. International reserves. 
4. Real effective exchange rate growth. 
5. Nominal effective exchange rate growth. 
 International variables: 
1. The ratio of real domestic and foreign interest rates. 
 Financial liberalization: 
1. Money multiplier. 
 Other financial variables: 
1. CPI growth rate. 
 65 
 Money supply growth rate. 
Indicators of two country groups are investigated based on the statistical analysis 
of means and medians. The results of the analysis are shown in the Tables 1.11-
1.38. 
Real sector  
 
Table 1.11. Average real GDP growth rate during the pre-crisis, crisis, and post-
crisis periods for “the countries that are not significantly affected by the crisis” 
(growth rate to the previous period, %) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
 Argentina 5.76 8.64 4.34 4.05 2.06 1.13 
Australia 3.51 3.55 1.27 0.88 2.04 2.58 
Canada 2.56 2.58 -1.00 -0.88 -0.36 -1.10 
Croatia 4.77 4.73 -1.61 0.21 -3.82 -4.48 
Germany  1.36 1.10 -2.70 -1.97 -1.26 -2.00 
Norway 2.42 2.70 0.83 1.17 -1.72 -1.13 
Poland 4.68 4.46 3.06 2.75 2.55 2.86 
Slovakia 6.81 7.20 0.90 1.63 -0.73 -2.57 
Sweden 3.17 3.34 -3.67 -4.99 -1.23 -1.20 
Mean 3.89 4.25 0.16 0.32 -0.27 -0.66 
 
Real GDP growth rate for “the countries that are not significantly affected 
by the crisis” (Table 1.11) is: 
- during the pre-crisis period: the average for countries 3.89% with the 
maximum value for Slovakia (6.8%) and minimum for Germany (1.36%); 
- during the crisis period: the average for countries 0.16% with the maximum 
value for Argentina (4.34%) and minimum for Sweden (-3.67%); 
- during the post-crisis period: the average for countries 0.27% with the 
maximum value for Poland (2.55%) and minimum for Croatia (-3.82%). 
Table 1.12. Average real GDP growth rate during the pre-crisis, crisis, and 
post-crisis periods for “the countries that are significantly affected by the 
crisis” 
(growth rate to the previous period, %) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
 Mean Median Mean Mean Median Mean 
Chile 4.51 4.71 0.74 0.74 -1.49 -1.77 
Costa Rica 5.96 6.04 3.13 3.13 -0.85 -0.15 
Georgia 8.38 8.57 -0.82 -0.82 -2.67 -0.62 
Iceland 4.57 4.48 -0.19 -0.19 -6.01 -6.27 
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Republic of 
Korea 4.81 4.98 -0.03 -0.03 2.64 3.52 
Romania 6.47 6.05 3.13 3.13 -5.28 -6.37 
The Russian 
Federation 7.06 7.48 -4.33 -4.33 -9.92 -9.92 
Ukraine 7.33 14.82 2.05 2.05 4.77 6.35 
Mean 6.14 7.14 0.46 0.46 -2.35 -1.90 
 
Real GDP growth rate for “the countries that are significantly affected by 
the crisis” (Table 1.12) is: 
- during the pre-crisis period: the average for countries 6.14%  with the 
maximum value for Georgia (8.38%) and minimum for Chile (4.51%); 
- during the crisis period: the average for countries 0.46% with the maximum 
value for Costa Rica (3.13%) and minimum for the Russian Federation (-
4.33%); 
- during the post-crisis period: the average for countries 2.35% with the 
maximum value for Ukraine (4.77%) and minimum for the Russian 
Federation (-9.92%). 
 
According to the analysis of average real GDP growth, a group of “countries 
that are significantly affected by the crisis” is characterized by a sharp decline in 
this indicator of 5.68 percentage points: from 6.14% in pre-crisis period to 0.46% 
during the crisis period (compared to another group of countries where the decline 
was 3.73 percentage points: from 3.89% to 0.16%). Total depth fall for this group of 
countries is 8.49 percentage points, unlike the other group, where it was 4.16 pct. 
Moreover, countries that are significantly affected by the crisis, suffer larger 
recession in post-crisis period (-2.35% vs. -0.27%). 
 
 
Table 1.13. The average rate of gross fixed capital formation in the pre-crisis, 
crisis, and post-crisis periods for “the countries that are not significantly affected 
by the crisis” 
(% of GDP) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
 Mean Median Mean Mean Median Mean 
Argentina 19.42 20.69 22.82 23.40 16.75 20.98 
Croatia 24.95 24.81 26.12 25.93 18.93 23.80 
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Kazakhstan 26.73 26.03 24.87 24.99 18.76 27.57 
Norway 19.08 18.18 21.56 21.66 16.72 21.29 
Poland 18.65 17.24 22.22 20.78 19.62 19.40 
Sweden 18.05 18.02 19.00 18.77 17.86 18.58 
Mean 18.22 17.94 19.63 19.48 15.63 18.91 
 
Gross fixed capital formation for “the countries that are not significantly 
affected by the crisis” (Table 1.13) is: 
- during the pre-crisis period: the average for countries 18.22%  with the 
maximum value for Kazakhstan (26.73%) and minimum for Sweden 
(18.05%). 
- during the crisis period: the average for countries 19.63% with the maximum 
value for Croatia (26.12%) and minimum for Sweden (19.00%). 
- during the post-crisis period: the average for countries 15.63% with the 
maximum value for Poland (19.62%) and minimum for Norway (16.72%). 
 
Table 1.14. The average rate of gross fixed capital formation in the pre-crisis, 
crisis, and post-crisis periods for “the countries that are significantly affected by 
the crisis” 
(% of GDP) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
 Mean Median Mean Mean Median Mean 
Chile 20.46 20.45 27.87 27.87 14.30 21.02 
Costa Rica 19.71 19.29 24.51 24.51 15.32 20.67 
Georgia 25.67 26.02 23.70 23.70 9.50 12.76 
Iceland 25.30 24.77 25.76 25.76 14.47 13.72 
Republic 
of Korea 28.93 29.35 31.13 31.13 23.77 27.53 
Romania 24.12 23.05 30.82 30.82 23.52 23.32 
Russian 
Federation 18.38 18.16 22.81 22.81 16.33 19.23 
Ukraine 23.02 22.89 21.29 21.29 14.02 17.16 
Mean 23.74 23.13 23.73 23.73 17.01 20.16 
 
Gross fixed capital formation for “the countries that are significantly 
affected by the crisis” (Table 1.14) is: 
- during the pre-crisis period: the average for countries 23.74%  with the 
maximum value for Republic of Korea (28.93%) and minimum for the 
Russian Federation (18.38%). 
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- during the crisis period: the average for countries 23.73% with the 
maximum value for Republic of Korea (31.13%) and minimum for Ukraine 
(21.29%). 
- during the post-crisis period: the average for countries 17.01% with the 
maximum value for Republic of Korea (23.77%) and minimum for Georgia 
(9.50%). 
 
According to the analysis of average gross fixed capital formation, a group of 
“countries that are significantly affected by the crisis”, is characterized by the 
decline of this index to 0.01 percentage points (from 23.74% in pre-crisis to 23.73% 
in the crisis period) compared with the group of countries that are not significantly 
affected by the crisis, where was an increase of 1.41 pct during the crisis period 
(from 18.22% to 19.63%). A decrease in the next period for the first group of 
countries was 6.72 pct for the second - 4 pct. Thus, the depth of drop for 
substantially affected countries is 6.73 pct. against 2.59 pct for another group. 
 
Table 1.15. The average rate of fixed capital consumption in the pre-crisis, crisis, 
and post-crisis periods for “the countries that are not significantly affected by the 
crisis” 
(% of GDP) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
 Mean Median Mean Mean Median Mean 
Argentina 73.12 73.06 72.78 72.07 58.55 72.47 
Croatia 80.74 82.62 77.51 80.49 61.38 77.67 
Kazakhstan 62.03 61.55 58.97 63.20 35.60 54.95 
Norway 63.87 63.82 59.55 59.26 52.39 64.50 
Poland 82.43 84.33 80.37 80.88 80.38 80.84 
Sweden 73.76 74.04 73.37 73.18 75.84 75.98 
Mean 62.56 63.05 60.73 61.67 52.39 61.29 
 
Rate of fixed capital consumption for “the countries that are not 
significantly affected by the crisis” (Table 1.13) is: 
- during the pre-crisis period: the average for countries 62.56%  with the 
maximum value for Poland (82.43%) and minimum for Kazakhstan (62.03%). 
- during the crisis period: the average for countries 60.73% with the maximum 
value for Poland (80.38%) and minimum for Kazakhstan (58.97%). 
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- during the post-crisis period: the average for countries 52.39% with the 
maximum value for Poland (80.38%) and minimum for Kazakhstan (35.60%). 
 
Table 1.15. The average rate of fixed capital consumption in the pre-crisis, crisis, 
and post-crisis periods for “the countries that are significantly affected by the 
crisis” 
(% of GDP) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
 Mean Median Mean Mean Median Mean 
Chile 70.06 69.96 77.12 77.12 48.79 72.88 
Costa Rica 80.32 79.37 81.93 81.93 62.73 82.13 
Georgia 90.31 87.36 98.10 98.10 71.92 101.06 
Iceland 82.46 82.38 75.94 75.94 77.04 78.19 
Republic of 
Korea 67.90 67.62 69.96 69.96 59.12 69.35 
Romania 85.99 84.71 78.84 78.84 82.70 81.37 
The Russian 
Federation 67.13 67.85 75.27 75.27 58.48 71.11 
Ukraine 76.12 76.96 91.01 91.01 67.63 83.81 
Mean 82.40 81.79 87.93 87.93 67.33 83.65 
 
Rate of fixed capital consumption for “the countries that are significantly 
affected by the crisis” (Table 1.13) is: 
- during the pre-crisis period: the average for countries 82.40%  with the 
maximum value for Georgia (90.31%) and minimum for the Russian 
Federation (62.03%). 
- during the crisis period: the average for countries 87.93% with the maximum 
value for Georgia (98.10%) and minimum for Republic of Korea (69.96%). 
- during the post-crisis period: the average for countries 67.33% with the 
maximum value for Romania (82.70%) and minimum for Chile (48.79%). 
 
According to the values of the average rate of fixed capital consumption, a group 
of countries that are significantly affected by the crisis is characterized by 
generally higher levels of fixed capital consumption, compared with a group of 
countries, which are not significantly affected by the crisis, during all three periods. 
Score for the first group of countries grew by 5.53 pct. (from 82.40% in the pre-
crisis to 87.93% in the crisis period) unlike the second group, where it decreased by 
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1.83 pct. (from 62.54% to 60.73%, respectively). A decrease of the indicator in 
the next period for the first group of countries is equal to 20.6 pct., while for the 
second it is 8.34 pct. Total depth of drop for the substantially affected countries 
is15.07 pct. against 10.17 pct. for another group. 
 
Debt Load 
 
Table 1.17. The average rate of total external debt durinf the pre-crisis, crisis and 
post-crisis periods for countries that are not significantly affected by the crisis 
(% of GDP) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
 Mean Median Mean Mean Median Mean 
Argentina 52 42 34 33 25 31 
Croatia 176 242 289 297 260 307 
Kazakhstan 142 131 234 202 140 208 
Norway 297 359 528 555 403 492 
Poland 146 148 176 164 150 191 
Slovakia 128 155 109 158 - - 
Sweden 251 400 609 588 619 632 
Mean  170 211 282 285 266 310 
 
 
Value of total external debt to “the countries that are not significantly 
affected by the crisis” (Table 1.17) is: 
 
- during the pre-crisis period: the average for countries 170%  with the 
maximum value for Norway (297%) and minimum for Argentina (52%). 
- during the crisis period: the average for countries 282% with the maximum 
value for Sweden (609%) and minimum for Argentina (34%). 
- during the post-crisis period: the average for countries 266% with the 
maximum value for Sweden (82.70%) and minimum for Argentina (48.79%). 
Table 1.18. The average rate of total external debt durinf the pre-crisis, crisis and 
post-crisis periods for countries that are significantly affected by the crisis 
(% of GDP) 
 Before the crisis During the crisis After the crisis 
 Mean Median Mean Mean Median Mean 
Armenia 109 99 248 248 180 169 
Chile 110 125 174 174 100 141 
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Costa Rica 75 92 112 112 74 102 
Georgia 139 140 185 185 152 217 
Iceland 76 49 297 297 436 439 
Republic of 
Korea 106 98 187 187 149 170 
Moldova 173 195 314 314 151 238 
Romania 154 154 140 140 238 235 
The Russian 
Federation 105 115 144 144 102 123 
Ukraine 130 163 349 349 263 317 
Mean 117 123 215 215 185 215 
 
Value of total external debt to “the countries that are significantly affected 
by the crisis” (Table 1.17) is: 
 
- during the pre-crisis period: the average for countries 117%  with the 
maximum value for Moldova (173%) and minimum for Costa Rica (75%). 
- during the crisis period: the average for countries 215% with the maximum 
value for Ukraine (349%) and minimum for Costa Rica (112%). 
- during the post-crisis period: the average for countries 185% with the 
maximum value for Iceland (436%) and minimum for Costa Rica (74%). 
 
Group of countries that are significantly affected by the crisis in general is 
characterized by lower rate of total external debt than the group of countries that are 
not significantly affected by the crisis, during all periods.  The score for the first 
group of countries increased by 98 pct (from 117% in the pre-crisis to 215% in the 
crisis period), unlike the second group, where growth was 112 pct. (from 170% to 
282%). In the subsequent period, both indices decreased: by 30 pct. for the first 
group and by 53 pct. for the second one. Overall, according to the data of all 
periods, indices increased: for the substantially affected countries by 68 pct. and by 
59 pct. for another group. 
Table 1.19. The average of the index of short term debt before, during and 
after crisis period for countries insignificantly damaged by crisis 
 (у %, from GDP) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
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Argentina 30 30 31 32 30 30 
Australia 33 34 34 34 32 32 
Canada 38 38 41 42 38 38 
Croatia 13 13 12 12 12 12 
Germany 39 39 39 37 37 37 
Kazakhstan  23 24 14 14 15 15 
Norway 46 56 53 52 47 47 
Poland 18 17 27 26 24 24 
Slovakia 48 50 54 51 60 60 
Sweden 32 44 51 51 44 44 
Average  32 34 36 35 34 34 
 
The index of short term debt for countries “insignificantly damaged by the crisis” 
(see table 1.19) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 32% with maximum for Slovakia (48%) 
and minimum for Croatia (13%) 
- During the crisis period in average is 36% with maximum for Slovakia (54%) 
and minimum for Croatia (12%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 34% with maximum for Slovakia (60%) 
and minimum for Croatia (12%) 
 
Table 1.20. The average of the index of short term debt before, during and 
after crisis period for countries significantly damaged by crisis 
 (у %, from GDP) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
Armenia 19 19 14 14 11 12 
Chili 19 18 24 24 23 23 
Costa-Rika 26 36 45 45 35 31 
Georgia  20 20 18 18 14 14 
The 
Republic of 
Korea 38 36 43 43 39 38 
Moldova 39 40 41 41 38 38 
Romania 33 33 32 32 20 18 
The 
Russian 
Federation 20 20 15 15 12 12 
Ukraine 32 29 20 20 20 20 
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Average  27 28 28 28 24 23 
 
The index of short term debt for countries “significantly damaged by the crisis” 
(see table 1.120) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 27% with maximum for Moldova (39%) 
and minimum for Armenia and Chili (19%) 
- During the crisis period in average is 28 with maximum for Costa-Rika  
(45%) and minimum for Armenia (14%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 24% with maximum for The Republic of 
Korea (39%) and minimum for Armenia (11%) 
According to the analysis of the average of the short term debt, the group of 
countries that were significantly damaged by the crisis show the rise of this index 
for about 1 percentage point (from 27% in before-crisis period to 28% in during-
crisis period); for the other group of countries the index rose for 4 percentage points 
(from 32% to 36%). For both group of countries the index fell for 4 percentage 
points in the next period. This means that the average meaning of short term debt for 
the significantly damaged countries in after crisis period equals 24%, and for 
insignificantly damaged - 34%. In total the index of the first group fell for 3 
percentage points, and for the second there was a rise for 2 percentage points.  
Balance of payments 
Table 1.21. The average of trade balance in before, during and after crisis periods 
for countries insignificantly damaged by the crisis 
 (fraction from GDP) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
 Argentina 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 
Croatia -0,08 -0,15 -0,05 -0,15 -0,03 -0,05 
Kazakhstan  0,08 0,09 0,12 0,11 0,06 0,03 
Norway 0,15 0,15 0,18 0,19 0,08 0,12 
Poland -0,02 -0,02 -0,03 -0,04 0,00 0,00 
Slovakia -0,03 -0,02 -0,01 -0,01 0,00 0,00 
Sweden 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,05 0,06 
Average  0,03 0,02 0,04 0,03 0,03 0,03 
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The index of trade balance for countries “insignificantly damaged by the crisis” 
(see table 1.21) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 3% with maximum for Norway (15%) 
and minimum for Croatia (-8%) 
- During the crisis period in average is 4% with maximum for Norway (18%) 
and minimum for Croatia (-5%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 3% with maximum for Poland (8%) and 
minimum for Croatia (-3%) 
 
Table 1.22. The average of trade balance in before, during and after crisis periods 
for countries significantly damaged by the crisis 
 (fraction from GDP) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
Armenia -0,20 -0,18 -0,36 -0,36 -0,24 -0,27 
Chili 0,09 0,09 -0,02 -0,02 0,05 0,07 
Costa-Rika -0,04 -0,04 -0,12 -0,12 -0,01 0,00 
Georgia  -0,20 -0,18 -0,34 -0,34 -0,13 -0,17 
Iceland -0,08 -0,08 -0,06 -0,06 0,09 0,08 
The 
Republic of 
Korea 0,02 0,01 -0,01 -0,01 0,03 0,04 
Moldova -0,40 -0,41 -0,45 -0,45 -0,22 -0,32 
Romania -0,10 -0,10 -0,10 -0,10 -0,06 -0,06 
The 
Russian 
Federation 0,12 0,11 0,06 0,06 0,07 0,08 
Ukraine 0,00 0,01 -0,07 -0,07 -0,01 -0,01 
Average  -0,08 -0,08 -0,15 -0,15 -0,04 -0,06 
 
The index of trade balance for countries “significantly damaged by the crisis” (see 
table 1.22) 
- Before the crisis period in average is -8% with maximum for The Russian 
Federation (12%) and minimum for Moldova (-40%) 
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- During the crisis period in average is -15% with maximum for The Russian 
Federation (6%) and minimum for Moldova (-45%) 
- After the crisis period in average is -4% with maximum for Iceland (9%) and 
minimum for Armenia (-24%) 
The main defining feature for the trade balance of countries that were 
significantly damaged by the crisis is a negative dynamics of the index during all 
periods of analysis. For the group of countries that were insignificantly damaged 
from the crisis the index is above zero (positive). First group of country show the 
decrease of the index for 7 percentage points (from -8 in before crisis period to -15 
in the during the crisis period); in contrast to the second group, where there was a 
growth of the index for 1 percentage point (from 3% to 4%). In the next period the 
index of the first group of countries grew  for 1 percentage point, and for the second 
group there was a decrease for 1 percentage point (to -4% and 3 accordingly).  
Therefore, the trade balance hadn’t changed dramatically for the countries 
insignificantly damaged by the crisis and rose for those significantly damaged in 
average for 4 percentage points still maintaining negative meaning. 
 
Table 1.23. The average meaning of the current account index of trade 
balance index before, during and after crisis periods for countries 
insignificantly damaged by the crisis 
 (fraction to GDP) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
 Argentina 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 
Croatia -0,08 -0,15 -0,06 -0,16 -0,04 -0,07 
Kazakhstan  -0,02 -0,02 0,00 -0,01 -0,02 0,00 
Norway 0,15 0,13 0,18 0,21 0,09 0,12 
Poland -0,03 -0,03 -0,03 -0,05 -0,01 -0,01 
Slovakia -0,06 -0,06 -0,04 -0,05 0,00 0,00 
Sweden 0,07 0,07 0,09 0,09 0,06 0,08 
Average  0,01 -0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,02 
 
The current account index of the trade balance for countries “insignificantly 
damaged by the crisis” (see table 1.23) 
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- Before the crisis period in average is 1% with maximum for Norway (15%) 
and minimum for Croatia (-8%) 
- During the crisis period in average is 2% with maximum for Norway (18%) 
and minimum for Croatia (-6%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 1% with maximum for Norway (9%) and 
minimum for Croatia (-4%) 
Table 1.24. The average meaning of the current account index of trade 
balance before, during and after crisis periods for countries significantly 
damaged by the crisis  
 (fractions, to GDP) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
Armenia -0,06 -0,04 -0,20 -0,20 -0,14 -0,15 
Chili 0,02 0,02 -0,06 -0,06 0,02 0,02 
Costa-Rika -0,05 -0,06 -0,12 -0,12 -0,02 0,00 
Georgia  -0,14 -0,13 -0,24 -0,24 -0,09 -0,09 
Iceland -0,13 -0,13 -0,36 -0,36 -0,03 -0,03 
The 
Republic of 
Korea 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,03 0,04 
Moldova -0,09 -0,08 -0,21 -0,21 -0,04 -0,05 
Romania -0,09 -0,09 -0,07 -0,07 -0,05 -0,05 
The 
Russian 
Federation 0,09 0,09 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,04 
Ukraine 0,03 0,03 -0,07 -0,07 -0,01 -0,01 
Average  -0,04 -0,04 -0,13 -0,13 -0,03 -0,03 
 
The current account index of trade balance for countries “significantly damaged by 
the crisis” (see table 1.24) 
- Before the crisis period in average is -4% with maximum for The Russian 
Federation (9%) and minimum for Georgia (-14%) 
- During the crisis period in average is -13% with maximum for The Russian 
Federation (3%) and minimum for Iceland (-36%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 34% with maximum for The Russian 
Federation (4%) and minimum for Armenia (-14%) 
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For countries that were significantly damaged by the crisis the current account 
index is characterized by the negative level and it is positive for the other group of 
the countries. First group of the countries is defined by the decrease of the index for 
9 percentage points  (from -4% in before crisis period to -13% in the during the 
crisis period), while the second shows the slight increase of the index for 1 
percentage points (from 1% to 2%). In the next period index of the first group of 
countries has increased for 1 percentage points, and for the second there was a 
decrease for 1 percentage point (to -3 and 1 respectively). Therefore the current 
account of trade balance has change little for the countries that experienced 
insignificant damage from the crisis and did increased for 1 percentage point for the 
countries that suffered significantly from the crisis. 
 
Table 1.25. The average meaning of the international reserves index before, 
during and after crisis periods for countries insignificantly damaged by the 
crisis  
 (fractions, to GDP) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
 Argentina 12 12 15 14 14 14 
Croatia 82 82 80 81 86 86 
Kazakhstan  58 55 62 53 68 69 
Norway 58 60 49 51 50 50 
Poland 54 55 57 54 68 65 
Slovakia 108 115 72 72   
Sweden 23 24 27 26 39 39 
Average  57 57 52 50 54 54 
 
The index of international reserves for countries “insignificantly damaged by the 
crisis” (see table 1.25) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 57% with maximum for Slovakia 
(108%) and minimum for Argentina (12%) 
- During the crisis period in average is 52% with maximum for Croatia (80%) 
and minimum for Argentina (15%) 
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- After the crisis period in average is 54% with maximum for Croatia (86%) 
and minimum for Argentina (14%) 
Table 1.26. The average meaning of the international reserves index before, 
during and after crisis periods for countries significantly damaged by the 
crisis  
 (fractions, to GDP) 
 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
Armenia 63 52 101 101 99 94 
Chili 62 58 66 66 58 58 
Costa-Rika 46 44 54 54 55 55 
Georgia  30 27 48 48 66 66 
Iceland 31 26 97 97 118 116 
The 
Republic of 
Korea 96 96 104 104 113 112 
Moldova 76 75 110 110 96 100 
Romania 67 67 65 65 106 105 
The 
Russian 
Federation 90 83 130 130 123 121 
Ukraine 61 65 99 99 87 87 
Average  62 59 87 87 92 91 
 
The international reserves index for countries “significantly damaged by the 
crisis” (see table 1.26) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 63% with maximum for the Republic of 
Korea (96%) and minimum for Georgia (30%) 
- During the crisis period in average is 87% with maximum for The Russian 
Federation (130%) and minimum for Georgia (48%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 74% with maximum for The Russian 
Federation (123%) and minimum for Costa-Rika (55%) 
 
In accordance to the analysis of the average meaning of international reserves, 
the group of countries that were damaged significantly from the crisis are 
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characterized by the rise of the index for 25 percentage points (from 62% in the 
before-crisis period to 87% in the during-crisis period). As for the other set of 
countries the index decreased for 5 percentage points (from 57% to 52%). For the 
first group of countries the index increased for 5 percentage points in the next 
period, reaching 92%, and as for the other group of countries it rose by 2 percentage 
points and reached 54 percentage points. The depth of the decrease for the 
insignificantly damaged countries accounts for 3 percentage points, while for the 
other countries the index rose substantially – for 30 percentage points. 
 
Table 1.27. The average meaning of the growth rate of the real effective 
exchange rate before, during and after crisis periods for countries 
insignificantly damaged by the crisis  
 (y% to the previous period) 
 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median Average median 
 Argentina 1,20 1,20 -7,42 -2,95 5,02 5,62 
Canada 0,94 0,88 -3,42 -1,73 3,03 3,48 
Croatia 0,50 0,37 -0,41 -0,53 -0,01 -0,58 
Kazakhstan  0,36 0,22 -0,54 -1,53 -0,99 0,54 
Norway 0,34 0,28 -3,26 -1,53 1,92 1,83 
Poland 0,53 0,61 -9,03 -13,97 2,18 2,66 
Slovakia 1,96 1,10 2,82 3,92 -1,15 0,01 
Sweden 0,28 0,39 -5,49 -5,02 1,54 1,53 
Average  0,76 0,63 -3,34 -2,91 1,44 1,88 
 
The growth rate of the real effective exchange rate for countries “insignificantly 
damaged by the crisis” (see table 1.27) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 0,76% with maximum for Slovakia 
(1,96%) and minimum for Sweden (0,28%) 
- During the crisis period in average is -3,34% with maximum for Slovakia 
(2,82%) and minimum for Poland (-9,03%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 1,44% with maximum for Australia 
(5,02%) and minimum for Slovakia (-1,15%) 
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Table 1.28. The average meaning of the growth rate of the real effective 
exchange rate before, during and after crisis periods for countries 
significantly damaged by the crisis  
 (y% to the previous period) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
Armenia 1,56 1,47 -1,52 -1,52 -4,33 -6,31 
Chili 0,02 0,11 -7,12 -7,12 2,05 2,17 
Costa-Rika -0,31 -0,18 -2,48 -2,48 3,11 1,13 
Georgia  1,19 0,35 4,63 4,63 -2,58 -2,08 
Iceland 0,13 1,00 -3,36 -3,36 -1,86 0,37 
Moldova 1,82 1,82 4,23 4,23 -4,60 -3,42 
Romania 0,92 1,16 -5,49 -5,49 -0,81 -0,40 
The 
Russian 
Federation 1,53 1,33 -7,61 -7,61 3,96 4,33 
Ukraine 0,52 0,03 -9,60 -9,60 -0,12 -1,49 
Average  0,82 0,79 -3,14 -3,14 -0,57 -0,63 
 
 
The growth rate of the real effective exchange rate for countries “significantly 
damaged by the crisis” (see table 1.28) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 0,82% with maximum for Moldova 
(1,82%) and minimum for Costa-Rika (-0,31%) 
- During the crisis period in average is -3,14% with maximum for Georgia 
(4,63%) and minimum for Ukraine (-9,6%) 
- After the crisis period in average is -0,57% with maximum for The Russian 
Federation (3,96%) and minimum for Moldova (-4,6%) 
According to the average meaning of the growth rate of the real effective 
exchange rate the group of countries that experienced significant loses from the 
crisis show the decrease in the index for 3,96 percentage points (from  0,82% to -
3,14% in the before-crisis and after-crisis periods respectively), while the second set 
of countries had suffered a decrease for 4,1 percentage points (from 0,76 to -3,34%). 
In the next period  the index rose for the 2,57 percentage points for the first group of 
countries and for 4,78 percentage points – for the second. All in all, the rate of 
growth of real effective exchange rate decreased for 1,39 percentage points for the 
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countries significantly influenced by the crisis and the increase for 0,68 
percentage point for the other set of countries. 
 Table 1.29. The average meaning of the nominal effective exchange rate 
before, during and after crisis periods for countries insignificantly damaged by 
the crisis (%, level) 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median Average median 
 Argentina 96,53 98,37 93,30 86,57 105,10 107,74 
Canada 96,06 97,45 98,77 96,91 105,03 103,73 
Croatia 99,77 99,98 103,84 104,48 103,82 103,79 
Kazakhstan  99,64 100,26 103,63 104,11 104,09 104,83 
Norway 99,78 99,65 96,75 94,15 99,74 101,57 
Poland 100,19 101,33 108,85 108,55 100,18 101,08 
Slovakia 101,47 99,38 129,37 128,73 131,17 132,14 
Sweden 100,15 101,17 94,20 92,60 94,16 94,54 
Average  99,20 99,70 103,59 102,01 105,41 106,18 
 
The index of the nominal effective exchange rate for countries “insignificantly 
damaged by the crisis” (see table 1.29) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 99,20% with maximum for Slovakia 
(101,47%) and minimum for Canada (96,06%) 
- During the crisis period in average is 103,59% with maximum for Slovakia 
(131,17%) and minimum for Australia (03,30%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 105,41% with maximum for Slovakia 
(131,17%) and minimum for Sweden (94,16%) 
Table 1.30. The average meaning of the nominal effective exchange rate 
before, during and after crisis periods for countries significantly damaged 
by the crisis  
(%, level) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
Armenia 104,49 101,62 142,47 142,47 115,64 115,87 
Chili 97,63 97,93 86,98 86,98 98,85 98,68 
Costa-Rika 107,77 101,14 80,25 80,25 82,46 82,48 
Georgia  99,80 100,23 122,49 122,49 112,18 110,35 
Iceland 89,59 89,50 65,94 65,94 47,76 47,60 
The 
Republic of 98,03 95,80 80,99 80,99 77,89 78,00 
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Korea 
Moldova 101,59 99,25 125,49 125,49 106,49 105,77 
Romania 102,10 102,35 96,87 96,87 89,23 89,24 
The 
Russian 
Federation 101,38 101,08 92,63 92,63 89,86 89,95 
Ukraine 100,15 99,96 76,33 76,33 63,60 63,46 
Average  100,25 98,89 97,04 97,04 88,40 88,14 
 
The index of the nominal effective exchange rate for countries “significantly 
damaged by the crisis” (see table 1.30) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 100,25% with maximum for Costa-Rika 
(107,77%) and minimum for Iceland (89,59%) 
- During the crisis period in average is 97,04% with maximum for Armenia 
(142,47%) and minimum for Iceland (47,76%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 88,04% with maximum for Armenia 
(115,64%) and minimum for Iceland (47,76%) 
Following the analysis of the nominal effective exchange rate, the group of 
countries that were significantly damaged by the crisis are characterized by the fall 
of the index for 3,21 percentage points (from 100,25 to 97,04 in before-crisis and 
after crisis periods respectively), while the index of the second group of countries 
rose for 4,39 percentage points (from 99,2 to 103,59%). In the following period the 
index went on to decrease for the first group of countries (for 8,64 percentage points 
to 88,4%) and to increase for the second set of countries (for 1,82 percentage points 
to 105,41%). The whole depth of decrease for the countries significantly influenced 
by the crisis accounts for 11,85 percentage points, when the total growth of the 
index for the countries of the second group amounts for 6,21 percentage points. 
 
International variables 
 
Table 1.31. The average meaning of the real internal and external interest 
rate before, during and after crisis periods for countries insignificantly 
damaged by the crisis  
 (y%, level) 
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 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median Average median 
Argentina -12,40 -4,58 -20,14 -18,26 -12,24 -11,27 
Australia -5,62 -6,02 -5,49 -4,94 -5,95 -6,07 
Canada -1,79 -1,90 -1,52 -1,59 -1,82 -1,90 
Croatia -7,90 -8,55 -8,40 -8,06 -10,74 -10,67 
Germany -1,82 -1,32 -3,24 -3,36 -4,18 -4,06 
Norway -2,53 -2,06 -4,49 -4,56 -3,10 -3,77 
Average  -5,43 -4,07 -7,21 -6,80 -6,33 -6,29 
 
The index of the real internal and external interest rate for countries “insignificantly 
damaged by the crisis” (see table 1.31) 
- Before the crisis period in average is -5,43% with maximum for Canada (-
1,79%) and minimum for Argentina (-12,40%) 
- During the crisis period in average is -7,21% with maximum for Canada (-
1,52%) and minimum for Argentina (-20,14%) 
- After the crisis period in average is -6,33% with maximum for Canada (-
1,82%) and minimum for Argentina (-12,24%) 
 
Table 1.32. The average meaning of the real internal and external interest 
rate before, during and after crisis periods for countries significantly 
damaged by the crisis  
(y%, level) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
Armenia -15,44 -14,57 -17,94 -17,94 -18,51 -18,44 
Chili -4,48 -3,69 -15,29 -15,29 -5,57 -3,93 
Costa-Rika -18,69 -21,32 -14,26 -14,26 -18,17 -17,87 
Georgia  -22,32 -18,65 -20,43 -20,43 -24,60 -25,02 
Iceland -12,48 -11,54 -17,70 -17,70 -10,45 -16,26 
The 
Republic of 
Korea -3,13 -3,53 -4,53 -4,53 -5,06 -5,10 
Moldova -17,06 -17,88 -21,86 -21,86 -18,18 -17,81 
Romania -18,25 -17,14 -14,46 -14,46 -15,90 -16,31 
The 
Russian 
Federation -8,72 -8,24 -13,75 -13,75 -13,32 -13,60 
Ukraine -14,40 -14,46 -22,07 -22,07 -17,67 -17,89 
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Average  -13,50 -13,10 -16,23 -16,23 -14,74 -15,22 
 
The index of the real internal and external interest rate for countries “significantly 
damaged by the crisis” (see table 1.32) 
- Before the crisis period in average is -13,50% with maximum for The 
Republic of Korea (-3,13%) and minimum for Georgia (-22,32%) 
- During the crisis period in average is -16,23% with maximum for Republic of 
Korea (-4,53%) and minimum for Ukraine (-22,07%) 
- After the crisis period in average is -14,74% with maximum for Republic of 
Korea (-5,06%) and minimum for Georgia (-24,60%) 
The average meaning of the index of real internal and external interest rates is 
negative for both group of countries during all 3 periods. The dynamics of the 
decrease of the index for the countries that suffered significantly from the crisis 
amounts for 2,73 percentage points (from -13,5% in before-crisis to -16,23% in 
during the crisis periods), while for the other group of countries the decrease 
accounts for 1,78 percentage points (from -5,43% to 7,21%). During the next period 
the index grew for both countries – for 1,49 percentage points to -14,74% for the 
first group and for 0,88 percentage points to -6,33% for the second group. All in all 
the depth of the decrease for the countries damaged significantly amounts for 1,24 
for 1,49 percentage points to -14,74 for the first group, for the other set of countries 
– 0,9 percentage point. 
Financial liberalization 
 
Table 1.33. The average meaning of the monetary multiplication index 
before, during and after crisis periods for countries insignificantly damaged 
by the crisis  
 (fraction,  level) 
 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median Average median 
Kazakhstan  2,18 2,23 2,49 2,46 2,06 2,09 
Poland 5,40 5,40 5,15 5,13 5,65 5,71 
Sweden 12,23 11,63 10,74 10,04 8,17 8,55 
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Average  6,60 6,42 6,12 5,88 5,30 5,45 
 
 
The index of the monetary multiplication for the countries “insignificantly 
damaged by the crisis” (see table 1.33) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 6,60 with maximum for Sweden (12,23) 
and minimum for Kazakhstan (2,18) 
- During the crisis period in average is 6,12 with maximum for Sweden (10,74) 
and minimum for Kazakhstan (2,49) 
- After the crisis period in average is 5,30 with maximum for Sweden (8,17) 
and minimum for Kazakhstan (2,06) 
 
Table 1.34. The average meaning of the monetary multiplication index 
before, during and after crisis periods for countries significantly damaged 
by the crisis  
(fraction,  level) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
Armenia 1,19 1,16 0,91 0,91 0,92 0,91 
Chili 3,93 3,82 4,43 4,43 4,22 4,13 
Costa-Rika 1,17 1,17 1,39 1,39 1,48 1,46 
Georgia  1,04 1,00 1,13 1,13 1,15 1,14 
Iceland 7,16 6,56 4,20 4,20 4,17 5,45 
The 
Republic of 
Korea 25,41 25,18 26,24 26,24 20,52 24,75 
Moldova 1,69 1,66 1,94 1,94 1,99 2,00 
Romania 3,97 4,15 3,44 3,44 3,86 3,78 
The 
Russian 
Federation 2,13 2,07 2,62 2,62 2,75 2,51 
Ukraine 2,45 2,44 2,69 2,69 2,51 2,49 
Average  5,01 4,92 4,90 4,90 4,36 4,86 
The index of the monetary multiplication for countries “significantly damaged by 
the crisis” (see table 1.34) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 5,01 with maximum for The Republic of 
Korea (25,41) and minimum for Georgia (1,04) 
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- During the crisis period in average is 4,90 with maximum for The Republic 
of Korea (26,24) and minimum for Armenia (0,91) 
- After the crisis period in average is 4,36 with maximum for The Republic of 
Korea (20,52) and minimum for Armenia (0,92) 
According to the analysis of the money multiplier , the set of countries that 
significantly suffered from the crisis are characterized by the decrease of the index 
for 1,1 percentage points (from 5,01 to 4,90 in before-crisis and during-crisis 
periods respectively). In the next period index continued to decrease for both set of 
countries (for the first group  for 0,54 point to 4,36; for the second – for 0,82 to 
5,30). The total depth of the fall  for the countries that were damaged significantly 
by the crisis amount for 0,65 points, and for insignificantly damaged – 1,3 points. 
 
Other financial variables 
Table 1.35. The average meaning of the growth rate of CPI  index before, 
during and after crisis periods for countries insignificantly damaged by the 
crisis  
 (y% to previous year) 
 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median Average median 
Argentina 12,14 8,95 7,79 7,84 7,63 7,12 
Australia 2,90 2,82 3,71 3,69 2,15 2,11 
Canada 2,20 2,16 2,19 1,91 0,60 0,79 
Croatia 2,77 2,26 5,24 4,49 1,47 1,23 
Germany 1,69 1,65 1,85 1,65 0,46 0,44 
Kazakhstan  8,55 7,49 13,25 11,53 6,97 6,94 
Norway 1,62 1,49 3,58 3,60 2,36 2,60 
Poland 2,17 1,87 4,10 3,85 3,46 3,64 
Slovakia 4,85 4,19 4,27 4,80 1,05 1,12 
Sweden 1,58 1,59 2,51 2,45 0,04 -0,37 
Average  4,05 3,45 4,85 4,58 2,62 2,56 
 
The index of the growth rate of CPI  for countries “insignificantly damaged by the 
crisis” (see table 1.35) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 4,05% with maximum for Argentina 
(12,14%) and minimum for Sweden (1,58%) 
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- During the crisis period in average is 4,85% with maximum for Kazakhstan 
(13,25%) and minimum for Germany (1,85%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 2,62% with maximum for Argentina 
(7,63%) and minimum for Sweden (0,04%) 
 
- Table 1.36. The average meaning of the growth rate of CPI  index before, 
during and after crisis periods for countries significantly damaged by the 
crisis  
-  (y% to previous year) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
Armenia 4,26 4,35 2,00 2,00 5,26 4,87 
Chili 3,52 2,86 8,61 8,61 1,28 0,70 
Costa-Rika 10,97 10,62 15,11 15,11 8,45 6,03 
Georgia  7,59 7,03 6,25 6,25 2,68 2,84 
Iceland 4,78 4,12 14,04 14,04 11,46 11,01 
The 
Republic of 
Korea 3,01 3,05 5,02 5,02 2,74 2,63 
Moldova 11,37 11,83 3,12 3,12 2,12 -0,60 
Romania 11,34 8,85 6,81 6,81 5,23 4,81 
The 
Russian 
Federation 12,21 12,55 13,74 13,74 9,24 9,21 
Ukraine 10,38 9,65 21,50 21,50 12,65 13,34 
Average  7,94 7,49 9,62 9,62 6,11 5,48 
The index of the growth rate of CPI  for countries “significantly damaged by the 
crisis” (see table 1.36) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 7,94% with maximum for The Russian 
Federation (12,21%) and minimum for The Republic of Korea (3,01%) 
- During the crisis period in average is 9,62% with maximum for Ukraine 
(21,50%) and minimum for Armenia (2,00%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 6,11% with maximum for Ukraine 
(12,65%) and minimum for Chili (1,28%) 
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In accordance to the conducted analysis of the CPI, the group of countries 
that were influenced significantly by the crises is characterized by the rise for 1,68 
percentage points (from 7.94% in the before-crisis period to 9,62% in the during-
crises period); while the index of the second group increased for 0,8 percentage 
points (from 4,05% to 4,85%). During the following period the index increased: for 
the first group for 3,51 percentage points (to 6,11%),  for the second group of 
countries for 2,23 percentage points (to 2,62%). The total fall of the index of the 
CPI for the first group of countries amounts 1,83 percentage points, and for the 
second – 1,43 percentage points. 
 
 
Table 1.37. The average meaning of the growth rate of money supply 
before, during and after crisis periods for countries insignificantly damaged 
by the crisis  
 (y% to previous year) 
 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median Average median 
Argentina 6,20 6,38 3,02 3,06 6,50 6,68 
Kazakhstan  7,15 6,94 4,31 7,07 6,77 7,25 
Norway 2,19 2,31 -0,15 - - - 
Poland 2,42 2,76 4,47 4,05 1,66 1,27 
Slovakia 1,84 2,23 1,88 1,52 - - 
Sweden 1,82 2,00 2,79 2,81 1,08 1,23 
Average  3,60 3,77 2,72 3,09 2,67 2,74 
The index of the growth rate of money supply for countries “insignificantly 
damaged by the crisis” (see table 1.37) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 3,60% with maximum for Kazakhstan 
(7,15%) and minimum for Sweden (1,82%) 
- During the crisis period in average is 2,72% with maximum for Poland 
(4,47%) and minimum for Norway (-0,15%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 2,67% with maximum for kazakhstan 
(6,77%) and minimum for Sweden (1,08%) 
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Table 1.38. The average meaning of the growth rate of money supply 
before, during and after crisis periods for countries significantly damaged 
by the crisis  
 (y% to previous year) 
 
 Before Crisis During Crisis After Crisis 
 average median average median average median 
Armenia 7,65 7,16 -33,54 -33,54 4,22 6,48 
Chili 3,24 3,22 5,94 5,94 -0,28 -1,01 
Costa-Rika 5,34 5,92 -0,38 -0,38 2,15 2,47 
Georgia  6,85 6,87 -18,33 -18,33 4,29 5,22 
Iceland 8,30 5,01 5,24 5,24 4,25 0,00 
The 
Republic of 
Korea 2,07 1,81 2,07 2,07 2,04 2,40 
Moldova 6,96 5,79 -21,17 -21,17 4,99 3,57 
Romania 6,99 6,23 4,65 4,65 1,71 2,04 
The 
Russian 
Federation 8,68 7,40 -8,19 -8,19 7,35 7,46 
Ukraine 9,03 9,63 -0,93 -0,93 2,95 1,96 
Average  6,51 5,90 -6,46 -6,46 3,37 3,06 
The index of the growth rate of money supply for countries “insignificantly 
damaged by the crisis” (see table 1.38) 
- Before the crisis period in average is 6,51% with maximum for Ukraine 
(9,03%) and minimum for The Republic of Korea (2,07%) 
- During the crisis period in average is -6,46% with maximum for Chili 
(5,94%) and minimum for Armenia (-33,54%) 
- After the crisis period in average is 3,37% with maximum for The Russian 
Federation (7,35%) and minimum for Chili (-0,28%) 
 
According to the analyses of the growth of the money supply, the index for the 
countries that suffered significantly from the crisis experienced the fall for 12,97 
percentage points (from 6,51% to 6,46%), while the other group the decline was 
minor and reached the level of the 0,88 percentage points (from 3,6% to 2,72%). 
During the next period the index increased for the first group for 9,83 percentage 
points (to 3,37%) and decreased for the 0,05 percentage point (to 2,67%) for the 
second group. The total decrease of the index of the growth rate of the money 
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supply for the first set of countries amounts for 3,4 percentage points, and for the 
group of countries  - 0,93 percentage point. 
The conducted comparative statistical analysis of the dynamics of the 
macroeconomics variables of the worlds economies for the before, during and after-
crisis periods showed  that there is one characteristic tendency: for the set of 
countries that experienced a significant damage from the crisis during the transition 
from the before-crisis to the crisis period there is obvious decrease in indexes such 
as growth rate of the real GDP (from 6,145 to 0,46%), the trade balance (from -8% 
to -15%), the current account of the trade balance (from -4% to -13%), the growth 
rate of the real effective exchange rate (from 0,82% to 3,14%), the growth rate of 
nominal effective exchange rate (from 100,25% to 97,04%), the level of real 
external and internal interest rate (from -13,5 to -16,23), the level of money 
multiplier (from 5,01 to 4,90) and the growth rate of the money supply (from 6,51% 
to -6,46); and also the increase of the following variables as the total external debt in 
respect to GDP (from 117% to 215%), short term external debt in respect to GDP 
(from 27% to 215%) and the CPI (from 7,94 to 9,62%). The indexes of the gross 
accumulation and consumption of the capital assets show the tendencies of the 
capital distribution. 
During the after crisis period one can see the resumption of the level of 
previously mentioned variables and indexes.  
For the index that shows the ratio of international reservs to GDP the situation 
is atypical. During the crisis period the group of countries that suffered sufficiently 
from the crisis are characterized by the much higher level of the index(87%) than 
the countries that were influenced little by the crisis (52%). The same is the 
comparison of the index of two groups of countries during the before-crisis period 
(62% for those that were damaged significantly and 57% for those the opposite) and 
after-crisis period (92% for those that were damaged significantly and 54% for those 
the opposite). 
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Conclusions to Part 1 
In the first part of the paper we have examined in detail the overall tendencies of 
the world financial crisis development of 2007-2009 years. We have distinguished 
among them the development of securitization, appearing of the “shadow banking 
system”, the rise of the market of credit-default swaps, the increase of the demand for 
the raw materials etc. 
Different theoretical approaches to identification and development of the three 
types of financial crisis  were investigated: banking, currency crises and the crises of 
financial markets (including state finance). On the basis of the conducted research 
dome tendencies that characterize crisis situation were noted. As a result of the 
investigation the list of main indexes was formed. Those variables reveal crisis 
tendencies  of the world economies according to the following groups: real sector, 
debt burden, trade balance, international variables, financial liberalization, and fiscal 
variables. The groups of the indexes, their compositions and description are provided 
in Table 1. 
Using the methodology of the index that shows the pressure on the currency 
market, the analyses of 239 countries was conducted and the periods of crises were 
defined. With the aim of the further analyses countries were grouped in two sets with 
10 countries each: “countries that were damaged significantly by the crisis” (Table 6). 
and “countries that were damaged insignificantly by the crisis” (Table 7). The 
characteristics of the economies’ peculiarities were provided. 
On the basis of the chosen indexes and countries the comparative statistical 
analyses of the dynamics of macroeconomic variables of the world economies during 
the periods of before, during and after crisis was carried out (table 10-37). In the 
result the main tendencies were shown apparent. 
So, as a result of the conducted comparative analysis of the dynamics of 
macroeconomic variables of the world economies during the periods of before, 
during and after crisis one may conclude that among the variables that foresee the 
crisis development best (other words may be considered as sign indicators) are the 
following 9with pointing out the group they belong to): the growth rate of the real 
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GDP, gross accumulation of current assets and the consumption of current assets 
(real sector); gross external and short term external debt (debt burden); trade balance; 
current account trade balance, the growth rate of real effective exchange rate and the 
growth rate of nominal effective exchange rate (balance of payments); the ratio of 
real internal to real external interest rates (international variables); money multiplier 
(financial liberalization), CPI and the growth rate of money supply (other financial 
variables). 
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Part 2. Analysis and quantitative estimation of the precondition of the 
economy shift to a crisis state  
 
2.1. Methods that determine main indexes and their values as a proof of a 
possible crisis arising   
 
To determine the main leading indicators and their values that indicate the 
possible onset of economic crisis the "signals approach", which was developed by G. 
Kaminsky and C. Reinhart for predicting financial crises, was used [27]. 
In order to utilise the “signals approach” it is necessary to determine the list of 
indicators to be tested, considering whether they predict financial instability or not. 
The list of such indicators was defined in chapter 1.2. It should be noted that not 
every proposed indicator was analyzed because the statistics on some of them is not 
available. 
The methodology of the "signals approach” is based on the concept of "signal". 
The idicator issues a signal if it deviates from its historical mean by an amount 
greater than specific critical value. It is said that the indicator jtX  gives a signal about 
the crisis in period t, if its value in this period exceeds the threshold value jcrX . 
Formal definition of the signal is as follows: 
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where jtS  is signal of indicator j in period t, 
j
tX  is the value of the indicator j in 
period t, jX  – mean of the indicator j, jcrX  – threshold value of the indicator j. 
 Respectively, lack of signal is defined as follows: 
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The equations are given in absolute values, as some indicators of future crises 
issue signals by declining and other by growing. By using the absolute values it is 
possible to take into account deviations from the mean to both sides.  
If the indicator issues a signal during some reasonable time before the crisis 
(the so-called “signaling window”), this indicator is labeled as accurate. If the 
indicator gives a signal and the crisis never occurs within given timeframe, the alarm 
is labeled as false alarm. In this research the signaling window of 4 quarters before 
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the crisis is used. In other words, it is assumed that the negative trends that can lead 
to financial crisis can be detected one year before the actual emergence of the crisis. 
To obtain a set of country-specific "optimal" threshold values of each indicator 
the following procedure was used. Threshold values are defined in percentiles of 
distribution of each parameter. For example, possible set of country-specific 
thresholds for the growth rate of imports could be a set of growth rates (one per 
country) that would leave 10% of observations of growth rates of imports above 
threshold for each country. Notice that threshold in percentiles of distribution is the 
same for all countries, whereas the corresponding country-specific thresholds for 
each country are different. For example, the optimal threshold value is 5 pecentiles of 
distribution of an indicator. Then the actual threshold value for each country leaves 
only 5 percentage of the distribution of this indicator above this value. 
Threshold values are chosen by exhaustive search of possible thresholds in 
percentiles in order to both minimize the number of false alarms, and predict the 
maximum number of crises. The criterion which allows to do this is the minimizing 
of the ratio of "noise" to "signal" for each of the indicators. To explain this criterion it 
is useful to divide all indicator values into four groups as in Table. 2.2.1. 
Table 2.1. Possible values of indicators 
 Crisis (within 4 quarters) 
No crisis (within 4 
quarters) 
Signal was issued А В 
No signal was issued С D 
 
It is clear that in case of an ideal indicator its values will fall only in cells A 
and D. When choosing the threshold values the ratio of "noise" to "signal" has to be 
minimized: 
 
[B/(B+D)]/[A/(A+C)]     (2.3) 
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Additional criteria are also used. The unconditional probability of financial 
crisis’ occurrence for each indicator is defined as the ratio of observations after which 
within the signaling window the financial crisis ocurred to all observations: 
 
P(C) = (A+C)/(A+B+C+D)     (2.4) 
 
If the indicator issues a large number of "accurate" signals, one can expect that 
the probability of occurrence of the crisis after the signal P(C|S) (conditional 
probability) is greater than the unconditional probability P(C). Conditional 
probability is defined as:  
 
P(C|S) = А/(А+В)     (2.5) 
 
Therefore, for effective indicators is the following inequality must hold:  
 
P(C|S) > P(C)      (2.6) 
 
The validity of this condition is necessary for the threshlod to be optimal. 
Thus, all possible thresholds for each indicator (for the maximum possible 
period of time) were considered, and those indicator-specific thresholds in percentiles 
which minimized the "noise" to "signal" ratio were chosen as optimal. The values in 
percentiles were then transformed into the actual country-specific threshold values of 
indicators. 
Application of methodology of “signals approach" for ten pre-selected crisis 
countries using the economic data between the I quarter of 2002 to II quarter of 2010 
allowed to obtain the results presented in Table. 2.2. Specific crisis periods for each 
country were specified in the previous sections. 
Indicators in Table 2.2 are sorted ascending by the ratio of "noise" to "signal". 
That is the most effective indicators by this criterion are listed first. Also the table 
provides data on the number of crises which were accurately predicted (local crisis in 
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selected countries, and hence the maximum is 10 crises). It should be noted that 
most indicators accurately forecast 5 or more local crises. 
The fifth column in the table shows the ratio of accurate signals issued to all 
possible accurate signals. 100% in this column would mean that the indicator gives a 
signal in each of the 4 quarters preceding the crisis period. According to this 
criterion, the most effective indicator is the ratio of government credit to GDP, 
which gave 72.97% accurate signals of all possible accurate signals. 
The sixth column shows the ratio of false alarms issued to all possible false 
alarms. The best indicator according to this criterion is the proportion of short-term 
debt in the structure of foreign debt, which provided only 0.98% of all possible 
false signals. 
The eighth column is an alternative to the seventh; it shows the probability of a 
crisis conditioned on the presence of the signal. The results according to this criterion 
correspond to the results received with the help of "noise" to "signal" ratio. 
The next column shows the difference between the conditional and the 
unconditional probabilities of crisis for each indicator. The better indicator, the 
greater the likelihood of financial crisis after the signal is given and, therefore, the 
higher is the difference between conditional and unconditional probabilities of crisis, 
since the unconditional probability does not depend on the choice of threshold. 
Different values of the unconditional probability of the indicators depend only on the 
availability of data. 
Table 2.3 contains the threshold values of indicators for each of the analyzed 
countries. Thresholds are provided in the form of deviation from the mean. 
Let’s illustrate the proposed methodology on the example of ratio of the trade 
balance to GDP. For clarity consider the indicators of two countries: Ukraine and the 
Republic of Korea.  
Figure 2.1 shows the dynamics of the deviation of the ratio of trade balance to 
GDP from its mean for the period from the I quarter of 2002 to IV quarter of 2009 for 
Ukraine. The mean ratio is -0.0035. Upper and lower threshold deviations from the 
mean, which were defined by the beforementioned methodologie are -0.0945 and 
0.0945 respectively (see Table. 2.3). 
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Figure 2.1 Deviation of “Ratio of Trade Balance to GDP” from the Mean, Ukraine 
The figure 2.2 shows deviation of the trade balance to GDP ratio from its mean 
for the period from I quarter of 2002 to IV quarter of 2009 for Korea, which is 
0.0178. Upper and lower threshold deviations from an average are -0.0347 and 
0.0347 respectively (see Table. 2.3). 
 
Figure 2.2 Deviation of “Ratio of Trade Balance to GDP” from the Mean, Korea 
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Signal is a situation when the deviation from the mean exceeds the threshold 
value (deviation from the mean crosses the critical limits). As one can see, the 
indicator for Ukraine gives three signals, namely in II quarter of 2004, in I quarter of 
2008 and in IV quarter of 2008. First signal is a false alarm because no crisis occurs 
within the signal window after the signal. Two other signals are correct as they 
correctly forecast crisis in advance (within a signaling window of 4 quarters). For the 
Republic of Korea figure also shows three signals, two of which are accurate i.e. 
occurred within 4 quarters before the crisis. 
Similarly, we can consider the actual value of the indicator, rather than its 
deviation from the average. In this case the signal is given when the actual value is 
outside the range which is defined as the mean ± threshold (see Fig. 2.3 and 2.4). 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Value of the “Ratio of Trade Balance to GDP”, Ukraine 
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Figure 2.4 Value of the “Ratio of Trade Balance to GDP”, Ukraine 
Table 2.4 summarizes the average values of indicators for all countries 
simultaneously and average threshold deviations for each of the indicators. 
Deviations from the average value greater than the threshold deviation may be 
regarded as a signal of the increasing risk of financial crisis. However, countries 
differ strongly enough in the amplitude of the indicators, so the average value and the 
threshold deviation from the mean for each indicator give only a general idea of 
acceptable limits of indicators, and can not be readily used for forecasting. For this 
purpose, for a given indicator of a new counrty, which took no part in the analysis, 
the most appropriate is to calculate the actual threshold values using the threshold of 
this indicator expressed in precentiles (see Table. 2.4). 
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Table 2.2. Effectiveness of indicators according to “signals approach” 
 Indicator Identifier 
Crises 
predict-
ed 
Accurate 
signals as a 
percentage of 
all possible 
accurate 
signals 
False signals 
as a 
percentage of 
all possible 
false signals 
Noise/ 
Signal 
Probability 
of a crisis 
conditioned 
on the 
presence of 
the signal 
Difference  
of 
conditional 
and uncon-
ditional pro-
babilities 
1 
The share of short-term debt in the structure of 
ext. debt ST_DEBT_SHARE 3 15,15% 0,98% 0,0645 62,50% 52,79% 
2 The ratio of current account to GDP CURACC_GDP 6 18,18% 1,30% 0,0717 60,00% 50,29% 
3 CPI growth rate,% CPI_CHNG 4 12,12% 1,95% 0,1612 40,00% 30,29% 
4 Money multiplier MM 4 11,76% 1,96% 0,1667 40,00% 30,00% 
5 The ratio of M2 to international reserves M2_RES 3 9,09% 1,95% 0,2150 33,33% 23,63% 
6 The real interest rate on loans  RLENDRATE 3 9,09% 1,95% 0,2150 33,33% 23,63% 
7 REER growth rate,% REERI 7 33,33% 8,14% 0,2443 30,56% 20,85% 
8 The ratio of trade balance to GDP GS_GDP 6 27,27% 6,84% 0,2508 30,00% 20,29% 
9 Investment, share in GDP GFCF 2 6,06% 1,63% 0,2687 28,57% 18,87% 
10 Growth of exports,% EXPI 5 22,86% 7,21% 0,3156 26,67% 16,37% 
11 Real rate on deposits RDEPRATE 5 26,47% 10,13% 0,3827 22,50% 12,50% 
12 Growth of imports,% IMPI 10 58,54% 28,76% 0,4914 21,82% 9,76% 
13 
The difference between the real rates on loans 
and on deposits RATE_MARGIN 6 41,67% 21,38% 0,5132 18,75% 8,16% 
14 The ratio of Int. reserves to imports RES_IMP 5 30,30% 17,59% 0,5805 15,63% 5,92% 
15 Consumption, share in GDP CONS_TOTAL 9 35,29% 22,22% 0,6296 15,00% 5,00% 
16 M2 growth rate,% DM2 8 30,56% 19,41% 0,6352 15,71% 5,13% 
17 The ratio of Int. reserves to export RES_EXP 3 12,12% 7,82% 0,6450 14,29% 4,58% 
18 Ratio of government loans to GDP,% GVT_CLAIMS_GDP 9 72,97% 49,50% 0,6784 15,25% 4,37% 
19 
Difference between LIBOR rates and rates on 
domestic loans DRATES 5 27,78% 19,74% 0,7105 14,29% 3,70% 
20 The ratio of international reserves to GDP RES_GDP 7 41,67% 34,54% 0,8289 12,50% 1,91% 
21 The nominal effective exchange rate NEER 10 67,50% 57,67% 0,8543 13,50% 1,74% 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3. Mean and threshold values of indicators for individual countries  
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 CPI_CHNG DM2 M2_RES GVT_CLAIMS_GDP RATE_MARGIN 
  CPI growth rate,% M2 growth rate,% 
The ratio of M2 
to international reserves 
Ratio of government  
loans to GDP,% 
Difference between 
the real rates on loans 
and on deposits 
Country mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation 
Armenia 4,3368 ± 6,38 5,9308 ± 16,33 1,0507 ± 0,89 0,0120 ± 0,01 0,1119 ± 0,02 
Chile 3,2743 ± 5,62 2,6951 ± 4,10 5,1915 ± 3,66 0,1718 ± 0,13 0,0362 ± 0,01 
Costa Rica 10,5697 ± 5,00 4,5124 ± 5,72 3,1043 ± 0,44 0,0363 ± 0,01 0,1144 ± 0,03 
Georgia 6,6862 ± 6,31 5,6558 ± 10,33 1,5029 ± 0,60 0,2584 ± 0,08 0,1497 ± 0,08 
Iceland 6,4257 ± 10,64 7,3761 ± 15,93 4,9852 ± 4,99 0,1157 ± 0,12 0,0244 ± 0,04 
Republic of Korea 3,0804 ± 1,71 2,0648 ± 1,72 7,4084 ± 1,32 0,0215 ± 0,02 0,0170 ± 0,00 
Moldova 9,7690 ± 10,71 5,8465 ± 7,70 1,9640 ± 0,54 0,2472 ± 0,08 0,0553 ± 0,03 
Romania 10,1317 ± 14,19 5,9856 ± 6,00 2,3490 ± 0,39 0,0020 ± 0,00 0,0927 ± 0,04 
Russian Federation 11,8658 ± 5,95 7,4908 ± 7,91 1,8307 ± 0,38 0,0791 ± 0,04 0,0635 ± 0,02 
Ukraine 11,3660 ± 14,49 7,5472 ± 6,29 3,6294 ± 0,70 0,1715 ± 0,09 0,0816 ± 0,03 
Mean 7,7506 ± 8,10 5,5105 ± 8,20 3,3016 ± 1,39 0,1116 ± 0,06 0,0747 ± 0,03 
Table 2.3. Mean and threshold values of indicators for individual countries  
 MM IMPI EXPI REERI DRATES 
  Money multiplier. Growth of imports,% Growth of exports,% REER growth rate,% 
Difference 
between LIBOR rates and 
rates on domestic loans 
Country mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation 
Armenia 1,1398 ± 0,27 6,3563 ± 17,84 4,4877 ± 32,50 0,6023 ± 7,21 -15,9664 ± 3,83 
Chile 3,9953 ± 1,30 4,2485 ± 5,49 4,3153 ± 15,89 0,1717 ± 6,35 -4,9932 ± 2,31 
Costa Rica 1,2404 ± 0,28 2,3508 ± 5,74 2,1993 ± 11,23 0,3269 ± 4,40 -18,4507 ± 7,37 
Georgia 1,0666 ± 0,23 7,0063 ± 17,75 9,1924 ± 40,57 0,6294 ± 5,16 -22,6685 ± 8,71 
Iceland 6,4604 ± 6,46 2,6218 ± 10,51 3,4243 ± 23,24 -0,3816 ± 7,67 -12,2134 ± 4,30 
Republic of Korea 24,5980 ± 2,59 3,8053 ± 5,38 4,0637 ± 14,98 0,0000 ± 0,00 -3,5552 ± 2,18 
Moldova 1,7418 ± 0,38 6,0493 ± 18,37 4,3623 ± 25,78 0,9446 ± 7,37 -17,3693 ± 4,00 
Romania 3,9352 ± 0,90 5,1985 ± 13,65 4,5381 ± 9,87 0,4273 ± 5,84 -17,7239 ± 9,48 
Russian Federation 2,1785 ± 0,64 6,3073 ± 17,88 5,4800 ± 16,04 1,3493 ± 3,13 -9,6924 ± 4,84 
Ukraine 2,4716 ± 0,54 5,2710 ± 12,35 4,7064 ± 20,65 -0,1673 ± 5,73 -15,3326 ± 6,37 
Mean 4,8828 ± 1,36 4,9215 ± 12,50 4,6770 ± 21,07 0,3903 ± 5,29 -13,7966 ± 5,34 
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Table 2.3. Mean and threshold values of indicators for individual countries  
 GS_GDP CURACC_GDP RES_GDP ST_DEBT_SHARE RLENDRATE 
  
The ratio of trade balance 
to GDP 
The ratio of current 
account to GDP 
The ratio of international 
reserves to GDP 
Share of short-term debt 
in the str. of ext. debt 
The real interest 
rate on loans 
Country mean 
threshold 
deviation Mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation 
Armenia -0,2082 ± 0,13 -0,0756 ± 0,13 0,4509 ± 0,17 0,1415 ± 0,14 0,1380 ± 0,09 
Chile 0,0765 ± 0,10 0,0133 ± 0,08 0,3984 ± 0,14 0,1643 ± 0,16 0,0423 ± 0,03 
Costa Rica -0,0386 ± 0,06 -0,0485 ± 0,07 0,2989 ± 0,05 0,2390 ± 0,24 0,0956 ± 0,08 
Georgia -0,1881 ± 0,14 -0,1309 ± 0,15 0,2218 ± 0,09 0,0706 ± 0,13 0,1764 ± 0,13 
Iceland -0,0425 ± 0,15 -0,1159 ± 0,25 0,3357 ± 0,20 0,1792 ± 0,70 0,0878 ± 0,09 
Republic of Korea 0,0178 ± 0,03 0,0167 ± 0,05 0,6493 ± 0,06 0,3829 ± 0,07 0,0303 ± 0,01 
Moldova -0,3779 ± 0,24 -0,0836 ± 0,15 0,4989 ± 0,15 0,2978 ± 0,30 0,0958 ± 0,11 
Romania -0,0948 ± 0,05 -0,0813 ± 0,08 0,4984 ± 0,13 0,0648 ± 0,26 0,0927 ± 0,04 
Russian Federation 0,1052 ± 0,05 0,0786 ± 0,07 0,5910 ± 0,21 0,1579 ± 0,16 0,0045 ± 0,05 
Ukraine -0,0034 ± 0,09 0,0159 ± 0,13 0,4304 ± 0,11 0,2238 ± 0,22 0,0641 ± 0,19 
Mean -0,2082 ± 0,13 -0,0756 ± 0,13 0,4509 ± 0,17 0,1415 ± 0,14 0,1380 ± 0,09 
Table 2.3. Mean and threshold values of indicators for individual countries  
 RDEPRATE RES_EXP RES_IMP NEER GFCF CONS_TOTAL 
  Real rate on deposits 
The ratio of Int. 
reserves to export 
The ratio of Int. 
reserves to imports. 
The nominal effective 
exchange rate 
Investment, share in  
GDP 
Consumption, share 
in GDP 
Country mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation mean 
threshold 
deviation 
Armenia 0,0261 ± 0,06 3,0661 ± 3,04 1,0809 ± 0,23 107,2471 ± 14,21 26,8480 ± 21,62 90,7999 ± 21,79 
Chile 0,0061 ± 0,02 1,2952 ± 1,06 1,5591 ± 0,78 97,5338 ± 2,99 19,5936 ± 19,59 66,5117 ± 7,83 
Costa Rica -0,0188 ± 0,05 0,9572 ± 0,23 0,6962 ± 0,13 101,7497 ± 12,81 18,9444 ± 18,94 76,7416 ± 9,37 
Georgia 0,0267 ± 0,05 2,1781 ± 1,90 0,6428 ± 0,24 102,6481 ± 3,74 22,7605 ± 22,76 87,2961 ± 14,30 
Iceland 0,0085 ± 0,02 1,2506 ± 0,93 1,1347 ± 0,84 80,2827 ± 9,76 23,0853 ± 12,48 81,1542 ± 3,92 
Republic of 
Korea 0,0133 ± 0,01 1,8437 ± 0,44 1,9761 ± 0,31 93,4707 ± 5,43 28,1485 ± 4,94 66,4721 ± 3,74 
Moldova 0,0405 ± 0,07 1,6483 ± 1,65 0,6388 ± 0,64 103,0138 ± 4,46 22,4329 ± 23,45 105,0430 ± 13,56 
Romania 0,0000 ± 0,05 1,7899 ± 0,74 1,2269 ± 0,45 99,6724 ± 4,30 24,2122 ± 11,74 85,1969 ± 10,33 
Russian 
Federation -0,0590 ± 0,04 2,1628 ± 1,05 3,3951 ± 1,43 99,1751 ± 1,89 18,3383 ± 11,48 66,3388 ± 5,32 
Ukraine -0,0175 ± 0,09 1,1557 ± 0,55 1,0415 ± 0,37 93,3736 ± 6,70 21,5924 ± 7,96 75,7473 ± 6,67 
Mean 0,0026 ± 0,05 1,7348 ± 1,16 1,3392 ± 0,54 97,8167 ± 6,63 22,5956 ± 15,5 80,1302 ± 9,68 
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Table 2.4. Mean and threshold values of indicators average across all countries 
  Indicator Identifier Mean Threshold deviation, % Threshold deviation 
1 The share of short-term debt in the structure of ext. debt ST_DEBT_SHARE 0,1922 6 ± 0,24 
2 The ratio of current account to GDP CURACC_GDP -0,0411 3 ± 0,12 
3 CPI growth rate,% CPI_CHNG 7,7506 3 ± 8,10 
4 Money multiplier MM 4,8828 3 ± 1,36 
5 The ratio of M2 to international reserves M2_RES 3,3016 3 ± 1,39 
6 The real interest rate on loans  RLENDRATE 0,0827 3 ± 0,08 
7 REER growth rate,% REERI 0,3903 12 ± 5,29 
8 The ratio of trade balance to GDP GS_GDP -0,0754 9 ± 0,10 
9 Investment, share in GDP GFCF 22,5956 3 ± 15,50 
10 Growth of exports,% EXPI 4,6770 9 ± 21,07 
11 Real rate on deposits RDEPRATE 0,0026 12 ± 0,05 
12 Growth of imports,% IMPI 4,9215 31 ± 12,50 
13 The difference between the real rates on loans and on deposits RATE_MARGIN 0,0747 22 ± 0,03 
14 The ratio of Int. reserves to imports RES_IMP 1,3392 20 ± 0,54 
15 Consumption, share in GDP CONS_TOTAL 80,1302 24 ± 9,68 
16 M2 growth rate,% DM2 5,5105 20 ± 8,20 
17 The ratio of Int. reserves to export RES_EXP 1,7348 9 ± 1,16 
18 Ratio of government loans to GDP,% GVT_CLAIMS_GDP 0,1116 55 ± 0,06 
19 Difference between LIBOR rates and rates on domestic loans DRATES -13,7966 21 ± 5,34 
20 The ratio of international reserves to GDP RES_GDP 0,4374 35 ± 0,13 
21 The nominal effective exchange rate NEER 97,8167 60 ± 6,63 
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2.2. Practical usage of the indexes for crisis phenomena diagnostics  
 
        Practical implementation of the “signals approach” to diagnose the crisis 
requires consistent application of specific steps that can be represented schematically 
as a flowchart, see Figure 2.2.1. Further, we analyze the characteristics of each step 
of diagnosis. 
Step 1. Definition of crisis countries and crisis periods with the help of index of 
currency market pressure. 
At the first step, it is necessary to select a set of countries for the diagnosis. 
Then, by constructing an index of currency market pressure countries that have 
experienced significant currency crisis are determined (those that experienced 
significant currency depreciation and/or significant losses of foreign reserves).  
For a given set of countries specific crisis periods for each country are 
determined. Detailed methods of calculation are described in chapter 1.3. Next, step 2 
is conducted: leading indicators of financial crises are chosen and their values are 
calculated according to the "signals approach" (note that a prerequisite of using this 
approach is the existence of specific crisis periods for all the countries). 
Step 2. Calculation of indicators’ values for each country for the whole period. 
In the previous chapters, based on the analysis of theoretical and empirical 
research of Ukrainian and Western economists, a number of indexes that can be 
considered signal indicators for predicting the occurrence of financial crises have 
been proposed and justified (see Chapter 1.2). In step 2, the indicators are calculated 
based on available statistical information. At this step, some indicators may be 
rejected, since data on them may not be available for all previously selected 
countries. Therefore, the initial information for the step 2 is a database of statistical 
values of the final set of indicators. 
Step 3. Application of optimization procedure to calculate the threshold values 
of crisis indicators. 
At this step, threshold values of the indicators that were selected during the 
previous phase are calculated. Note that the calculations are made for each indicator 
simultaneously for all countries. Next, we illustrate how we calculate the threshold 
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values for the CPI growth rate for 10 selected countries that have suffered 
significantly from the financial crises (see Chapter 2.1). 
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Figure 2.2.1 General flow chart of indicators’ threshold values estimation 
Available data on the rates of CPI for the 10 crisis countries is presented in 
Table 2.2.1. 
Table 2.2.1.  Dynamics of CPI growth rate in the selected crisis countries  
Country 
Q1 
2002 
Q2 
2002 
Q3 
2002 
Q4 
2002 
Q1 
2003 
Q2 
2003 
Q3 
2003 
Q4 
2003 
Q1 
2004 
Q2 
2004 
Q3 
2004 
Q4 
2004 
Armenia 0,43 3,04 -0,17 0,88 3,36 3,01 5,13 7,53 7,87 7,32 8,39 4,31 
Chile 2,44 2,20 2,36 2,94 3,78 3,72 2,73 1,07 0,01 0,46 1,48 2,27 
Costa Rica 9,80 7,81 9,18 9,86 9,39 10,22 8,83 9,37 11,30 11,54 13,09 13,24 
Georgia 5,22 6,60 5,14 5,31 4,30 3,04 5,10 6,78 5,84 4,86 5,53 6,46 
Iceland 9,05 6,05 3,46 2,42 1,72 2,09 1,95 2,50 2,14 3,15 3,57 3,76 
Republic of 
Korea 2,53 2,69 2,58 3,25 4,08 3,37 3,17 3,52 3,28 3,38 4,31 3,40 
Moldova 6,10 6,15 4,55 4,41 6,76 8,20 15,30 16,78 14,57 13,00 11,07 11,63 
Romania 26,94 24,29 21,35 18,42 16,66 14,78 14,96 14,80 13,56 12,29 11,88 9,96 
Russian 
Federation 17,81 15,54 14,97 15,01 14,63 14,02 13,54 12,55 10,66 10,18 10,99 11,64 
Ukraine 3,71 0,76 -0,91 -0,47 2,22 4,52 6,44 7,72 7,47 7,33 9,59 11,81 
 
Table 2.2.1. Dynamics of CPI growth rate in the selected crisis countries, 
continued 
Country 
Q1 
2005 
Q2 
2005 
Q3 
2005 
Q4 
2005 
Q1 
2006 
Q2 
2006 
Q3 
2006 
Q4 
2006 
Q1 
2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
2007 
Armenia 4,40 0,20 -1,83 -0,26 -2,04 1,73 6,64 5,69 4,84 4,26 2,16 6,38 
Chile 2,29 2,77 3,32 3,81 4,06 3,81 3,49 2,25 2,69 2,86 4,79 7,24 
Costa Rica 13,41 13,96 13,73 14,07 12,79 11,97 11,62 9,64 9,01 9,22 8,92 10,25 
Georgia 9,45 9,49 7,03 7,27 5,01 9,12 12,99 9,62 10,42 7,56 7,76 11,25 
Iceland 4,37 3,33 3,92 4,32 4,31 7,04 8,19 7,16 6,70 4,62 3,81 5,16 
Republic of 
Korea 3,28 2,94 2,37 2,43 2,01 2,30 2,49 2,19 2,07 2,45 2,33 3,31 
Moldova 13,07 13,58 11,02 10,30 10,81 11,81 14,19 14,23 11,84 10,60 13,23 13,70 
Romania 8,85 9,84 8,81 8,48 8,61 7,14 5,95 4,77 3,82 3,80 4,99 6,69 
Russian 
Federation 13,09 13,75 12,68 11,29 10,85 9,43 9,42 9,07 7,72 7,94 8,89 11,39 
Ukraine 13,55 14,54 14,56 11,55 9,65 7,19 7,94 11,39 10,16 11,41 14,09 15,54 
 
Table 2.2.1. Dynamics of CPI growth rate in the selected crisis countries, 
continued 
Country Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 Q1 2010 Q2 2010 
Armenia 7,89 10,06 11,16 6,79 2,00 3,34 3,40 4,87 8,39 6,30 
Chile 8,01 8,89 9,34 8,61 5,62 3,11 -0,60 -1,86 0,23 1,16 
Costa Rica 11,00 11,89 15,11 15,49 12,86 9,80 5,81 3,54 5,59 6,03 
Georgia 11,26 11,55 11,08 6,25 2,70 2,17 -0,87 2,98 4,69 4,37 
Iceland 7,14 12,27 14,04 17,06 17,08 11,91 11,01 8,60 7,44 7,14 
Republic of 
Korea 3,77 4,78 5,51 4,53 3,91 2,83 1,98 2,44 2,69 2,57 
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Moldova 14,88 16,32 11,91 8,42 3,12 -0,93 -1,71 -0,60 5,85 7,98 
Romania 7,95 8,56 8,11 6,81 6,77 6,09 4,99 4,56 4,63 4,36 
Russian 
Federation 12,86 14,87 14,94 13,74 13,74 12,43 11,44 9,21 7,21 5,92 
Ukraine 22,51 30,16 25,81 22,61 20,39 15,04 15,27 13,34 11,24 8,34 
 
First, for the indicator under consideration threshold defined in percentiles 
which minimizes the noise to signal ratio (one for all countries) is calculated. 
The indicator issues a signal if it deviates from its historical mean by an 
amount greater than specific critical value. Formal definition of the signal is as 
follows: 
},{}1{ jcr
jj
t
j
t
j
t XXXSS  ,     (2.2.1)      
where jtS  is signal of indicator j in period t, 
j
tX  is the value of the indicator j in 
period t, jX  – mean of the indicator j, jcrX  – threshold value of the indicator j. 
Respectively, lack of signal is defined as follows: 
},{}0{ jcr
jj
t
j
t
j
t XXXSS  .    (2.2.2)      
For the purpose of following calculations all the values of an indicator of the 
specific country have to be converted to deviations from indicator’s average over a 
chosen period. For example, the average rate of growth of CPI in Armenia for the 
period from I quarter of 2002 to II quarter of 2010 is 4.34. Deviation from average 
for I quarter of 2002 will, therefore, be: 0.43 - 4.34 = -3.91. The calculated values of 
deviations of CPI growth rate from its average value for the respective country are 
presented in Table 2.2.2. 
 
Table 2.2.2. CPI growth rate (deviation from the mean) 
Country 
Q1 
2002 
Q2 
2002 
Q3 
2002 
Q4 
2002 
Q1 
2003 
Q2 
2003 
Q3 
2003 
Q4 
2003 
Q1 
2004 
Q2 
2004 
Q3 
2004 
Q4 
2004 
Armenia -3,91 -1,30 -4,51 -3,46 -0,98 -1,33 0,79 3,19 3,53 2,98 4,05 -0,03 
Chile -0,83 -1,07 -0,91 -0,33 0,51 0,45 -0,54 -2,20 -3,26 -2,81 -1,79 -1,00 
Costa Rica -0,77 -2,76 -1,39 -0,71 -1,18 -0,35 -1,74 -1,20 0,73 0,97 2,52 2,67 
Georgia -1,47 -0,09 -1,55 -1,38 -2,39 -3,65 -1,59 0,09 -0,85 -1,83 -1,16 -0,23 
Iceland 2,62 -0,38 -2,97 -4,01 -4,71 -4,34 -4,48 -3,93 -4,29 -3,28 -2,86 -2,67 
Republic of 
Korea -0,55 -0,39 -0,50 0,17 1,00 0,29 0,09 0,44 0,20 0,30 1,23 0,32 
Moldova -3,67 -3,62 -5,22 -5,36 -3,01 -1,57 5,53 7,01 4,80 3,23 1,30 1,86 
Romania 16,81 14,16 11,22 8,29 6,53 4,65 4,83 4,67 3,43 2,16 1,75 -0,17 
Russian 
Federation 5,94 3,67 3,10 3,14 2,76 2,15 1,67 0,68 -1,21 -1,69 -0,88 -0,23 
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Ukraine -7,66 -10,61 -12,28 -11,84 -9,15 -6,85 -4,93 -3,65 -3,90 -4,04 -1,78 0,44 
 
Table 2.2.2. CPI growth rate (deviation from the mean), continued 
Country 
Q1 
2005 
Q2 
2005 
Q3 
2005 
Q4 
2005 
Q1 
2006 
Q2 
2006 
Q3 
2006 
Q4 
2006 
Q1 
2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
2007 
Armenia 0,06 -4,14 -6,17 -4,60 -6,38 -2,61 2,30 1,35 0,50 -0,08 -2,18 2,04 
Chile -0,98 -0,50 0,05 0,54 0,79 0,54 0,22 -1,02 -0,58 -0,41 1,52 3,97 
Costa Rica 2,84 3,39 3,16 3,50 2,22 1,40 1,05 -0,93 -1,56 -1,35 -1,65 -0,32 
Georgia 2,76 2,80 0,34 0,58 -1,68 2,43 6,30 2,93 3,73 0,87 1,07 4,56 
Iceland -2,06 -3,10 -2,51 -2,11 -2,12 0,61 1,76 0,73 0,27 -1,81 -2,62 -1,27 
Republic of 
Korea 0,20 -0,14 -0,71 -0,65 -1,07 -0,78 -0,59 -0,89 -1,01 -0,63 -0,75 0,23 
Moldova 3,30 3,81 1,25 0,53 1,04 2,04 4,42 4,46 2,07 0,83 3,46 3,93 
Romania -1,28 -0,29 -1,32 -1,65 -1,52 -2,99 -4,18 -5,36 -6,31 -6,33 -5,14 -3,44 
Russian 
Federation 1,22 1,88 0,81 -0,58 -1,02 -2,44 -2,45 -2,80 -4,15 -3,93 -2,98 -0,48 
Ukraine 2,18 3,17 3,19 0,18 -1,72 -4,18 -3,43 0,02 -1,21 0,04 2,72 4,17 
 
Table 2.2.2. CPI growth rate (deviation from the mean), continued 
Country Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 Q1 2010 Q2 2010 
Armenia 3,55 5,72 6,82 2,45 -2,34 -1,00 -0,94 0,53 4,05 1,96 
Chile 4,74 5,62 6,07 5,34 2,35 -0,16 -3,87 -5,13 -3,04 -2,11 
Costa Rica 0,43 1,32 4,54 4,92 2,29 -0,77 -4,76 -7,03 -4,98 -4,54 
Georgia 4,57 4,86 4,39 -0,44 -3,99 -4,52 -7,56 -3,71 -2,00 -2,32 
Iceland 0,71 5,84 7,61 10,63 10,65 5,48 4,58 2,17 1,01 0,71 
Republic of 
Korea 0,69 1,70 2,43 1,45 0,83 -0,25 -1,10 -0,64 -0,39 -0,51 
Moldova 5,11 6,55 2,14 -1,35 -6,65 -10,70 -11,48 -10,37 -3,92 -1,79 
Romania -2,18 -1,57 -2,02 -3,32 -3,36 -4,04 -5,14 -5,57 -5,50 -5,77 
Russian 
Federation 0,99 3,00 3,07 1,87 1,87 0,56 -0,43 -2,66 -4,66 -5,95 
Ukraine 11,14 18,79 14,44 11,24 9,02 3,67 3,90 1,97 -0,13 -3,03 
 
The original paper by G. Kaminsky suggests calculating all threshold values in 
percentiles from 1 to 20 to select optimal threshold [27]. Note that if the threshold is 
defined as 5 percentiles, it means that 5 percent of extreme values of the indicator’s 
distribution are considered to be over the threshold. Thus, previous assumptions 
about the distribution law of the indicator are not required. Moreover, the 
methodology assumes that some indicators may signal crisis by declining, and some, 
on contrast, by growing, which creates the necessity of using absolute values of 
deviations while determining the signals. Therefore, the task of determining, for 
example, 5% of the most extreme values of indicators is equal to determining the 
largest deviations in absolute values from the mean value of this indicator. So, next 
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step requires converting indicator deviations from the mean (given in Table 2.2.2) 
to their absolute values. The calculated absolute values of deviations of CPI growth 
rate from their respective mean values are presented in Table 2.2.3. 
 
Table 2.2.3. CPI growth rate, absolute values of deviations from the mean 
Country 
Q1 
2002 
Q2 
2002 
Q3 
2002 
Q4 
2002 
Q1 
2003 
Q2 
2003 
Q3 
2003 
Q4 
2003 
Q1 
2004 
Q2 
2004 
Q3 
2004 
Q4 
2004 
Armenia 3,91 1,30 4,51 3,46 0,98 1,33 0,79 3,19 3,53 2,98 4,05 0,03 
Chile 0,83 1,07 0,91 0,33 0,51 0,45 0,54 2,20 3,26 2,81 1,79 1,00 
Costa Rica 0,77 2,76 1,39 0,71 1,18 0,35 1,74 1,20 0,73 0,97 2,52 2,67 
Georgia 1,47 0,09 1,55 1,38 2,39 3,65 1,59 0,09 0,85 1,83 1,16 0,23 
Iceland 2,62 0,38 2,97 4,01 4,71 4,34 4,48 3,93 4,29 3,28 2,86 2,67 
Republic of 
Korea 0,55 0,39 0,50 0,17 1,00 0,29 0,09 0,44 0,20 0,30 1,23 0,32 
Moldova 3,67 3,62 5,22 5,36 3,01 1,57 5,53 7,01 4,80 3,23 1,30 1,86 
Romania 16,81 14,16 11,22 8,29 6,53 4,65 4,83 4,67 3,43 2,16 1,75 0,17 
Russian 
Federation 5,94 3,67 3,10 3,14 2,76 2,15 1,67 0,68 1,21 1,69 0,88 0,23 
Ukraine 7,66 10,61 12,28 11,84 9,15 6,85 4,93 3,65 3,90 4,04 1,78 0,44 
 
Table 2.2.3. CPI growth rate, absolute values of deviations from the mean, 
continued 
Country 
Q1 
2005 
Q2 
2005 
Q3 
2005 
Q4 
2005 
Q1 
2006 
Q2 
2006 
Q3 
2006 
Q4 
2006 
Q1 
2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
2007 
Armenia 0,06 4,14 6,17 4,60 6,38 2,61 2,30 1,35 0,50 0,08 2,18 2,04 
Chile 0,98 0,50 0,05 0,54 0,79 0,54 0,22 1,02 0,58 0,41 1,52 3,97 
Costa Rica 2,84 3,39 3,16 3,50 2,22 1,40 1,05 0,93 1,56 1,35 1,65 0,32 
Georgia 2,76 2,80 0,34 0,58 1,68 2,43 6,30 2,93 3,73 0,87 1,07 4,56 
Iceland 2,06 3,10 2,51 2,11 2,12 0,61 1,76 0,73 0,27 1,81 2,62 1,27 
Republic of 
Korea 0,20 0,14 0,71 0,65 1,07 0,78 0,59 0,89 1,01 0,63 0,75 0,23 
Moldova 3,30 3,81 1,25 0,53 1,04 2,04 4,42 4,46 2,07 0,83 3,46 3,93 
Romania 1,28 0,29 1,32 1,65 1,52 2,99 4,18 5,36 6,31 6,33 5,14 3,44 
Russian 
Federation 1,22 1,88 0,81 0,58 1,02 2,44 2,45 2,80 4,15 3,93 2,98 0,48 
Ukraine 2,18 3,17 3,19 0,18 1,72 4,18 3,43 0,02 1,21 0,04 2,72 4,17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 110 
Table 2.2.3. CPI growth rate, absolute values of deviations from the mean, 
continued 
Country 
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
2008 
Q1 
2009 
Q2 
2009 
Q3 
2009 
Q4 
2009 
Q1 
2010 
Q2 
2010 
Armenia 3,55 5,72 6,82 2,45 2,34 1,00 0,94 0,53 4,05 1,96 
Chile 4,74 5,62 6,07 5,34 2,35 0,16 3,87 5,13 3,04 2,11 
Costa Rica 0,43 1,32 4,54 4,92 2,29 0,77 4,76 7,03 4,98 4,54 
Georgia 4,57 4,86 4,39 0,44 3,99 4,52 7,56 3,71 2,00 2,32 
Iceland 0,71 5,84 7,61 10,63 10,65 5,48 4,58 2,17 1,01 0,71 
Republic of 
Korea 0,69 1,70 2,43 1,45 0,83 0,25 1,10 0,64 0,39 0,51 
Moldova 5,11 6,55 2,14 1,35 6,65 10,70 11,48 10,37 3,92 1,79 
Romania 2,18 1,57 2,02 3,32 3,36 4,04 5,14 5,57 5,50 5,77 
Russian 
Federation 0,99 3,00 3,07 1,87 1,87 0,56 0,43 2,66 4,66 5,95 
Ukraine 11,14 18,79 14,44 11,24 9,02 3,67 3,90 1,97 0,13 3,03 
 
After calculating absolute values of deviations from the mean for a particular 
indicator, the thresholds in percentiles are calculated. As it has been previously 
stated, a percentile is a value of a variable below which certain percent of 
observations fall. For example 5
th
 percentile is a value of a variable, below which 5% 
of observations of this variable fall. So, to determine, for example, 5% of the most 
extreme values, one may calculate 95
th
 percentile of the variable, and then all the 
values greater in absolute terms than the found value are considered such that exceed 
the critical limit. 
Next, we illustrate the described procedure for 99
th
 percentile of the CPI 
growth rate. Note that all calculations on real data were conducted using Microsoft 
Excel, in which this methodology was implemented in practice. 
To estimate the value vp, of the P-th percentile of N ordered values (arranged 
from least to greatest) with values , the rank of P-th percentile is 
calculated: 
 
Then the value is split into its integer component k and decimal component d, 
such that n = k + d. Then vp is calculated as: 
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Next, we calculate actual threshold values for all countries for the 99
th
 
percentile of the absolute values of deviations of CPI growth rate from its respective 
averages. We illustrate this calculation on the example of Ukraine: 
 
 
 
Thus, if the deviation of Ukraine’s CPI growth rate is higher than the 17.36 (in 
absolute value), the indicator has crossed the threshold and therefore has given a 
warning signal of future crisis. Similarly, the actual values of threshold deviations for 
all other countries are calculated. For illustration purposes table 2.2.4 presents 
calculated critical values of the CPI growth rate for all countries for percentiles from 
1
st
 to 20
th
. 
 
Table 2.2.4. CPI growth rate, threshold values for deviations from the mean 
               Percentile 
Country  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Armenia 6,67 6,53 6,38 6,31 6,24 6,17 6,03 5,88 5,74 5,38 
Chile 5,91 5,77 5,62 5,52 5,43 5,34 5,27 5,21 5,14 5,02 
Costa Rica 6,36 5,68 5,00 4,96 4,94 4,92 4,87 4,82 4,77 4,70 
Georgia 7,14 6,73 6,31 5,84 5,37 4,89 4,77 4,68 4,58 4,57 
Iceland 
10,6
5 
10,6
4 
10,6
4 9,67 8,67 7,67 7,06 6,48 5,89 5,73 
Republic of Korea 2,19 1,95 1,71 1,62 1,54 1,45 1,38 1,31 1,23 1,19 
Moldova 
11,2
2 
10,9
6 
10,7
1 
10,5
9 
10,4
8 
10,3
7 9,33 8,22 7,11 6,90 
Romania 
15,9
4 
15,0
6 
14,1
9 
13,2
2 
12,2
5 
11,2
8 
10,3
1 9,34 8,37 7,76 
Russian Federation 5,95 5,95 5,95 5,53 5,11 4,68 4,50 4,33 4,16 4,08 
Ukraine 
17,3
6 
15,9
2 
14,4
9 
13,7
5 
13,0
3 
12,3
2 
12,1
4 
12,0
0 
11,8
5 
11,6
6 
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Table 2.2.4. CPI growth rate, threshold values for deviations from the mean, 
continued 
               Percentile 
Country 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Armenia 5,01 4,64 4,57 4,54 4,51 4,40 4,28 4,16 4,12 4,09 
Chile 4,89 4,75 4,51 4,26 4,00 3,94 3,91 3,88 3,71 3,51 
Costa Rica 4,62 4,55 4,54 4,54 4,54 4,25 3,90 3,56 3,47 3,43 
Georgia 4,57 4,57 4,55 4,53 4,52 4,48 4,44 4,40 4,28 4,15 
Iceland 5,62 5,50 5,26 5,00 4,75 4,67 4,63 4,59 4,55 4,52 
Republic of Korea 1,15 1,11 1,09 1,08 1,07 1,05 1,03 1,01 1,01 1,00 
Moldova 6,78 6,66 6,62 6,59 6,55 6,26 5,93 5,59 5,48 5,42 
Romania 7,18 6,60 6,47 6,41 6,34 6,33 6,32 6,31 6,16 5,99 
Russian Federation 4,01 3,93 3,85 3,77 3,69 3,53 3,35 3,18 3,14 3,12 
Ukraine 
11,4
6 
11,2
7 
11,2
1 
11,1
8 
11,1
4 
10,9
9 
10,8
1 
10,6
4 
10,2
1 9,73 
 
After calculating threshold values for the CPI growth rate, we may determine 
in which periods of time CPI growth rate crosses the country’s specific threshold, and 
thus signals of the possibility of financial crisis in the future. 
Next, we graphically illustrate the signal using the Ukraine’s CPI growth rate 
and the 5
th
 percentile threshold (i.e. 5% of extreme values of its distribution are 
considered to be abnormal) (see Figure.2.2.2). 
 
Figure 2.2.2. Absolute value of deviation of CPI growth rate from its mean, 
Ukraine 
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As seen from Figure 2.2.2, Ukraine’s CPI growth rate with the threshold of 
5 percentiles signals twice: in II and III quarters of 2008. 
Similarly, the described procedure is performed for all countries and all values 
of thresholds in percentiles from 1
st
 to 20
th. As a result, a table of indicator’s signals is 
formed for each percentile (signal is labeled as 1 and absence of signal as 0). For 
example, a set of signals for the CPI growth rate with the threshold of 1 percentile is 
presented in Table 2.2.5. 
Table 2.2.5. CPI growth rate signals, threshold of 1 percentile 
Country 
Q1 
2002 
Q2 
2002 
Q3 
2002 
Q4 
2002 
Q1 
2003 
Q2 
2003 
Q3 
2003 
Q4 
2003 
Q1 
2004 
Q2 
2004 
Q3 
2004 
Q4 
2004 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Republic of 
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Romania 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russian 
Federation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 2.2.5. CPI growth rate signals, threshold of 1 percentile, continued 
Country 
Q1 
2005 
Q2 
2005 
Q3 
2005 
Q4 
2005 
Q1 
2006 
Q2 
2006 
Q3 
2006 
Q4 
2006 
Q1 
2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
2007 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Republic of 
Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russian 
Federation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 2.2.5. CPI growth rate signals, threshold of 1 percentile, continued 
Country Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 Q1 2010 Q2 2010 
Armenia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Republic of 
Korea 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russian 
Federation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ukraine 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Based on the table of signals the noise to signal ratio for the indicator "CPI 
growth rate" with the threshold of 1 percentile can be calculated. To complete this, it 
is necessary to classify all signals into four possible types according to Table 2.2.6. 
 
Table 2.2.6. Possible values of indicators 
  Crisis (within 4 quarters) 
No crisis (within 4 
quarters) 
Signal was issued А В 
No signal was issued С D 
 
In the process, data about specific crisis periods identified by the index of 
currency market pressure in chapter 1.3 is used. The crisis periods for the countries in 
question are given in Table 2.2.7. 
 
Table 2.2.7. Crisis periods for the countries in question 
Country 
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
2008 
Q1 
2009 
Q2 
2009 
Q3 
2009 
Q4 
2009 
Q1 
2010 
Q2 
2010 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iceland 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Republic of Korea 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Moldova 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russian Federation 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Ukraine 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Each signal in Table 2.2.5 should be classified as a signal of type A, B, C or D, 
according to Table 2.2.6. Note that the signaling window in our study is 4 quarters. 
The following Table 2.2.8 lists signals issued by the indicator “CPI growth rate” with 
the threshold of 1 percentile. 
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Table 2.2.8. Classification of CPI growth rate signals 
Country 
Q1 
2002 
Q2 
2002 
Q3 
2002 
Q4 
2002 
Q1 
2003 
Q2 
2003 
Q3 
2003 
Q4 
2003 
Q1 
2004 
Q2 
2004 
Q3 
2004 
Q4 
2004 
Armenia D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Chile D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Costa Rica D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Georgia D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Iceland D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Republic of 
Korea D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Moldova D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Romania B D D D D D D D D D D D 
Russian 
Federation D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Ukraine D D D D D D D D D D D D 
 
Table 2.2.8. Classification of CPI growth rate signals, continued 
Country 
Q1 
2005 
Q2 
2005 
Q3 
2005 
Q4 
2005 
Q1 
2006 
Q2 
2006 
Q3 
2006 
Q4 
2006 
Q1 
2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
2007 
Armenia D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Chile D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Costa Rica D D D D D D D D D D D C 
Georgia D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Iceland D D D D D D D D D D D C 
Republic of 
Korea D D D D D D D D D D D C 
Moldova D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Romania D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Russian 
Federation D D D D D D D D D D D D 
Ukraine D D D D D D D D D D D D 
 
Table 2.2.8. Classification of CPI growth rate signals, continued 
Country Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 2008 Q4 2008 Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 Q1 2010 Q2 2010 
Armenia D C A C D D D D D D 
Chile C C A D D D D D D D 
Costa Rica C C D D D D D B D D 
Georgia C C C D D D B D D D 
Iceland C C D D B D D D D D 
Republic of 
Korea C C A D D D D D D D 
Moldova D C C C D D B D D D 
Romania C C C D D D D D D D 
Russian 
Federation C C C C D D D D D B 
Ukraine C A C C D D D D D D 
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Based on the obtained information, the noise to signal ratio of the indicator 
(for the chosen threshold deviation) is calculated according to the following general 
formula: 
 ,     (2.2.5) 
where  – noise to signal ratio of the indicator with the threshold value 
corresponding to P-th percentile, A, B, C, D – the total number of signals of the 
respective type. 
 Calculated quantities of each type of signals for the indicator "CPI growth rate” 
with the threshold of 1 percentile are given in Table 2.2.9. 
Table 2.2.9. Quantity of signals of each type of the indicator “CPI growth rate” 
Type of signal A B C D 
Quantity of signals 4 6 29 301 
Consequently, the noise to signal ratio of the CPI growth rate can be 
calculated: 
 
 
Calculated noise to signal ratio of the CPI growth rate with a threshold of 1 
percentile equals 0.1612. 
This procedure is then repeated for all threshold values in percentiles, from 1
st
 
to 20
th
, and the threshold value that minimizes the noise to signal ratio is selected. For 
example, the minimum noise to signal ratio of the indicator “CPI growth rate” in this 
research is observed at a thresholds of 1
st
, 2
nd
 or 3
rd
 percentile. For these threshold 
values respective noise to signal ratios are the same, so the largest possible range is 
selected, i.e. 3% of the indicator’s distribution. 
Thus, for the indicator "CPI growth rate” the optimal threshold of 3 percentiles 
was determined (which is the same for all countries), and the corresponding actual 
value of threshold for each country was calculated. 
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The described procedure of calculating threshold values is conducted for all 
indicators that were selected for analysis. In the result, a set of actual threshold values 
of indicators for each country is determined (see Table 2.1.3 Chapter 2.1). 
The calculated threshold values are used for further in-depth analysis. For 
example, the CPI growth rate at the chosen threshold deviation accurately signals 
about 4 out of 10 crises in our sample, namely the crisis in Armenia, Chile, South 
Korea and Ukraine. To illustrate this point the dynamics of the absolute value of 
deviations of CPI growth rate from its mean is presented in Figures 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 
and 2.2.6. 
 
Figure 2.2.3 А CPI growth rate, absolute deviation from the mean, Armenia  
 
Figure 2.2.4 CPI growth rate, absolute deviation from the mean, Chile  
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Figure 2.2.5 CPI growth rate, absolute deviation from the mean, South Korea  
 
Figure 2.2.6 CPI growth rate, absolute deviation from the mean, Ukraine 
The above figures show that abnormal behavior of indicator "CPI growth rate" 
indeed signals in advance about the financial crisis for these countries. On the 
contrast, for six other analyzed countries with a chosen threshold the indicator does 
not signal about a crisis in advance. The dynamics of the absolute value of deviations 
of CPI growth rate from its mean for Costa Rica, Georgia, Iceland, Moldova, 
Romania and the Russian Federation is presented in Figures 2.2.7, 2.2.8, 2.2.9, 
2.2.10, 2.2.11, and 2.2.12. 
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Figure 2.2.7 CPI growth rate, absolute deviation from the mean, Costa Rica 
 
Figure 2.2.8 CPI growth rate, absolute deviation from the mean, Georgia 
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Figure 2.2.9 CPI growth rate, absolute deviation from the mean, Iceland 
 
 
Figure 2.2.10 CPI growth rate, absolute deviation from the mean, Moldova 
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Figure 2.2.11 CPI growth rate, absolute deviation from the mean, Romania 
 
 
Figure 2.2.12 CPI growth rate, absolute deviation from the mean, Russian 
Federation 
The growth of CPI in some cases does not show abnormal dynamics for 4 
quarters preceding the crisis (as in cases of Costa Rica, Romania, and Russian 
Federation), and in some cases a significant increase in this indicator in the pre-crisis 
period is not crossing the threshold (an example of this is the trend before the crisis in 
Moldova, Iceland, and Georgia). 
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This example shows that every crisis is a unique phenomenon, so one 
cannot expect that all countries will show the same dynamics of macroeconomic 
variables before the crisis. Therefore, while diagnosing financial crises, only a 
simultaneous analysis of signals from the entire set of leading indicators can take into 
account individual characteristics of countries and forecast crises with decent 
probability. 
After the analysis of the entire array of parameters several important 
conclusions can be formulated. 
Firstly, one can clearly distinguish the group of indicators that signal in 
advance of a crisis for at least seven countries (see Table 2.2). These are the 
following indicators: growth rate of imports (IMPI), the nominal effective exchange 
rate (NEER), consumption share in GDP (CONS_TOTAL), the ratio of government 
loans to GDP (GVT_CLAIMS_GDP), M2 growth rate (DM2), REER growth rate 
(REERI), the ratio of international reserves to GDP (RES_GDP). It can be said that 
this set of indicators describes general trends in the global crisis, or those that are 
common to most countries. For example, five of the seven named indicators signaled 
about the crisis in advance in the case of Ukraine and Iceland, 6 in the case of Chile, 
Costa Rica, South Korea, Romania, and Russian Federation, and all 7 indicators 
issued timely signals about the future crises in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. 
Secondly, each country has its specific set of indicators that signal about the 
approaching financial crisis in advance. For Ukraine, such indicators are: CPI growth 
rate (CPI_CHNG), ratio of government loans to GDP (GVT_CLAIMS_GDP), the 
difference between the real rates on loans and on deposits (RATE_MARGIN), 
growth rate of imports (IMPI), growth rate of exports (EXPI), REER growth rate 
(REERI), ratio of trade balance to GDP (GS_GDP) ratio of international reserves to 
GDP (RES_GDP), real rate on deposits (RDEPRATE), nominal effective exchange 
rate (NEER), consumption share in GDP (CONS_TOTAL). Therefore, Ukraine 
should pay particular attention to these indicators for early prediction of financial 
crises. 
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29. Kaminsky G., Lizondo S., Reinhart C. Leading Indicators of Currency 
Crises // IMF Staff Papers. 1998. Vol. 45 (March) 
 
Conclusions to Part 2  
Therefore, the indexes that were proposed as leading indicators of crisis were 
analyzed with the help of "signals approach”. 
Following indicators successfully predicted the largest number of crises in the 
sample: growth of imports, the nominal effective exchange rate, the ratio of 
government loans to GDP, the share of consumption in GDP, growth rate of money 
supply, the ratio of international reserves to GDP, growth rate of REER, the ratio of 
current account to GDP, ratio of trade balance to GDP, the difference between the 
real rates on loans and on deposits. However, most of these indicators also issued 
significant levels of signals labeled as "false alarms”. Rate of growth of imports gave 
28.76% of all possible "false alarms", nominal effective exchange rate issued 57.67% 
“false signals” possible, the ratio of government loans to GDP had 49.5% “false 
alarms”, the share of consumption in GDP had 22.22% “false alarms”, money supply 
growth issued 19.74% “false alarms”, ratio of international reserves to GDP had 
34.54% “false alarms”, and the difference between the real rates on loans and on 
deposits issued 21.38% of all possible “false alarms”. Given the large number of 
inaccurately issued signals these indicators are not the best predictors of crises. Only 
a small number of mentioned indicators have low percentage of "false alarms”: 
REER growth rate gives 8.14% of all possible “false alarms”, the ratio of current 
account to GDP issues 18.18% false signals possible, and the ratio of trade balance to 
GDP gives only 6.84% of all possible “false alarms”. 
On the other hand, the following indicators provided the highest percentage of 
all possible accurate signals: ratio of government loans to GDP – 72.97%, the 
nominal effective exchange rate – 67.50%, growth of imports – 58.54%, the ratio of 
international reserves to GDP – 41.67%, the difference between the real rates on 
loans and on deposits – 41.67%, share of consumption in GDP – 35.29%, growth rate 
of REER – 33.33%, M2 growth rate – 30.56%, the ratio of international reserves to 
imports – 30.30%, difference between LIBOR rates and rates on domestic loans – 
 124 
27.78%, the ratio of trade balance to GDP – 27.27%. However, among these 
indicators, only the trade balance ratio to GDP, growth rate of REER, the ratio of 
international reserves to imports, and growth rate of M2 issued an acceptable level of 
"false alarms". 
Therefore, to select the most effective indicators (which would both predict a 
significant portion of crises, and have low levels of "false alarms") minimization of a 
noise to signal ratio was used as a criterion for determining the threshold values of 
indicators. The most effective indicators according to this criteria were the following: 
the share of short-term debt in structure of external debt, the ratio of current account 
to GDP, growth rate of CPI, money multiplier, the ratio of M2 to international 
reserves, the real interest rate on loans, the growth rate of REER, the ratio of trade 
balance to GDP, investment share in GDP, and growth rate of exports. For these 
indicators noise to signal ratio is less than 32%. All figures that characterize the 
effectiveness of indicators are presented in Table 2.2. 
 For each country and for each indicator the critical value of the maximum 
deviation from the mean was identified. Using these values, one can easily build 
“safe” limits of actual index. If the indicator crosses the defined threshold values, it 
signals about the threat of financial crisis over the next 4 quarters. Threshold 
deviations for each country are given in Table 2.3. 
Average threshold deviations of indicators are presented in Table 2.4. These 
values provide information on the values of each indicator that may indicate the 
threat of financial crisis in specific countries. 
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PART 3. Estimation of the optimal bank reserves  Modeling. 
 
3.1. Model of the optimal bank reserves on the basis of exogenous 
estimation of crisis arising  probability.  
 
During the 90s of the last century scientists and policymakers used the ratio of 
official reserves to amount of money necessary to finance the import of goods and 
services, as a rule, during the three months so as to evaluate the risks related with the 
balance of payments account. However, since 2001 such approach has been 
considered as too artificial and incomplete since it does not take into account the 
balance of borrowing and lending in terms of their amounts and maturities.  
In “General approaches to the foreign reserves management”, approved by the 
IMF Council of Directors in March 2001, the rule of three-months-of-import-
coverage is questioning and further the documents states that for the countries with 
limited access to the capital markets reserves were continued considering in terms of 
import volume since this procedures is universally accessible and easy to account. 
Despite this fact in reality more broaden criteria should be considered for reserves 
holding determination instead of three-months of imports criterion and for the 
reserves management using the short term debt accounting. 
         In October 2001 IFM published the analysis of potential opportunities for the 
adequacy of monetary reserves based on the capital flows. The ratio of international 
reserves to short-term debt was stated as one of the most useful indicator for 
adequacy reserves evaluation in emerging countries. Also the following conclusion 
was made: the countries with weak economic positions (Ukraine belongs to this 
group) such as, for example, with unstable macroeconomic base (high budget deficit), 
with high level of domestic short-term debt (especially in the economies where the 
mechanism for capital controls is absent), with developing immature banking system, 
which cannot reach high level of capital turnover, require the presence of high 
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reserves level, which should be much higher than the level of reserves suggested 
by the three-months-of-import rule
2
. 
Regardless of the transitions from the three-months-of-import-coverage to the 
coverage of short-term debt, the problem of reserves optimization still remains open 
due to the artificial nature of both approaches. In addition, they do rely on serious 
theoretical background. 
That is why in this chapter we are developing and analyzing the model which 
allows for optimal reserves calculation that are necessary to preclude negative 
consequences which can appear during the sudden stop. The approach is based on 
deeper modeling of economic agent behavior in contrast to the mentioned classical 
rules. Proposed model is relatively simple with small number of equations. The 
important peculiarity of the model is the exogenous probability of the sudden stop, 
which taken as given, not derived within the model itself.  
The model for optimal reserves calculation is based on the approaches, offered 
by Jeanne and Rancière[26]. It was selected because of the following reasons: 
1. The work of authors has been started since 2006 and was published in the IMF 
Working papers. Taking into account the close cooperation of Ukrainian 
government with the IMF and IMF own requirements to the reserves amount, it 
would be useful to take into account the IFM approaches. 
2. The model is developed for the optimal reserves calculation for small open 
emerging economies. Ukraine can be classified to this group of countries. 
3. The reserves are calculated with the insurance goal to protect the economy in 
case of the sudden stop of capital inflows, which was observed in many 
countries during the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009. 
4. The approach itself is based on the modeling of economic agents behavior and 
has serious theoretical background in contrast to the widely spread alternative 
models (vector autoregressive, etc., where the links between variables are set 
atheoretically). 
                                                        
2
 Expository letter to the Draft Law of Ukraine on Introducing the changes to some Laws of 
Ukraine  in order to improve the balance of payments positions in Ukraine in terms of word 
financial crises by 19.11.2008, The Supreme Court of Ukraine. 
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It is worth noticing that developed model does not require including the 
large number of variables and concentrates mainly on the insurance against sudden 
stop of capital inflows, neglecting other aspects of economic system. As a result, the 
model calibration does not require large statistical data sets and can be considered as 
standard approach to the optimal level of reserves calculation. 
The analysis of the model, its assumptions and the results of optimization 
The formal model is derived based on the exogenous probability of the sudden 
stop by aggregating the behavior of separate economic agents (consumers) in before 
and after crisis conditions. It is assumed that representative consumer has the 
following budget constraint: 
  11t t t t tC Y L r L Z     , (3.1) 
where tC  is the level of consumption,  tY  is the GDP,  tL  is the foreign debt,  tZ  is the 
transfer which is granted by the government from the reserves. Before the sudden 
stop
3
 of capital inflows (before the crisis) the transfer is negative, that is, the 
government is taxing consumers in order to repay the loan to the creditor (e.g., to 
IMF). This volume is proportional to the sum of the risk premium and the probability 
of the sudden stop. During the period of the crisis the transfer is positive; the 
government is helping to the representative consumer to repay the foreign debt which 
by assumption is not extended. 
In such circumstances the consumer can smooth its consumption during the 
normal periods and the periods of the crises using the “insurance contract” or 
reserves. During the normal periods the contract establishes the payments to the 
foreign investor in the volume of: 
1
n
t t tZ x R   ,     (3.2) 
and during the crises consumer receives: 
1 (1 )
s
t t tZ x R   ,  (3.3) 
                                                        
3
 This is a sudden stop of capital inflows to the country, which is related first of all with the crises 
episodes as in the country, as well as in the word. 
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where  denotes normal before and after crisis period, while  denotes the period 
of the sudden stop. 
This assumption corresponds to the current situation in Ukraine, where IMF is 
supporting Ukrainian economy during the crisis using such form of help as reserves 
increase and Ukraine repay the loans and interests during the period of economic 
stability. 
Potential GDP is assumed to be increasing with the constant rate in such a way 
that in normal situation (before and after the crisis) it is: 
0(1 )
n t
tY g Y  .  (3.4) 
During the sudden stop of foreign capital GDP is decreasing by  % and 
constitutes: 
(1 )s nt tY Y  .  (3.5) 
To finalize the model we should set up intertemporal preferences of consumers 
– the population of Ukraine: 
 
0
1 ( )
i
t t t i
i
U E r u C




 
  
 
 ,  (3.6) 
where utility function has constant risk-aversion 0  ,   
1
1
C
u C





 if 1  , 
and   ( )u C log C  if 1  , C  is the level of consumption,  E  is the operator for 
mathematical expectations. 
The optimal level of reserves maximizes the following function, which 
represents the expectations of the population welfare in Ukraine as during the sudden 
stop periods as well before and after the crisis periods: 
   1 1( 1 ( ))n st t t t tR argmax u C u C     ,  (3.7) 
where t  is the probability of the crises in 1t   year. 
The goal of the optimization is to smooth the consumption of the population 
during the crisis in such a way that it becomes close to the consumption level during 
the non-crisis episodes. Solving the optimization problem (3.6) – (3.1), which 
consists of objective function and budget constraint, the first order condition can be 
set up: 
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     ' '1 11 (1 )s nt t t t t tx u C x u C     ,  (3.8) 
where x    ,   is the probability of the sudden stop,    is the net risk premium 
(the difference between nominal interest rate and risk free rate). 
Let set up the price of one unit of consumption during the normal times relative 
to the price of one unit of consumption during the crisis as: 
'
1
'
1
( )
( )
n
t
t s
t
u C
p
u C


 ,  (3.9) 
If 1tp  , then consumption level will be always the same regardless of the fact 
whether the economy is in the crisis or not. If 1tp  , then the consumption level is 
smaller during the period of sudden stop. 
If the level of reserves is set up optimally, then based on the (3.8) and (3.9) we 
can derive the following expression: 
1
1
1
1
t
t
t
x
p






.  (3.10) 
Optimizing the consumer problem, the following ratio of optimal reserves to 
GDP can be derived: 
  1
*
1
1 (1 )
1
1 (1 )
t
t
t t
r g
p
g
x p



 

 
    
 
 
,  (3.11) 
where   is the change of short-term debt to GDP during the sudden stop,  r  is the 
risk free rate, x    ,   is the probability of the sudden stop,    is the net risk 
premium (the difference between nominal interest rate and risk free rate),    is the 
level of real GDP drop,  g  is the growth rate of GDP,    is the relative risk-aversion. 
To take into account the national currency depreciation during the sudden stop, 
we should slightly transform described formulas but the algorithm of calculations 
remains the same. The formula for optimal reserves calculation will have the 
following form: 
   
 
1
*
1
1
1 1 Δ
1 1
1 1 (1 )Δ
t
t
t t t
r g r
p Q
g g
x p x Q



  

  
     
  
   
,  (3.12) 
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1
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



 

. (3.13) 
Model parameters estimation 
Let consider three variants of model calibration. The first one (table 3.2, 
column 3) is analogous to the calibration described in the work of Jeanne and 
Rancière (2009), which is based on the analysis of 34 countries with the average level 
of development, using the data for 1975-2003 period [26]. The second one (table 3.2, 
column 4) and the third one (table 3.2, column 5) are based on the data of Ukraine. 
This is done in order to accommodate  the parameters values of the model closer to 
the Ukrainian conditions. The difference between the last two lies in the 
determination of the periods of the sudden stop. The second variant defines the period 
of the sudden stop if the ratio of short-term debt to GDP has decreased by more than 
5% during the year. The third variant determines the periods of sudden stop using the 
expert analysis, regardless of the change of capital inflows. We selected 1999 and 
2009 as crisis years since they are considered in such a way by the majority of 
economists (table 3.1). 
Table 3.1. Periods of sudden stop and before and after crises periods 
Year 
Sudden stop – 
5% drop 
Sudden stop – based on empirical 
analysis and expert assumptions 
1997 0 0 
1998 1 0 
1999 1 1 
2000 0 0 
2001 0 0 
2002 1 0 
2003 1 0 
2004 0 0 
2005 0 0 
2006 0 0 
 131 
2007 0 0 
2008 0 0 
2009 0 1 
Source: Jeanne and Rancière (2009), NBU data, own calculations. 
The results of calibration are shown in the table 3.2 (more detailed calculations 
are shown in the appendix). The final calculations of reserves are conducted in three 
steps: 
1. The following parameters are evaluated λ, π, γ, g, δ, r, σ, x, ΔQ based on the 
statistical data and other scientific investigations (see table 3.2 for parameters 
description). 
2. Calculate p and p standard using (3.10) and (3.13). 
3. Using the results of calculations at the previous two steps and formulas (3.11) 
and (3.12), we can determine the optimal level of reserves. 
Table 3.2. Calibrated parameters and optimal level of reserves calculations 
Parameter Name 
Values 
from the 
Jeanne 
and 
Rancière, 
work – 
variant 1 
The 
change of 
parameters 
for 
Ukraine – 
variant 2 
The 
change of 
parameter 
for 
Ukraine – 
variant 3 
1 2 3 4 5 
λ The the change of short-term debt to GDP, % 10% 10% 10% 
π Probability of the sudden stop, % 10% 10% 10% 
γ GDP drop during the first period of the sudden stop, % 6.5% 6.5% 7.6% 
g Potential GDP growth, % 3.3% 3.1% 3.1% 
δ Net risk premium, % 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 
r Risk free rate, % % 5% 5% 
σ Risk-aversion 2 2 2 
x Gross risk premium, % 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 
p 
The price of one unit of currency during non-crisis 
period relative to the price of one unit of currency 
during the sudden stop without depreciation 
0.86 0.86 0.86 
p ΔQ The price of 1 unit of currency during non-crises period 0.94 1.07 1.35 
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relative to the price of one unit of currency during the 
sudden stop with depreciation 
ΔQ Exchange rate depreciation, % 10% 25% 58% 
ρ 
standard Ratio of reserves to GDP without depreciation, % 
9.1 9.0% 10.2% 
p ΔQ Ratio of reserves to GDP with depreciation, % 13.4% 18.3% 26.0% 
Source: Jeanne and Rancière (2009), NBU data, own calculations. 
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 Estimated level of reserves 
The results of calculations assume that the probability of the sudden stop is 0.1 
each year. The optimal level of reserves is also a fixed number and constitutes: 
 9.1% of GDP based on the parameters values of Jeanne and Rancière (table 
3.2, column 3, which are averages and are calculated based on the data of 34 
countries with the average income level during the 1975-2003 period),  
 9.0% – based on the parameters values calculated for Ukraine for the period 
1996-2009 (table 3.2, column 4), assuming the periods of sudden stops shown in 
the second column of the table 3.1 (1998, 1999, 2002 and 2003 years) and  
 10.2% - for periods of sudden stop based on the third column of the table 3.1 
(the crises of 1999 and 2009 years) using the parameters of table 3.2, column 5.  
Potential usage of depreciation significantly increases the level of optimal 
reserves:  
 from 9.1% to 13.4% using the data for 34 countries (table 3.2, column 3),  
 from 9.0% to 18.3% –calibration based on the data for Ukraine with the sudden 
stops in  1998, 1999, 2002 and 2003 (table 3.2, column 4) and  
 from 10.2% to 26.0% – with the sudden stop in 1999 and 2009 (table 3.2, 
column 5). 
The comparison of current level of reserves volume with the recommended one 
by the model which takes into account depreciation is shown on the figure 3.1. 
 
 134 
Figure 3.1. Optimal level of reserves calculation 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
As we can see from the figure 3.1, the variant which is based on the sudden 
stops in 1999 and 2009 (table 3.2, column 5) always recommends larger volume of 
reserves in comparison to the current level. On the other hand, variant 1 which uses 
the parameters estimated based on the data for 34 countries (table 3.2, column 3) 
would recommend till 2004 larger volume of the reserves and to decrease it after 
2005. Similar dynamics is observed based on the variant 2 (table 3.2, column 4) 
where the model would suggests increasing the level of reserves till 2006 and slightly 
decreasing after 2006 and, basically, keep the current level in 2010. 
In 2011 variant 1 of the model recommends decreasing the level of reserves by 
12%, variant 2 – increasing by 19% and variant 3 – increasing even by 70% in 
comparison to the existing level of reserves (by 2010). 
Simulations and comparison with alternatives 
The results of estimation of the developed model hardly depend on the values 
of the parameters. That is why an important element of the analysis of the model 
quality is stability check by changing parameters in comparison with their existing 
values. For such type of analysis the simulation principle is often used. We offer to 
determine for each value of the parameters (based on the variant 2 of the calibration, 
table 3.2, column 4) the optimal level of reserves and compare it with the current 
volume by 2010. It should be stated that for 2010 the current level of reserves and 
recommended one by the model in fact coincide. 
In table 3.3 the initial values of the parameters are shown with the intervals of 
changes. 
Table 3.3. Parameters values, which are used for the initial model estimation  
and their intervals for the next simulation 
Symbol Parameter Value 
Simulation 
interval 
π Probability of the sudden stop, % 10.0% 1%-30% 
g Real GDP growth, % 3.1% 0%-10% 
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r Risk free rate, % 7.8% 1%-10% 
δ Risk premium, %. 1.3% 0.0%-2.5% 
γ GDP decrease during the sudden stop, % 6.5% 0%-50% 
ΔQ Exchange rate depreciation, % 25% 0%-80% 
σ Risk-aversion 2.0 1.0-3.0 
Source: NBU data, authors’ assumptions.  
Calculated optimal level of reserves is relatively sensitive to all parameters 
except the risk free rate. 
As for the probability of the sudden stop this relation is positive and linear as 
can be seen from the figure 3.2. It should be noticed also that for each percent of the 
probability increase the model recommends increasing the level of reserves by 1.4 
billion dollars. 
 
Figure 3.2. The optimal level of reserves sensitivity to the probability of the sudden 
stop 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
The level of reserves positively depends on the potential GDP growth rate, as it 
is shown on the figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3. The optimal level of reserves sensitivity to the potential GDP growth 
rate 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
With the change of the risk free rate the optimal level of reserves is almost not 
changing (figure 3.4). 
 
Figure 3.4. The optimal level of reserves sensitivity to the risk free rate 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
Risk premium is negatively related to the level of reserves: as it is growing, the 
optimal level of reserves is decreasing, as shown on the figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5. The optimal level of reserves sensitivity to risk premium 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
The higher the level of expected GDP decrease during the sudden stop, the 
larger is the recommended by the model level of reserves. This dependence is shown 
on the figure 3.6 and it is linear. Each expected percentage of GDP drop requires 
increasing the level of reserves by 2.2 billion dollars. 
 
Figure 3.6. The optimal level of reserves sensitivity to the GDP drop during the 
sudden stop 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
Expected significant exchange rate depreciation requires accumulating larger 
level of reserves to combat the negative consequences of potential crisis (figure 3.7). 
This dependency is linear. If the expected percentage of exchange rate depreciation 
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increases by 10%, then the model recommends increasing the level of reserves on 
average by 6 billion dollars. 
 
Figure 3.7. The optimal level of reserves sensitivity to the exchange rate change 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
The level of risk aversion is negatively related to the recommended level of 
reserves (figure 3.8). However, this relation is not very strict. In this context, we 
should also remember than we can face the famous Lukas critique. Its essence means 
that some classical models assume the stability of parameters as the time changes, 
specifically during monetary and fiscal regulations. In reality this situations may be 
the opposite one. Let take as an example the level of risk aversion. At the first glance 
it is expected to be relatively stable. But in fact the situation may be significantly 
indeterminant. The level of risk aversion characterizes the degree of riskiness of 
economic agents, including investors. During many year economists argue that 
liquidity can be explained though the analysis of monetary aggregates. But the 
problems at the mortgage market in the USA and the corresponding world crises 
showed that liquidity (or its absence) has more and more in common with the 
appetites to the risk from the sides of borrowers and creditors than with the monetary 
aggregates. Simply speaking this is the decrease of the riskiness of economic agents 
and their desire to invest into the projects which were acceptable before the crisis 
ceteris paribus. That is why we should remember that risk aversion during the crisis 
periods can change a lot, which will require the corresponding change of the level of 
reserves served as an insurance instrument. 
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Figure 3.8. The optimal level of reserves sensitivity to the risk aversion 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
In addition, to compare the results of modeling with existing practical rules for 
reserves calculation, we can compare the level of current reserves of Ukraine with the 
recommended level, which are calculated based on the model and also with the levels 
of results which can be calculated based on two classical rules: 
1) Greenspan-Guidotti rule and 
2) three-months-of-import-coverage rule. 
Greenspan-Guidotti rule
4
 states that the level of reserves should be equal to the 
short-term debt, and, as a result, the ratio of reserves to the short-term debt will be 
equal to unity. This rule is derived from the fact that countries should possess with 
the recourses necessary to protect them from the massive foreign capital outflows
5
. 
Three-months-of-import-coverage rule allows to finance the import of goods 
and services during the specified periods without additional capital inflows. 
                                                        
4
 The rule is named after Pablo Guidotti – the former Argentinean Deputy Minister of Finance and 
Alan Greenspan - the former Head of Federal Reserve of USA. Initially Guidotti formed the rule 
during the G33 summit in 1999, and Greenspan widely spreaded it in his speech during the meeting 
at the World Bank. Gusman Kalafel and Padilia del Boske (2002) showed that the ratio of reserves 
to the short-term debt is the leading indicator of external crises.  
5
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guidotti%E2%80%93Greenspan_rule. 
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Figure 3.9. Comparison of the current level of reserves, model prediction and 
reserves recommended by the classical rules 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
As shown on the figure 3.9, the optimal level of reserves based on the three-
months-of-import-coverage rule during 2008-2009 approximately is two times lower 
than the current level. Similar to this rule recommendation provides variant 1 of the 
model (table 3.2, column 3). On the other hand, Greenspan-Guidotti rule recommends 
increasing significantly the level of reserves – by 40-60% – in order to combat 
possible negative tendencies related with the massive capital outflows from the 
country. Similar prediction is received based on the variant 3 of the model (table 3.2, 
column 5). Variant 2 of the model (table 3.2, column 4) almost coincides with the 
current level of reserves, which lies between two rules. 
 
3.2.  Model of the optimal bank reserves with probability calculations of the 
sudden stop on the basis of macroeconomic data  
 
 
 Instead of determining the parameter of the sudden stop based on the expert 
estimation, we can estimate it on the existing macroeconomic data. This estimate can 
be obtained using the probability models like probit or logit, which are based on the 
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assumption that the distribution of such indicator as probability of the sudden stop 
is normal or logistic, respectively, and the dependent variable is a dummy. 
 In general there are three classical approaches to the probability of the sudden 
stop modeling with the usage of dummy variable as dependent one: linear probability 
model (LPM), probit and logit. Dependent variable in each of these models is the 
binary value, which takes 0 (event did not occur) and 1 (even occurred). [58,61] 
 Linear probability model (LPM) is a classical regression of binary variable on 
other explanatory variables and has the following form: 
 Y Xβ e ,  (3.14) 
where Y  is Nx1 vector of values of dependent variable,  X  is Nxk matrix of k 
explanatory variables (including the constant),  β  is kx1 vector of regression 
parameters,  e  is Nx1 vector of residuals of the regression. 
The usage of this method on practice is related with the following problems: 
1. Residuals of such type of regression are not normally distributed. It means that 
hypothesis testing and confidence intervals building for the estimated 
parameters based on the small sample will be not correct. 
2. Heteroscedasticity of the residuals leads to the violation of one of the classical 
assumption of ordinary linear regression, which also can lead to the incorrect 
conclusion in terms of modeling. 
3. The possibility of predicted probability lying outside (0, 1) interval, which 
contradicts to the definition of the probability and complicates the usage of the 
received results on practice. 
4. The coefficient of determination will be underevaluated (R-squared) since all 
values of the dependent variables are lying on the lines 0y   and 1y  , and the 
model forms the line which intersects them. 
The first problem can be addressed by increasing the sample size, the second 
one by using the weighted least squares method, problem 4 – by introducing other 
analogous indicators of goodness of fit measure (for example, using pseudo-R-
square, that is, Mc Fadden R-square
6
). So the main remaining problem is the 
                                                        
6
 The indicator is named after 2000 Nobel laureate in Economics Daniel McFadden. 
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distribution of estimated probability outside (0, 1) interval. It can be addressed by 
using the nonlinear methods of probability estimation such as probit and logit, which 
have the following form: 
   
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tx z
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where 
ty  is the values of the dependent variable at the period t , 1,t N , tx  is the 1xk 
vector of k explanatory variables (including the constant) during the period t , 
1,t N , tx  is the t  row of the matrix 
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X = , β  is the kx1 vector of regression 
parameters,   F   is the standardized normal cumulative distribution function.,   L   is 
the logistic function. 
 Estimation of these models is conducted by maximum likelihood estimator. 
The parameters of them are not treated in a classical way, that is, as itx  changes by 
unity the probability  1|t tP y x  will not change by i  as in the case of LPM. With the 
change of itx  by unity in the probit model (3.15) the probability will change 
approximately by  i tf x β
7
, in the logit model (3.16) – by 
    1| 1 1|i t t t tP y x P y x    . The coefficient i  is called partial regression coefficient, 
and the change of the probability caused by itx  is called a marginal effect (see 
Appendix 9). 
We should notice that probit and logit models are close and there are no strict 
criteria in favor of any of them. In the models of this class pseudo-R-squared or 
McFadden R-squared is used to estimate the coefficient of determination. It can be 
calculated using the following formula: 
                                                        
7
  f   – marginal standard normal probability distribution function. 
 143 
2
ˆ( )
1
( )
McF
l
R
l


  ,  (3.17) 
where ˆ( )l   is the optimal log-likelihood of the estimating model, 
( )l   is the optimal log-likelihood of the restricted model, when all coefficients, 
except the constant, equals to zero. 
In order to calculate the probability of the crisis in 1999 and 2009 we used 
general probit models (3.15) in two modifications. Parallel computations based on the 
logit models (3.16) produced analogous results. 
 To formalize probit model and run it on real data we assume that during the 
period of 1996-2010 the crises happened in 1999 and 2009. It is assumed that the 
probability of the crisis depends on the following factors: deviation of exchange rate 
from its long-term trend, which is estimated by Hodrick-Prescott filter (detailed 
algorithm for using this filter is given in appendix 8), ratio of short-term debt to GDP, 
ratio of current account to GDP.  
Two versions (3.18) and (3.19) of probit models were estimated
8
 to calculate 
the probabilities of sudden stops in 1999 and 2009. They differ one from another in 
the numbers of lags variables and have the following form:  
Probit 1: 
      21 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _t t t t t t ty F erate erate hp st to gdp st to gdp ca to gdp             
     
2
2
1 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _
2
1
2
t t t t t terate erate hp st to gdp st to gdp ca to gdp z
e dz
   

        


 ,  (3.18) 
Probit 2: 
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 ,      (3.19) 
where ty  is the values of dependent variable in period t , 1,t N ,  1999, 2009 1ty   , 
 1999, 2009 0ty   , terate  is the exchange rate,  _ terate hp  is the long-term exchange rate,  
                                                        
8
 In order to estimate the probit models in Eviews Object/New object…/Equation should be 
selected, then the equations should be entered and the type of estimation BINARY – Binary 
Choice (Logit, Probit, Extreme Value) should be chosen. 
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_ _ tst to gdp  is the ratio of short-term debt to GDP,  _ _ tca to gdp  is the ratio of 
current account to GDP, 
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5  are regression coefficients,  1t  and 2t  are 
residuals,   F   is the standardized cumulative density function. 
 The results of estimation of unknown parameters of the models on the 1996-
2009 data are shown in the tables 3.4 and 3.5. 
Table 3.4. The results of estimation of the probability of the sudden stop based 
on the Probit 1 (3.18) 
Explanatory variable Valiable Coefficient р-statistics9 
Exchange ratet-1-Long-term exchange 
ratet-1 
1 1_t terate erate hp   -1.145484 0.2037 
Ratio of short-term debt to GDPt-1- 
Ratio of short-term debt to GDPt-2 
1 2_ _ _ _t tst to gdp st to gdp   -45.74402 0.1198 
Ration of current account to GDPt-1
2
  
2
1_ _ tca to gdp   -246.6334 0.1944 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
Table 3.5. The results of estimation of the probability of the sudden stop based 
on the Probit 2 (3.19) 
Explanatory variable Variable Coefficient р-statistics 
Exchange ratet-1-Long-term exchange 
ratet-1 
1 1_t terate erate hp   -1.278222 0.0973 
Ratio of short-term debt to GDPt-2 2_ _ tst to gdp   -6.994474 0.0358 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
The resulting values of McFadden R-square for the models (3.18) and (3.19) 
based on the formula (3.17) is: 
2
1
5,056
1 0.119
5,742
McFR

  

,  (3.20) 
2
2 2
4,809
1
5,742
McFR

  

0.162.  (3.21) 
As we can see from the resulting calculations shown in the tables 3.4 and 3.5, 
estimated coefficients of the model probit 1 (3.18) are marginally significant (that is, 
they lie on the margin or close to the 10% significance level), and for the model 
probit 2 the coefficients are significant with lower p-statistics. The increase of each 
factor (explanatory variable) negatively influences the probability of the sudden stop. 
                                                        
9
 p-statistics shows the probability of the so called Type I error, which is the rejection of true 
hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero. This is a minimum significance level at which the 
hypothesis of equality of the coefficient to zero can be rejected. The smaller the p-statistics, the 
lower the probability of rejection of true hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero. 
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In order to get the marginal effects for probit models, which show the change of 
the probability caused by the change in 
itx  by some value, additional calculations 
should be conducted. More specifically, probability density functions should be 
evaluated and multiplied by the partial coefficients (see attachment 3.3). The 
resulting calculations of marginal effects are shown in the table 3.6. 
Table 3.6. The change of the probability caused by changes in the explanatory 
variables 
Year 
Probit 1 Probit 2 
Exchange ratet-
1-Long-term 
exchange ratet-1. 
The change of 
this variable by 
1.00 
Ratio of short-
term debt to 
GDPt-1 - Ratio 
of short-term 
debt to GDPt-2. 
The change of 
this variable by 
0.01 
Ratio of current 
account to 
GDPt-1
2
. The 
change of this 
variable by 0.01 
Exchange ratet-1-
Long-term 
exchange ratet-1. 
The change of 
this variable by 
1.00 
Ratio of short-
term debt to 
GDPt-2. The 
change of this 
variable by 0.10 
1996 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1997 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1998 -0.42 -0.17 -0.91 -0.32 -0.18 
1999 -0.23 -0.09 -0.49 -0.35 -0.19 
2000 -0.22 -0.09 -0.47 -0.43 -0.23 
2001 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.06 
2002 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.23 -0.13 
2003 -0.44 -0.18 -0.95 -0.04 -0.02 
2004 -0.34 -0.13 -0.73 -0.09 -0.05 
2005 -0.06 -0.02 -0.12 -0.23 -0.13 
2006 -0.17 -0.07 -0.37 -0.36 -0.20 
2007 -0.45 -0.18 -0.97 -0.35 -0.19 
2008 -0.39 -0.15 -0.83 -0.43 -0.24 
2009 -0.46 -0.18 -0.98 -0.40 -0.22 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
As we can see from the table 3.6, the results of modeling are least sensitive to 
the changes of factors in 2001, 2002 and 2005, where marginal effects for estimated 
coefficients have the lowest values. During before crisis years sensitivity of models 
sharply increased. It means that instability of economic system raised and small 
changes of factors (explanatory variables) lead to relatively significant changes in the 
probability of the sudden stop. For example, analyzing the model probit 1 (3.18), only 
based on the changes of ratio of short-term debt to GDP during the period of 2006-
2008, the conclusion about the sharp increase of probability of the sudden stop of 
capital inflows can be made, which constitutes +0.53. 
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Graphical results of estimated probabilities of sudden stop for two probit 
models are shown on the figure 3.10. 
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Figure 3.10. Estimated probabilities of sudden stop for probit 1 and probit 2 
models  
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
As we can see from the figure, the principal difference between the models is 
that probit 1 shows very high probability of sudden stop in 2004.  
Estimated values of the probabilities of both probit 1 and probit 2 can be used 
as input parameters to the next calculations of optimal reserves level based on the 
formula (3.12) which takes into account depreciation and parameters are represented 
by variant 3 (probability of the sudden stop influences on x  – see (3.8) – and on 
 tp directly and through x  – see (3.13), that is we should change constant probability 
  in the formulas for x  (3.8) and  tp  (3.13) for the probabilities that are calculated 
for each year based on the probit models and use the new values in the final formula 
(3.12). The values of parameters for the variant 3 of the model for optimal reserves 
calculations are shown in table 3.2 in the column 5. 
Graphical results of the optimal level of reserves calculations based on the 
annual data for the period of 1996-2009 with the probabilities from the probit models 
Probit 1 Probit 2 
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are shown on the figure 3.11 (analytical results of calculations are shown in the 
appendix 4). 
 
Figure 3.11. Calculated level of reserves using the probabilities of the sudden 
stop from the probit 1 and probit 2. 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
As we can see from the figure, due to the large fluctuations of the probability 
of the sudden stop, the optimal level of reserves is also very volatile in contrast to the 
current level and reserves predicted by the variant 3 with constant probability of the 
sudden stop. The model results with the probabilities from the probit 1 are more 
volatile than the results of the model with probabilities from probit 2. Nevertheless, 
both models show close reserves volumes after 2006. These calculated volumes are 
higher than recommended levels of reserves recommended by the variant 3, since the 
probability of the sudden stop in the variant 3 during 2007-2009 is stable and equals 
to 0.1, but for the probit models during this period it practically does not decline 
below 0.2. As a result, received optimal level of reserves which fluctuates a lot 
cannot be considered as realistic ones since NBU and other Central Banks have no 
practical possibility to change sharply the volume of reserves since it is very costly 
operation (this conclusion is especially actual for the model which uses the 
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probability from the probit 1). One of the possible variants of solving this problem 
may be the introduction of transaction costs for the change of reserves, which can 
help smoothing recommended level of reserves as the probability of the sudden stop 
changes. 
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Conclusions to Part 3 
Conducted analysis of the change of macroeconomic dynamics during, before 
and after crisis periods showed that before crisis periods the clear trend of reserves 
accumulation could be observed. The results of calculations based on all models of 
optimal reserves calculations allow analyzing these tendencies in different ways. 
Moreover, the variants of the model are significantly different, which may require 
additional investigations, improvements, analysis and modeling of influence of 
different factors which influences the volume of reserves and calculations of their 
optimal value. 
Such two standard tests, which determines the adequacy of reserves volume as 
Greenspan-Guidotti rule (reserves should cover completely short-term liabilities if the 
state) and three-months-of-import-coverage rule (the reserves should be equal to the 
import volume for the last three months), as it was shown by Krznar (2009)
10
, has 
several drawbacks: 
1) They are not based on optimization criteria. Because of this the excess of the 
reserves above optimal level can lead to the alternative costs increase, which 
can be decreased by using reserved for other goals. At the same time 
insufficient reserves volume can put under the risk economy of Ukraine before 
potential crisis; 
2) They do not take into account the high level of economy dollarization since the 
rules were to the large extent developed for the US for which the term 
dollarization is not actual; 
3) These standard rules cannot be relevant in new financial conductions, 
especially after the world crisis of 2008-2009. 
At the current moment, we think that the results that can describe the Ukrainian 
reality the most adequately can be represented by the variant 2 of the model for 
                                                        
10
 Ivo Krznar, Essays in International Economics, A dissertation for the degree Doctor of 
Philosophy. 
 150 
optimal level of reserves calculation with depreciation taken into account. In this 
case current reserves of 2010 almost coincide with the recommended by the model 
volume (current reserves are recommended to increase by 3.1% in 2010). As for the 
next 2011, the results of modeling recommend to accumulate by 19.3% more reserves 
in comparison with the 2010 volume.  
As for the probability of the sudden stop calculation based on the 
macroeconomic data, the low flexibility of reserves changing should be taken into 
account. It can be done by expanding the model introducing into it transaction or 
other costs of reserves changing. The more stable reserves volume can be formed, 
less sensitive to the fluctuations of the probability of the sudden stop. It should be 
noticed that there is a necessity in increasing the sample size, which can be achieved 
by modeling the probability of the sudden stop based on the data for a group of 
countries. 
Besides it, we should notice that the following problems may require attention 
in the future research: 
1. There is a necessity in developing the modified version of the proposed 
model for optimal level of reserves calculation by taking into account more detailed 
aspects of the Ukrainian economy. It will help to achieve three important results: 
   1.1. More deeper to understand the influence of different factors on the optimal 
and current level of reserves, which can allow the NBU to determine the most 
effective instruments for achieving the optimal level of reserves. 
 1.2. The realization of more detailed and elaborated model, which will include 
more descriptive equations in comparison to the model analyzed in this chapter, 
will allow improving the stability of the parameters of the model itself. It is very 
important in the crisis conditions, which are characterized by fast changes and 
large and frequent domestic and foreign shocks. 
 1.3. To conduct the endogenization of the several model assumptions, which 
means that the values of several parameters will be determined within the model 
itself and not given exogenously. As a result, NBU can receive the answers to the 
conjugate to the optimal level of reserves calculation questions like the probability 
of the sudden stop, etc. 
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2. It is important to widen the optimization problem, for example, to 
consider the optimization by several instruments of the monetary and fiscal policy of 
NBU. It may be useful to consider the simultaneous optimization of the level of 
reserves with other variables – debt, inflation, GDP growth, etc., which may to rise 
the efficiency of not only of the monetary policy but also fiscal one. 
In addition, the perspective direction for future research is the improving of the 
core task of the model, which is the insurance of the sudden stop of capital inflows 
motive by including other goals for reserves accumulations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The global financial crisis of 2007-2009, the beginning of which has been 
provoked by the issues at the USD mortgage market, is one of the most powerful 
financial crises since the Great Depression.  
Capital flows and foreign trade belong to the key transmission channels of the crisis 
from the developed countries to developing ones. Thus, countries that have been 
significantly affected by the crisis, suffered almost immediate withdrawal of capital. 
Consequently, these countries experienced high levels of repayment for loans and 
bonds of private issue, as well as difficulties in refinancing them in terms of global 
reduction in interbank lending and the suspension of new bonds issues. In addition, 
the capital reduction of the largest hedge funds and mutual funds, along with 
termination of their strategy of "carry-trade", caused additional pressure on the 
currency depreciation in these countries. The financial collapse of 2008 and further 
decline in lending and global demand caused a sharp fall in international trade 
volumes and commodity prices, which in turn strengthened the crisis for developing 
countries, affecting their external debt and balance of payments.  
2. Certain macroeconomic indicators appear to be helpful for diagnosing the 
occurrence of the global economic crises. Generalization and comparison of 
macroeconomic indicators, selected on the basis of theoretical and empirical research, 
allowed forming a basic set of 71 proactive indicators in order to develop methods of 
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diagnosing the onset of recession in the economy of Ukraine. Since not all of them 
can be used in practice due to the absence or inaccessibility of information, it was 
necessary to conduct additional analysis of availability and completeness of the 
original information.  
3. Analysis of availability and completeness of the initial information based on three-
dimensional model of data helped to reduce possible sample of countries from 239 to 
60, and a list of indicators - from 71 to 60. Thus, the analysis took into account forty-
one indicator for which sufficient  information was available in all countries and all 
time periods, and also nineteen variables (stock indexes) that have global effect and 
need just one time series .  
4. In order to group countries according to the level of involvement into the global 
crisis of recent years the exchange market pressure index (EMP) has been used. 
Based on the calculations of this index based on 2002-2010 years quarterly data the 
countries had been divided into two groups: the ones most and the ones least affected 
by the crisis of 2008-2009. Moreover, countries of each group were additionally 
ranked by time of occurrence and duration of the crisis. The detailed analysis of 
peculiarities of the economic situation in each country from the first and the second 
group accounting for their territorial proximity to Ukraine, similarity of economies 
type and the need of representing most of the Earth continents finally allowed to set 
up two pools of 10 countries each, comprising that were significantly and slightly 
affected by the crisis, respectively.  
5. The comparative statistical analysis of the macroeconomic dynamics in the 
economies of selected countries during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods 
has shown that for countries that have been significantly affected by the crisis, crisis 
period was associated with relatively deeper recession of following indicators: real 
GDP growth rate, trade balance, current account surplus, the growth rate of nominal 
effective exchange rate, the level of real domestic and foreign interest rates, money 
growth rate etc. However, for this particular group the values of real effective 
exchange rate and the level of money multiplier growth rates decreased much less.  
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6. As a result of the comparative analysis of the economies’ macroeconomic 
dynamics in the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods the general conclusion was 
made that among the indexes that provide best prediction of the onset of the crisis and 
thus can be user as the indicators of approaching crisis the following indexes can be 
named (with the group to which they belong in brackets): real GDP, gross fixed 
capital formation and fixed capital consumption (real sector), total foreign debt and 
short-term external debt (debt burden), trade balance, current account balance, the 
growth rate of real effective exchange rate and pace of nominal effective exchange 
rate growth (the balance of payments), the ratio of real domestic and foreign interest 
rates (international variables) money multiplier (financial liberalization), the 
consumer price index and growth rate of money supply (other financial variables).  
7. In order to calculate the threshold values for proactive indicators of possible 
occurrence of economic crisis, the “signal approach” has been used. This approach is 
based on the notion of "signal", which is specified as a deviation of some indicator 
from its average value by an amount greater than a certain critical value. This critical 
value had been identified separately for each combination of country and indicator as 
the maximum deviation from the mean through, so that "safe" range of actual index 
values can be built. The event of index intersecting the defined threshold values is 
assumed to be the indicator’s signal of the financial crisis threat within the next 4 
quarters.  
8. By using the “signal approach” technique the analysis of indicators proposed as 
proactive indicators of crisis has been conducted. The most effective indicators 
judging by “noise” to “signal” ratio criterion were the following (in brackets we give 
the average value and threshold deviations for Ukraine): the share of short-term debt 
in foreign debt, in ratio units (0,2238 ± 0,22); current account ratio to GDP, rat.un. 
(0,0159 ± 0,13); growth rate of CPI,% (11,3660 ± 14,49); money multiplier, rat.un. 
(2,4716 ± 0,54), ratio of M2 to international reserves, rat.un. (3,6294 ± 0,70), the real 
loan interest rate, rat.un. (0,0641 ± 0,19), growth rate of REER,% (-0,1673 ± 5,73); 
trade balance to GDP ratio, rat.un. (-0,0034 ± 0,09); investment as a share of GDP,% 
(21,5924 ± 7,96); exports growth rate,% (4,7064 ± 20,65).  
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9. Preliminary assessment of the reserves volume sufficient to prevent the 
negative consequences during the crisis periods has been obtained based on the 
modified model of Jeanne and Rancière, which originally was designed to determine 
the amount of reserves for small open developing economies. According to the 
model, reserves are specified as means of insurance against sudden outflows of 
capital investments in Ukraine's economy, which had been observed during the 
financial crisis of 2008-2009. The model is based on modeling the behavior of 
economic agents. Calculations on real data sample were conducted for 3 possible 
options for model’s calibration. Moreover, the difference between the latter two lies 
in the way of identifying the periods of sudden stop either based on the fall of the 
short-term debt to GDP ratio more than 5% in a given year, or based on the expert 
estimates periods instantaneous stop without respect to the magnitude of change in 
capital inflows. Comparison of the calculated optimal levels of reserves and their 
actual volumes at different times showed an insignificant difference. Accordingly, the 
model can be used as a basis of estimating the optimal size of reserves in the policy 
decision making.  
10. The model for determining optimal size of reserves, based on the likelihood of 
occurrence of exogenous crisis can be improved by the introducing more factors into 
the model. It is also important to develop and evaluate version of the model that 
simultaneously determines the optimal amount of reserves and the probability of 
crisis occurrence. An important direction for further research is also to develop 
models for simultaneous optimization of size of reserves and debt. In addition, it is 
important to identify and analyze key factors that influence the formation of reserves 
in different groups of countries based on vector autoregressive models and their 
derivatives.  
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Appendixes  
Appendix 1  
Detailed comments for Matlab application for processing the initial data  
Stage 1. Importing data for analysis.  
Note that in current the data for analysis is stored in the Exel-file in the following 
structure (column headings):  
 Units,  
 Scale,  
 Country name,  
 Database  
 Indicator code in the database,  
 Description of indicator  
 Variable name  
 Index period (Q1 2002 ... Q2 2010)  
 
Importing data is performed by the following command sequence:  
  
importts ('raw_data_save.xls');  
dimensions = {'COUNTRYNAME', 'VARNAME'};  
data_start_col = 8;  
data_start_row = 2;  
mddi = MDDataImport (data, textdata, dimensions, data_start_col, data_start_row);  
The result of the procedures above is MDDataImport object, which contains all the 
information of the input Excel-table, and procedure for its transformation into a more 
convenient form for analysis.  
Step 2. Creating a three-dimensional matrix of initial information, indexed by 
country, indicator and time.  
Creating of a three-dimensional matrix is initialized by the command:  
md_data = mddi.recursive_reshape ();  
 164 
The result of the command is a creation of the three-dimensional data matrix and 
codes vectors named «md_data», which correspond to the sets of values for each of the 
dimensions - the country names, variable names and time periods identifiers.  
Step 3. Sort countries and indicators by the number of missing values:  
Sort countries and indicators by the number of missing values is done by the instruction 
set:  
[Dd vi] = sort (count_nans_dim (md_data, 'VARNAME'));  
[Dt ci] = sort (count_nans_dim (md_data, 'COUNTRYNAME'));  
The result of the code is a set of two vectors named “dd” and “dt”, containing data for 
respective indicators and countries, ordered according to increase the number of missing 
observations.  
Step 4. Charting obtained data decay functions:  
Diagram of indicators according to the missing values number growth is drawn by:  
plot (dd, 'DisplayName', 'dd', 'YDataSource', 'dd');  
The result of this command is displaying a graph of data decay by indicator in all 
countries and time periods.  
The following command plots countries in the ascending order of missing observations 
amount:  
plot (dt, 'DisplayName', 'dt', 'YDataSource', 'dt');  
The result of this command is a graph of data decay by country on all indicators in all 
time periods. 
PS Note that the list of indicators includes some variables that do not bind to a specific 
country, but are used in calculations as variables of global economy. These include gold 
prices, and stock indexes. For such variables the field "country" is set to "Global".  
Step 5. Forming the final sample of countries and indicators on which there is 
greatest completeness of data.  
In order to minimize the number of missing observations in the sample, we select the 
countries and variables as follows: initial 54 selected indicators with the lowest values of 
unavailability of data, and 15 price and stock indices that reflect the global economic 
environment and are put at the end of the sorted series. Among the countries 60 
countries that have the highest data availability were selected. This was performed by the 
instructions:  
cutoff.VARNAME = md_data.dimtags.VARNAME (vi ([1:54 56: end]));  
cutoff.COUNTRYNAME = md_data.dimtags.COUNTRYNAME (ci (1:60));  
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The result of implementation of these commands is the list of variable names and 
countries, according to which a data sub-sample will be formed. Lists stored in the 
structure named “cutoff” with the field names VARNAME and COUNTRYNAME 
respectively.  
Formation of the final sub-sample from the already existing database is done with a 
sequence of commands:  
desc.dims = cutoff;  
desc.timespan = 1: length (md_data.ts_indices);  
new_slice_countries = md_data.get_slice (desc);  
The result of implementation of these commands is the final selection of indicators (69 
indicators) and the (60 +1) in the data object named new_slice_countries.  
Step 6 Sorting countries and indicators of  the final sample according to the data 
decay rate:  
Sorting countries and indicators of  the final sample according to the data decay rate is 
done with:  
[Dd vi] = sort (count_nans_dim (new_slice_countries, 'VARNAME'));  
[Dt ci] = sort (count_nans_dim (new_slice_countries, 'COUNTRYNAME'));  
The result of the commands is a set of two vectors with the names of “dd” and “dt”, 
which contain data of  the final selection of indicators and countries sorted according to 
increase the number of missing observations.  
Step 7. Charting the completeness of data for the final selection of countries and 
indicators:  
Diagram of indicators and countries included in the final sample is done by a sequence 
of commands:  
figure  
plot (dd, 'DisplayName', 'dd', 'YDataSource', 'dd');  
set (gca, 'XTickLabel', new_slice_countries.dimtags.VARNAME, 'XTick', 1: length 
(...  
new_slice_countries.dimtags.VARNAME))  
rotateticklabel (gca, 90)  
figure  
plot (dt, 'DisplayName', 'dt', 'YDataSource', 'dt');  
set (gca, 'XTickLabel', new_slice_countries.dimtags.COUNTRYNAME, 'XTick', 1: ...  
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length (new_slice_countries.dimtags.COUNTRYNAME))  
rotateticklabel (gca, 90)  
The result of implementation of these instructions is to build and display graphically the 
lack of data on each indicator, which is included in the final sample, for all countries 
included in the final sample in all time periods, as well as construction and display 
graphics lack of data on each country on all indicators in all time periods.  
Note that the list of names and designations of indicators and countries included in the 
final sample is presented in Appendix 2  
 
Appendix 2  
List of primary variables and the countries included in the final sample  
 
Table 1. List of variables in the final sample used for analysis  
Number  Variable name  Explanation variable  
1  RMG  International reserves excluding gold, million SDR 
2  INTERN_RESERVES  International reserves, million SDR 
3  ER  The official or market exchange rate in national currency 
per $ 1. USD  
4  CPI_CHNG  Percentage change in CPI compared with the previous 
quarter  
5  DEPRATE  Average market rate on deposits  
6  GOLD_OUNC  Gold stock, oz.  
7  BRMONEY  Aggregate growth rate of broad money aggregate, pp.  
8  LENDRATE  Average market rate on loans 
9  IMPORT  Imports, mln. USD  
10  EXPORT  Exports, mln. USD 
11  GVT_CLAIMS  Loans to government, mln. national currency   
12  DEP_TRANS  Volume transitional deposits, mln. national currency 
13  DEP_OTH  Other deposits included in the monetary aggregate BROAD 
MONEY, mln. national currency 
14  M2  Monetary aggregate M2, millions of national currency  
15  DEP_EXCL  Deposits not included in the monetary aggregate BROAD 
MONEY, mln. national currency  
16  BOP_CURACC  Current account balance, mln. USD  
17  BOP_GS  The balance of trade in goods and services, mln. USD  
18  BOP_GSI  The balance of trade in goods and services taking into 
account income transfers, million USD  
19  BOP_TR_BAL  The balance of trade balance, mln. USD  
20  MBASE  Monetary base, mln. national currency 
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21  BOP_CAPACC  Capital account balance, mln. national currency 
22  NEER  NEER,%  
23  LOANS  The volume of loans, mln. national currency 
24  REER  REER, % 
25  SPI  Stock Price Index  
26  GDP_VOL_CHNG  Volume change in real GDP,%  
27  GDP_DEFL_CHNG  Change of GDP deflator,%  
28  CONS_H  Household consumption, million national currency  
29  GFCF  Gross fixed capital, mln. national currency 
30  CONS_GOV  Consumption of state, mln. national currency 
31  NGDP  Nominal GDP, mln. national currency 
32  M3  Monetary aggregate M3, mln. national currency 
33  EXPORT_UNT_PRICES  Unit Price export, USD 
34  FD_CB  External debt of commercial banks, mln. USD 
35  FD_GG  External government debt, mln. USD 
36  FD_MA  External debt of the central bank, mln. USD 
37  FD_OS  External debt of other sectors, million USD  
38  GEDP  Gross external debt position, million USD 
39  GDP_VOL_2005  Real GDP, 2005 = 100% 
40  FD_CB_ST  Short-term external debt of commercial banks, million $. 
USD  
41  FD_GG_ST  Short-term external debt of the government million. USD  
42  FD_MA_ST  Short-term external debt of the central bank mln. USD 
43  FD_OS_ST  Short-term external debt of other sectors million. USD  
44  GDP_DEFL_2005  GDP deflator, base by 2005, %  
45  IMPORT_UNT_PRICES  Unit price of imports, USD  
46  GNI  Gross national income, mln. national currency 
47  GNDI  Gross national disposable income, mln. national currency 
48  GDP_VOL_2000  GDP in prices of 2000, million national currency  
49  FD_FC  External debt in foreign currency, million USD  
50  FD_DC  External debt in local currency, million. USD  
51  FD_FC_LT  Long-term external debt in foreign currency, million USD  
52  FD_FC_ST  Short-term external debt in foreign currency, million. USD  
53  FD_DC_LT  Long-term external debt in local currency, million. USD  
54  FD_DC_ST  Short-term external debt in local currency, million. USD  
55  GOLD_IMF  Stocks of gold, acc.  to IMF  
56  WIG20  WIG20, period average  
57  WIG20EP  WIG20, end of period  
58  FTSE100  FTSE100  
59  GOLD_LOND  The price of gold in London.  
60  GOLD_SDR_OUNC  The price of gold, SDRs per ounce  
61  AMEX  AMEX  
62  NASDAQ  NASDAQ  
63  SP_IND  S & P industrials  
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64  USD_SDR  rate USD / SDR  
65  GOLD_MARKET  The market price of gold  
66  GOLD_SDR  Collect gold, SDRs  
67  LIBOR  LIBOR  
68  RTS  RTS  
69  MICEX  MICEX  
 
Table 2. List of countries in the final sample for analysis  
Number  Name Country  Number  Name Country  Number  Name Country  
1  Hungary  21  Germany  41  Romania  
2  KoreaRepublicof  22  RussianFederation  42  Norway  
3  Colombia  23  Ukraine  43  Slovenia  
4  Turkey  24  Iceland  44  Austria  
5  Chile  25  Lithuania  45  Peru  
6  UnitedStates  26  Belarus  46  Italy  
7  SouthAfrica  27  Estonia  47  Spain  
8  Thailand  28  Argentina  48  France  
9  Sweden  29  Canada  49  Portugal  
10  Croatia  30  SlovakRepublic  50  Uruguay  
11  Denmark  31  Finland  51  Armenia  
12  CostaRica  32  Greece  52  Kazakhstan  
13  Brazil  33  Indonesia  53  Netherlands  
14  Bulgaria  34  Moldova  54  Australia  
15  CzechRepublic  35  Ireland  55  Philippines  
16  Malaysia  36  Belgium  56  KyrgyzRepublic  
17  Poland  37  Georgia  57  UnitedKingdom  
18  Switzerland  38  Bolivia  58  Paraguay  
19  Japan  39  Mexico  59  Mauritius  
20  Latvia  40  Israel  60  Egypt  
 61  Global   
 
 
Appendix 3  
Detailed comments on the Matlab application for calculating the exchange market 
pressure index based on precision weighting approach  
Matlab application is to calculate the index of exchange market pressure following 
general formula:  
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where ER -official or market exchange rate logER - the difference of logarithms of 
current and previous values of ER , log IR - the difference of logarithms of current and 
previous interest rate on loans, 
2
0
M
M
- approximation of money multiplier, 
_INTERN RESERVES - the volume of international reserves, in special drawing rights 
(SDR), 
1 1/2t tM ER  - approximation of money supply, expressed in dollars, for the 
preceding period. 
ER , IR , RES  -corresponding weights of index components that for the 
precision weighting approach are equal to unit divided by the standard deviation of each 
component.  
The calculation of the formula (1) is conducted in three successive steps.  
Step 1. At the first stage the individual components of (1) are computed, namely the 
variables  
2
0
log
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


 (2)  
are calculated with the following instruction sequence:  
d = new_slice_countries;  
p = d.md_eval (['MM = {d2: M2 {}}./{ d2: MBASE {}}' ...  
    'LOGER = log ({d2: ER {}})' ...  
    'LOGIR = log ({d2: LENDRATE {}})' ...  
    'RES_USD = {d2: INTERN_RESERVES {}}.*{ d2: USD_SDR, d1: Global {}}' ...  
    'M2 = {d2: M2 {}}' ...  
    'ER = {d2: ER {}}' ...  
], 'VARNAME', 'VARNAME');  
The result of consecutive commands is a calculated set of time series: LOGER - 
logarithm of nominal exchange rate, LOGIR - logarithm of nominal interest rate, 
RES_USD - international reserves in million USD, M2 - the money supply, mln. USD, 
ER - nominal exchange rate, national. curr. per USD.  
Step 2. In the second stage on the basis of values, calculated at the first stage, DER, 
DIR, DRES indices are calculated:  
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by the sequence of the following commands:  
r = p.md_eval (['DER = ({d2: LOGER {}}-{ d2: LOGER {-1}})' ...  
     'DIR = ({d2: LOGIR {}}-{ d2: LOGIR {-1}})' ...  
     'DRES = ({d2: MM {}}.*{ d2: RES_USD {}}-{ d2: MM {-1 }}.*{ d2: RES_USD {-1 
}})./({ d2: M2 { -1 }}./{ d2: ER {-1}}) ' ...  
], 'VARNAME', 'VARNAME');  
The result of consecutive commands is a set of time series that contain the components 
of the formula (1), namely DER - a difference of logarithms of nominal exchange rate, 
DIR - a difference of logarithms of nominal market interest rate, DRES - index changes 
in international reserves.  
Step 3. The stage of weighing and calculating the index of exchange market 
pressure.  
For the examined approach, namely the precision weighting, weights are defined as the 
inverse standard deviation of each of the components of the DER, DIR, DRES, and the 
EMP index is calculated according to the formula:  
DER DIR DRES
DER DIR DRES
EMP
  
    (4)  
by the following sequence of commands:  
k = r.md_eval (['EMP = {d2: DER {}}./ stdi ({d2: DER {}}, 1) +' ...  
    '{D2: DIR {}}./ stdi ({d2: DIR {}}, 1) - {d2: DRES {}}./ stdi ({d2: DRES 
{}}, 1)'], 'VARNAME' , 'VARNAME');  
Note that stdi function computes standard deviation, ignoring missing observations.  
Next, we remove the singleton dimension (as computational results contain only one 
indicator, EMP, and the need for indexing data by variable name disappears), bringing 
the results to the matrix Time-Country:  
k = squeeze (k.md_data);  
The result of command is the index of exchange market pressure (index EMP) based on 
precision weighting approach. 
 
Appendix 4  
   
Detailed comments on the Matlab application for calculating the exchange market 
pressure index based on equal weighting approach  
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Matlab application is to calculate the index of exchange market pressure following 
general formula: 
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where ER -official or market exchange rate logER - the difference of logarithms of 
current and previous values of ER , log IR - the difference of logarithms of current and 
previous interest rate on loans, 
2
0
M
M
- approximation of money multiplier, 
_INTERN RESERVES - the volume of international reserves, in special drawing rights 
(SDR), 
1 1/2t tM ER  - approximation of money supply, expressed in dollars, for the 
preceding period. ER , IR , RES  -corresponding weights of index components that for the 
precision weighting approach are equal to unit. 
The calculation of the formula (1) conducted in three successive phases.  
Step 1. At the first stage the individual components of (1) are computed, namely the 
variables  
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
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 (2)  
are calculated with the following instruction sequence:  
d = new_slice_countries;  
p = d.md_eval (['MM = {d2: M2 {}}./{ d2: MBASE {}}' ...  
    'LOGER = log ({d2: ER {}})' ...  
    'LOGIR = log ({d2: LENDRATE {}})' ...  
    'RES_USD = {d2: INTERN_RESERVES {}}.*{ d2: USD_SDR, d1: Global {}}' ...  
    'M2 = {d2: M2 {}}' ...  
    'ER = {d2: ER {}}' ...  
], 'VARNAME', 'VARNAME');  
The result of consecutive commands is a calculated set of time series: LOGER - 
logarithm of nominal exchange rate, LOGIR - logarithm of nominal interest rate, 
RES_USD - international reserves in million USD, M2 - the money supply, mln. USD, 
ER - nominal exchange rate, national. curr. per USD.  
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Step 2. In the second stage on the basis of values, calculated at the first stage, 
DER, DIR, DRES indices are calculated:  
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by the sequence of the following commands:  
r = p.md_eval (['DER = ({d2: LOGER {}}-{ d2: LOGER {-1}})' ...  
     'DIR = ({d2: LOGIR {}}-{ d2: LOGIR {-1}})' ...  
     'DRES = ({d2: MM {}}.*{ d2: RES_USD {}}-{ d2: MM {-1 }}.*{ d2: RES_USD {-1 
}})./({ d2: M2 { -1 }}./{ d2: ER {-1}}) ' ...  
], 'VARNAME', 'VARNAME');  
The result of consecutive commands is a set of time series that contain the components 
of the formula (1), namely DER - a difference of logarithms of nominal exchange rate, 
DIR - a difference of logarithms of nominal market interest rate, DRES - index changes 
in international reserves. 
Step 3. The stage of weighing and calculating the index of exchange market 
pressure.  
For the examined approach, namely the equal weighting, weights are defined as the 
inverse standard deviation of each of the components of the DER, DIR, DRES, and the 
EMP index is calculated according to the formula:  
DRESDIRDEREMP   (4)  
by the following command:  
ke = r.md_eval ('EMP = {d2: DER {}}+{ d2: DIR {}}-{ d2: DRES {}}', 'VARNAME', 
'VARNAME');  
Next, we remove the singleton dimension (as computational results contain only one 
indicator, EMP, and the need for indexing data by variable name disappears), bringing 
the results to the matrix Time-Country:  
ke = squeeze (ke.md_data);  
The result of consecutive commands is the index of exchange market pressure (index 
EMP), based on equal weighting approach.  
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Appendix 5  
Detailed description of the Matlab program ranking countries by the time of crisis 
occurrence and the construction of schedules-maps “periods and countries”, 
according to the EMP (calculated by precision and equal weighting methods) at 
different threshold values.  
5.1. Program in Matlab environment for   ranking countries by the onset time of the 
crisis according to the EMP index, calculated on the basis of precision weighting 
method and charting of the results is to implement the following steps:  
Step 1. Calculation of the EMP index deviation index from its average value over 
threshold.  
For a given threshold (e.g. EMPEMP  2,  etc.), we determine a fact of EMP deviating 
beyond its trust region using the command:  
detect_dev (matrix, nsigma),  
where the matrix - matrix of EMP values computed in time for the countries and nsigma 
- number of standard deviations (the threshold given).  
The result of this operation is the matrix in which 1 denotes depreciation pressure on the 
market, -1 - appreciation pressure, and 0 - absence of significant pressure according to 
the chosen threshold.  
Step 2. Sorting countries by the time of crisis onset.  
To ease the analysis of current crises in the countries, results are sorted by time of onset 
of the crisis, starting with the 3-rd quarter of 2007 (23-rd observation time series).  
Frstpositive function sorts the countries according to the time of onset of the 
depreciation pressure on the market.  
bins = detect_dev (k, 1);  
bins = bins (23: end,:);  
[sm si] = frstpositive (bins);  
countries_sorted = p.dimtags.COUNTRYNAME (si);  
The result of this operation and the list of countries ranked according to time of 
occurrence depreciation pressure on the market.  
Step 3. Calculating and plotting a “periods and countries” map for the countries 
having experienced a deep financial crisis (threshold: two standard deviation 
( EMP2  )).  
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Calculations for the graph and its plotting are made through the following sequence 
of commands:  
figure  
k2 = detect_dev (k, 2);  
imagesc (k2 (:, si) ')  
emp_prec_2std = k2 (:, si) ';  
set (gca, 'XTick', [1: length (r.ts_indices)])  
set (gca, 'XTickLabel', p.ts_indices)  
set (gca, 'FontSize', 6)  
set (gca, 'YTickLabel', countries_sorted)  
set (gca, 'YTick', [1: length (countries_sorted)])  
The result is a display of a graph in the form of map “countries and periods” for the 
threshold of two standard deviations ( EMP2 )).  
Step 4. Calculating and plotting a “periods and countries” map for the countries 
having experienced a deep financial crisis (threshold: two standard deviation 
( EMP )).  
Calculations for the graph and its plotting are made through the following sequence of 
commands:  
figure  
k3 = detect_dev (k, 1);  
imagesc (k3 (:, si) ')  
emp_prec_1std = k3 (:, si) ';  
set (gca, 'XTick', [1: length (r.ts_indices)])  
set (gca, 'XTickLabel', p.ts_indices)  
set (gca, 'FontSize', 6)  
set (gca, 'YTickLabel', countries_sorted)  
set (gca, 'YTick', [1: length (countries_sorted)])  
cs1 = countries_sorted;  
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The result is a display of a graph in the form of map “countries and periods” for the 
threshold of two standard deviations ( EMP )).  
5.2. Program in Matlab environment for   ranking countries by the onset time of the 
crisis according to the EMP index, calculated on the basis of equal weighting 
method and charting of the results is to implement the following steps:  
Step 1. Calculation of the EMP index deviation index from its average value over 
threshold.  
For a given threshold (e.g. EMPEMP  2,  etc.), we determine a fact of EMP deviating 
beyond its trust region using the command:  
detect_dev (matrix, nsigma),  
where the matrix - matrix of EMP values computed in time for the countries and nsigma 
- number of standard deviations (the threshold given).  
The result of this operation is the matrix in which 1 denotes depreciation pressure on the 
market, -1 - appreciation pressure, and 0 - absence of significant pressure according to 
the chosen threshold.  
Step 2. Sorting countries by the time of crisis onset.  
To ease the analysis of current crises in the countries, results are sorted by time of onset 
of the crisis, starting with the 3-rd quarter of 2007 (23-rd observation time series).  
Frstpositive function sorts the countries according to the time of onset of the 
depreciation pressure on the market.  
bins = detect_dev (ke, 1);  
bins = bins (23: end,:);  
[sm si] = frstpositive (bins);  
countries_sorted = p.dimtags.COUNTRYNAME (si);  
The result of this operation and the list of countries ranked according to time of 
occurrence depreciation pressure on the market.  
Step 3. Calculating and plotting a “periods and countries” map for the countries 
having experienced a deep financial crisis (threshold: two standard deviation 
( EMP2  )).  
Calculations for the graph and its plotting are made through the following sequence of 
commands:  
figure  
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ke2 = detect_dev (ke, 2);  
imagesc (ke2 (:, si) ')  
emp_prec_2std = ke2 (:, si) ';  
set (gca, 'XTick', [1: length (r.ts_indices)])  
set (gca, 'XTickLabel', p.ts_indices)  
set (gca, 'FontSize', 6)  
set (gca, 'YTickLabel', countries_sorted)  
set (gca, 'YTick', [1: length (countries_sorted)])  
The result is a display of a graph in the form of map “countries and periods” for the 
threshold of two standard deviations ( EMP2 )).  
Step 4. Calculating and plotting a “periods and countries” map for the countries 
having experienced a deep financial crisis (threshold: two standard deviation 
( EMP )).  
Calculations for the graph and its plotting are made through the following sequence of 
commands:  
figure  
ke3 = detect_dev (ke, 1);  
imagesc (ke3 (:, si) ')  
emp_prec_1std = ke3 (:, si) ';  
set (gca, 'XTick', [1: length (r.ts_indices)])  
set (gca, 'XTickLabel', p.ts_indices)  
set (gca, 'FontSize', 6)  
set (gca, 'YTickLabel', countries_sorted)  
set (gca, 'YTick', [1: length (countries_sorted)])  
cs2 = countries_sorted;  
The result is a display of a graph in the form of map “countries and periods” for the 
threshold of two standard deviations ( EMP )).   
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Appendix 6  
Description of the application in Matlab environment for calculating leading 
indicators of the crisis based on the initial variables’ values   
For the program, the working space of MATLAB interpreter should contain loaded 
MDData objects under the names md_data and new_slice_countries, that  provide 
information on the initial variables’ values and a list of countries selected for analysis.  
Step 0. Forming a list of countries that were selected for analysis is based on the 
sequence of commands:  
countr_crisis = {'Ukraine' 'KoreaRepublicof' 'RussianFederation' 'Moldova' 
'Armenia' 'Romania' 'Chile' 'CostaRica' 'Iceland' 'Georgia'} ';  
countr_nocrisis = {'Canada' 'Sweden' 'Croatia' 'Poland' 'Germany' 'Argentina' 
'SlovakRepublic' 'Norway' 'Kazakhstan' 'Australia'} ';  
countr_select = [countr_crisis; countr_nocrisis; {'Global'}];  
As a result of consecutive commands countr_select variable contains a list of countries 
severely affected and not affected by the crisis, based on which the average value of 
proactive indicators will be computed.  
Step 1. Extraction of the selected countries’ data.  
desc.timespan = 1: length (new_slice_countries.ts_indices);  
desc.dims = new_slice_countries.dimtags;  
desc.dims.COUNTRYNAME = countr_select;  
mainslice = md_data.get_slice (desc);  
It should be noted that the data are taken from the object md_data, which contains all the 
information collected as soon as the subset new_slice_countries does not contain the 
data on Global.  
The result of consecutive commands is creation of an object mainslice (of MDData 
type), containing a subset of the data have been analyzed for selected countries and 
indicators.  
Step 2. Calculating the basic elements of proactive crises indicators 
Some of the indicators of the crisis are not directly based on raw data, but calculated 
basedon some more complicated formulas. Therefore it is logical to calculate the 
indicators in two stages. In the first stage comprises estimation of variables that are the 
elements of leading indicators’ formulas. These include:  
comp_data = mainslice.md_eval (['RGDP_CHNG = {d2: GDP_VOL_CHNG {}}' ...  
Change in real GDP compared to the previous period  
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    'RGDP2005 = {d2: NGDP {}}./{ d2: GDP_DEFL_2005 {}}' ...  
Real GDP data based on nominal GDP and the deflator index with the base in 2005  
    'RGDP_CHNG2000 = {d2: GDP_VOL_2000 {}}-{ d2: GDP_VOL_2000 {-1}}' ...  
Change in real GDP calculated based on changes in GDP expressed 2000 prices  
    'DSPI = {d2: SPI {}}-{ d2: SPI {-1}}' ...  
Change of the stock market index  
    'FD_TOT = {d2: FD_GG {}}+{ d2: FD_MA {}}+{ d2: FD_CB {}}+{ d2: FD_OS {}}' 
...  
Total external debt of the country as the amount of external government debt, 
central bank, commercial banks and other sectors  
    'FD_TOT_ST = {d2: FD_GG_ST {}}+{ d2: FD_MA_ST {}}+{ d2: FD_CB_ST {}}+{ d2: 
FD_OS_ST {}}' ...  
Total short-term debt of the country as the sum of volumes of short-term 
external debt above the main categories of agents  
    'FD_STATE = {d2: FD_GG {}}+{ d2: FD_MA {}}' ...  
State debt, as the amount of debt the government and central bank  
    'GS_GDP = {d2: BOP_GS {}}./({ d2: NGDP {}}./{ d2: ER {}})' ...  
The ratio of trade balance in goods and services to GDP expressed in million  
USD  
    'CURACC_GDP = {d2: BOP_CURACC {}}./({ d2: NGDP {}}./{ d2: ER {}})' ...  
The ratio of current account balance to GDP expressed in mln. USD  
    'RES_GDP = ({d2: INTERN_RESERVES {}} .* {d2: USD_SDR, d1: Global {}}  
)./({ D2: NGDP {}}./{ d2: ER {}}) ' ...  
The ratio of international reserves denominated in mln. USD to GDP expressed in 
mln. USD  
    'RES_EXP = ({d2: INTERN_RESERVES {}} .* {d2: USD_SDR, d1: Global {}}  
). / {D2: EXPORT {}} ' ...  
The ratio of international reserves denominated in mln. USD to exports volume 
    'RES_IMP = ({d2: INTERN_RESERVES {}} .* {d2: USD_SDR, d1: Global {}}  
). / {D2: IMPORT {}} ' ...  
The ratio of international reserves denominated in mln. USD  to imports volume  
   'TOT = {d2: EXPORT_UNT_PRICES {}}./{ d2: IMPORT_UNT_PRICES {}}' ...  
Terms of trade as the ratio of average export unit price to the average unit 
price of imports  
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    'EXPI = 100 .* {d2: EXPORT {}}./{ d2: EXPORT {-1}} -100' ...  
Growth of exports, the percentage  
    'IMPI = 100 .* {d2: IMPORT {}}./{ d2: IMPORT {-1}} -100' ...  
Growth of imports, the percentage  
    'REERI = {d2: REER {}}-{ d2: REER {-1}}' ...  
REER change compared to previous month  
    'DLIBOR = {d1: Global d2: LIBOR {}}-{ d1: Global d2: LIBOR {-1}}' ...  
Change in LIBOR as an indicator of foreign lending rate compared to previous 
month  
    'LIBOR = {d2: LIBOR, d1: Global {}}' ...  
LIBOR index as an indicator of the foreign lending rate  
    'DRATES = {d2: LIBOR, d1: Global {}}-{ d2: LENDRATE {}}' ...  
The difference between foreign and domestic lending rates  
    'DOM_CREDIT_GDP = {d2: LOANS {}}./{ d2: NGDP {}}' ...  
The size of loans to GDP ratio 
    'DOM_CREDIT_CHNG = 100 .* {d2: LOANS {}}./{ d2: LOANS {-1}} -100' ...  
Growth rates of domestic loans volume, as a percentage  
    'MM = {d2: M2 {}}./{ d2: MBASE {}}' ...  
Money multiplier  
    'RDEPRATE = (100 + {d2: DEPRATE {}})./( 100 + {d2: CPI_CHNG {}})- 1' ...  
Real deposit rate based on the nominal rate and CPI  
    'RLENDRATE = (100 + {d2: LENDRATE {}})./( 100 + {d2: CPI_CHNG {}})- 1' ...  
The real loans rate based on the nominal rate and CPI  
    'DEPOSITS = {d2: DEP_TRANS {}}+{ d2: DEP_OTH {}}+{ d2: DEP_EXCL {}}' ...  
The volume of deposits as the sum of the relevant articles of standard reporting 
forms  
    'CPI_CHNG = {d2: CPI_CHNG {}}' ...  
CPI Change  
    'DM2 = 100 .* {d2: M2 {}}./{ d2: M2 {-1}} -100' ...  
Money growth rate in percent  
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    'M2_RES = {d2: M2 {}}./({ d2: INTERN_RESERVES {}} .* {d2: USD_SDR, d1: 
Global {}}  
.* {D2: ER {}}) ' ...  
The ratio of money supply to international reserves, expressed in national 
currency  
    'ER = {d2: ER {}}' ...  
Nominal exchange rate (official or market, depending on the mode of exchange 
rates in the country)  
    'NGDP = {d2: NGDP {}}' ...  
Nominal GDP  
    'NEER = {d2: NEER {}}' ...  
NEER  
    'GFCF = {d2: GFCF {}}' ...  
Gross fixed capital formation (investment)  
    'LOANS = {d2: LOANS {}}' ...  
The volume of loans to the economy  
    'CONS_TOTAL = {d2: CONS_GOV {}}+{ d2: CONS_H {}}' ...  
The volume of domestic consumption as the sum of public and private consumption  
    'GVT_CLAIMS = {d2: GVT_CLAIMS {}}' ...  
The claims of the central bank to the government  
    'GEDP = {d2: GEDP {}}' ...  
Gross external debt position  
    'EXPORT = {d2: EXPORT {}}' ...  
Exports in mln. USD  
    'IMPORT = {d2: IMPORT {}}' ...  
Imports in mln. USD  
], 'VARNAME', 'VARNAME');  
Note that all code described is a one MATLAB command, so there should be no 
comments between the individual indices in order for the code to be executed.  
As a result of the command object comp_data is created, which contains the calculated 
variables of the "first stage" for the selected countries.  
Step 3. The final calculation of proactive crises indicators  
 181 
comp_data = comp_data.md_eval (['RGDP_CHNG = {d2: RGDP_CHNG {}}' ...  
Change in real GDP compared to the previous period  
    'RGDP2005_CHNG = 100 .* {d2: RGDP2005 {}}./{ d2: RGDP2005 {-1}}' ...  
Real GDP index calculated based on the nominal GDP  and deflator index with the 
base in 2005 over the previous period  
    'RGDP_CHNG2000 = {d2: RGDP_CHNG2000 {}}' ...  
Change in real GDP was calculated based on changes in GDP in 2000 prices  
    'DSPI = {d2: DSPI {}}' ...  
Change of the stock market index  
    'NGDP = {d2: NGDP {}}' ...  
Nominal GDP  
    'FD_TOT_GDP = ({d2: ER {}}.*{ d2: FD_TOT {}})./{ d2: NGDP {}}' ...  
The ratio of total external debt denominated in national currency to nominal GDP  
    'ST_DEBT_SHARE = {d2: FD_TOT_ST {}}./{ d2: FD_TOT {}}' ...  
The ratio of short-term external debt to total external debt  
    'FD_STATE_GDP = ({d2: ER {}}.*{ d2: FD_STATE {}})./{ d2: NGDP {}}' ...  
The ratio of foreign debt, expressed in national currency to nominal GDP  
    'FD_TOT = {d2: FD_TOT {}}' ...  
Total external debt of the country  
    'FD_EXP = 100 * {d2: FD_TOT {}}./{ d2: EXPORT {}}' ...  
The ratio of total external debt to exports  
    'FD_IMP = 100 * {d2: FD_TOT {}}./{ d2: IMPORT {}}' ...  
The ratio of total external debt to total imports  
    'GEDP = {d2: GEDP {}}' ...  
Gross external debt position  
    'FD_STATE = {d2: FD_STATE {}}' ...  
State debt  
    'GS_GDP = {d2: GS_GDP {}}' ...  
The ratio of trade balance in goods and services to GDP 
    'CURACC_GDP = {d2: CURACC_GDP {}}' ...  
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The ratio of current account balance to GDP  
    'RES_GDP = {d2: RES_GDP {}}' ...  
The ratio of international reserves to GDP  
    'RES_EXP = {d2: RES_EXP {}}' ...  
The ratio of international reserves to total exports  
    'RES_IMP = {d2: RES_IMP {}}' ...  
The ratio of international reserves to total imports  
    'TOT = {d2: TOT {}}' ...  
Terms of trade  
    'EXPI = {d2: EXPI {}}' ...  
Growth of exports, the percentage  
    'IMPI = {d2: IMPI {}}' ...  
Growth of imports, the percentage  
    'REERI = {d2: REERI {}}' ...  
REER change compared to previous month  
    'DEPOSITS = {d2: DEPOSITS {}}' ...  
The volume of deposits  
    'LOANS = {d2: LOANS {}}' ...  
The volume of loans to economy  
    'DLIBOR = {d2: DLIBOR {}}' ...  
Change in LIBOR as an expression of foreign lending rate  
    'LIBOR = {d2: LIBOR {}}' ...  
LIBOR index as an expression of the foreign lending rate  
    'DRATES = {d2: DRATES {}}' ...  
The difference between foreign and domestic lending rates  
    'DOM_CREDIT_GDP = {d2: DOM_CREDIT_GDP {}}' ...  
The size of loans to GDP  
    'DOM_CREDIT_CHNG = {d2: DOM_CREDIT_CHNG {}}' ...  
Growth rates of domestic loans, as a percentage  
    'MM = {d2: MM {}}' ...  
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Money multiplier  
    'RDEPRATE = {d2: RDEPRATE {}}' ...  
Real deposit rate  
    'RLENDRATE = {d2: RLENDRATE {}}' ...  
The real rate on loans  
    'RATE_MARGIN = {d2: RLENDRATE {}}-{ d2: RDEPRATE {}}' ...  
The difference between real loan and deposit rates  
    'DEBT_DEPOS = ({d2: ER {}}.*{ d2: FD_TOT {}})./{ d2: DEPOSITS {}}' ...  
The ratio of total external debt denominated in national currency to the amount 
of deposits  
    'LOANS_TO_DEPS = 100 .* ({d2: LOANS {}}./{ d2: DEPOSITS {}})' ...  
The ratio of loans to deposits, in percent  
    'CPI_CHNG = {d2: CPI_CHNG {}}' ...  
CPI Change  
    'DM2 = {d2: DM2 {}}' ...  
Money growth rate  
    'M2_RES = {d2: M2_RES {}}' ...  
The ratio of money supply to international reserves  
    'GVT_CLAIMS = {d2: GVT_CLAIMS {}}' ...  
The claims of the central bank to the government  
    'NEER = {d2: NEER {}}' ...  
NEER  
    'GFCF = 100 * {d2: GFCF {}}./{ d2: NGDP {}}' ...  
The ratio of gross investment to GDP, percent  
    'CONS_TOTAL = 100 * {d2: CONS_TOTAL {}}./{ d2: NGDP {}}' ...  
The ratio of gross consumption to GDP, percent  
], 'VARNAME', 'VARNAME');  
The result of this command is the object comp_data, which contains leading indicators 
calculated.  
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Appendix 7. Calibration of the model for optimal level o reserves calculation 
Using the values of parameters from the table 3.2, formulas (3.10), (3.11), 
(3.12) and (3.13), we can calculate recommended optimal level of reserves. 
If we do not take into account possible depreciation, then on the basis of (3.10) 
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for all variants. 
Taking into account depreciation and using (3.2.13): 
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for variant 2, 
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for variant 3. 
Using the formula (3.11) and the results of previous calculations we can 
receive the following results without depreciation: 
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for variant 2, 
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for variant 3. 
Taking into account depreciation, based on the formula (3.12) and using 
previous calculations: 
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for variant 3. 
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Appendix 8. Description of Hodrick-Prescott filter 
During 80s economists often used in their working papers the method of 
smoothing long-term macroeconomic series with the goal of eliminating from them 
short-term fluctuations. Formally this method was published in 1997 by Robert 
Hodrick and 2004 Nobel prize winner in Economics Eward Prescott and received the 
name Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
The idea of Hodrick-Prescott filter is to divide the variable, tY , on two 
components: long-term trend, TtY , and short-term fluctuations, 
C
tY : 
T C
t t tY Y Y  ,  (D.8.1) 
where TtY  can be found by solving the following optimization problem: 
 
 
Time
T
t
1
Time Time 1
T 2 T T T T 2
t t t 1 t t t 1
Y  t 1 t 2
min (Y Y ) λ (Y Y (Y Y ))
t

 
 
      ,  (D.8.2) 
where Time  is the sample size, λ  is the parameter, the values of which are 
recommended to be 100 for annual, 1600 – for quarterly and 14400 – for monthly 
data. 
 In Eviews the separation of long-term trend can be done with the menu element 
Proc/Hodrick-Prescott Filter. Short-term part can be found as difference of the 
values of the variable and separated long-term trend. 
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Appendix 9. Calculation of marginal effects for probit and logit 
Let set up once more LPM, probit and logit: 
  0 1 1 2 21|t t t t k kt tP y x x x x          ,  (D.9.1) 
 
2
0 1 1 2 2
2
1
1|
2
t t k kt tx x x z
t tP y x e dz
    

   


   ,  (D.9.2) 
   0 1 1 2 2
1
1|
1 t t k kt t
t t x x x
P y x
e
        
 

,  (D.9.3) 
where ty  is the dummy variable, which denote sudden stop,  itx  is the i-th explanatory 
variable,  i  is the i-th regression parameter,  t  is the regression residual. 
In order to determine the influence of explanatory variable ix  during the period 
t  on the probability of the sudden stop, we should calculate for each model 
 1|t t
it
P y x
x
 

. So for the LPM, probit and logit we will have respectively: 
 1|t t
i
it
P y x
x

 


,  (D.9.4) 
 1|
  
t t
it
P y x
заформулою Ньютона Лейбніца
x
 
  

 
   
 0 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 2
t t k kt t
t t k kt t i
it
F x x x F
f x x x
x
    
     
     
    

, 
 (D.9.5) 
     
  
0 1 1 2 2
0 1 1 2 2
0 1 1 2 2
2
1
1| 1
1
t t k kt t i
t t k kt t
t t k kt t
x x xx x x
t t
x x x
it it
P y x ee
x x e
         
    
        
    
    
  
 
    1| 1 1|t t t t iP y x P y x    ,  (D.9.6) 
So as we see from the equations (D.9.4), (D.9.5) and (D.9.6), marginal effect or 
the change in probability with the change of some explanatory variable is constant for 
LPM, but depends on the time period for models probit and logit. 
In EViews package the algorithm for marginal effects calculation consists of 
three steps: 
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1. At the beginning the prediction for 
tx β  should be generated: 
Proc/Forecast(Fitted Probability/ Index) and choose Index – where 
Prob=1-F(-Index).   
2. Then for the probit model  tf x β  shold be generated by inserting into the 
command line: series name = @dnorm(-
nsme_xb_from_the_previous_prediction). For the logit model to generate 
 1|t tP y x  name = @dlogistic(-name_xb_fomr_the_previous_prediction) 
should be used. 
3. Multiply the results from step 2 by corresponding partial coefficients. 
 
Appendix 10. Optimal level of reserves calculation based on the models Probit 1 
and Probit 2 
At the beginning based on the models Probit 1 and Probit 2, which are given by 
the formulas (3.18) and (3.19) and by the tables of coefficients (3.4) and (3.5), we 
calculate the probability of the sudden stop for each year. The results of calculations 
are shown in the table D.10.1. 
Table D.10.1. Probability of the sudden stop. 
Year Probit 1 Probit 2 
1998 0.65 0.83 
1999 0.88 0.81 
2000 0.11 0.28 
2001 0.01 0.04 
2002 0.00 0.11 
2003 0.40 0.01 
2004 0.78 0.03 
2005 0.02 0.10 
2006 0.08 0.20 
2007 0.44 0.19 
2008 0.28 0.28 
2009 0.49 0.24 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
Using the values of the parameters from the table 3.2 (all except from the 
probability of the sudden stop, π), formulas (3.12) and (3.13), and identity 
x    ,   (D.10.1) 
 190 
We can calculate recommended optimal reserves level. 
 The algorithm is completely analogous to the described in the Appendix 9., 
only in the formulas (D.10.1) and (3.13) instead of  we should use the values of the 
parameters from the table D.10.2, and into the formula (3.13) instead of  the value 
from (D.4.1). Then the results received from the formulas (D.10.1) and (3.13) we can 
substitute into the formula (3.12). Such calculations should be conducted for each 
model and for each year. 
 Final and intermediate results are shown in the table D.10.2. 
Table D.10.2. Optimal level of reserves calculation. 
Year 
Probit 1 Probit 2 
Probabili
ty of the 
sudden 
stop 
Gross 
risk 
premium 
The price 
of 1 unit 
of 
currency 
during 
non-
crises 
period 
relative 
to the 
price of 
one unit 
of 
currency 
during 
the 
sudden 
stop with 
depreciat
ion 
Ratio of 
reserves 
to GDP 
with 
depreciat
ion 
Probabili
ty of the 
sudden 
stop 
Gross 
risk 
premium 
The price 
of 1 unit 
of 
currency 
during 
non-
crises 
period 
relative 
to the 
price of 
one unit 
of 
currency 
during 
the 
sudden 
stop with 
depreciat
ion 
Ratio of 
reserves 
to GDP 
with 
depreciat
ion 
1998 0.65 0.66 1.48 0.34 0.83 0.84 1.42 0.34 
1999 0.88 0.90 1.36 0.33 0.81 0.82 1.43 0.34 
2000 0.11 0.13 1.37 0.27 0.28 0.29 1.47 0.30 
2001 0.01 0.03 0.64 0.02 0.04 0.06 1.15 0.20 
2002 0.00 0.02 - - 0.11 0.12 1.36 0.26 
2003 0.40 0.41 1.49 0.32 0.01 0.03 0.74 0.06 
2004 0.78 0.80 1.45 0.34 0.03 0.05 1.07 0.17 
2005 0.02 0.04 0.91 0.12 0.10 0.12 1.36 0.26 
2006 0.08 0.10 1.31 0.25 0.20 0.22 1.45 0.29 
2007 0.44 0.45 1.49 0.32 0.19 0.21 1.44 0.29 
2008 0.28 0.30 1.47 0.30 0.28 0.30 1.47 0.30 
2009 0.49 0.51 1.49 0.33 0.24 0.26 1.46 0.30 
Source: NBU data, own calculations. 
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